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SOMMARIO  
La presente Tesi di Dottorato esamina il livello di sicurezza dei reattori di potenza 
raffreddati ad acqua bollente e moderati a grafite (reattori RBMK), mediante l’uso di 
codici di calcolo best-estimate termoidraulici e neutronici accoppiati. La 
disponibilità di tali sofisticati strumenti ha reso possibili, infatti, analisi dettagliate e 
realistiche anche per questo tipo di impianti nucleari, notoriamente complessi e 
comunemente denominati “reattori di tipo Chernobyl” (in riferimento al gravissimo 
incidente occorso ad uno di questi impianti nel 1986). Parte delle attività della 
presente Tesi di Dottorato, si sono svolte nell’ambito del Progetto TACIS R2.03/97 
“Software development for the RBMK and WWER reactors”, coordinato dal Gruppo 
di Ricerca Nucleare San Piero a Grado dell’Università di Pisa in collaborazione con 
i progettisti e gli esercenti russi di tali impianti (NIKIET, Kurchatov Institute, 
RosEnergoAtom, oggi EnergoAtom Concern OJSC). 
 
Le attività di ricerca hanno contemplato lo sviluppo di una complessa 
nodalizzazione termoidraulica dell’unità 3 dell’impianto nucleare di Smolensk, la 
sua validazione ed il suo successivo accoppiamento con un modello di cinetica 
neutronica tridimensionale. Il codice utilizzato è il RELAP5-3D. I calcoli di 
neutronica hanno richiesto, preliminarmente, lo sviluppo di librerie di sezioni d’urto 
macroscopiche. Tale attività, è stata svolta in collaborazione con la Pennsylvania 
State University, ed ha comportato l’utilizzo del codice di trasporto deterministico 
HELIOS.  
 
Dopo la validazione dei modelli sviluppatii, si sono eseguite analisi di transitori a 
piena potenza, focalizzandosi su quelli particolarmente critici per la sicurezza (per 
esempio, la rottura di un collettore dei canali di potenza o del sistema di 
raffreddamento delle barre di controllo). Una speciale enfasi è stata data, anche 
mediante l’uso del codice Montecarlo MCNP5, allo studio del transitorio 
contemplante il bloccaggio di un canale di potenza.  
 
L’ultima parte delle attività di dottorato si sono concentrate sull’analisi di un 
transitorio a bassa potenza, ricostruendo uno scenario incidentale estremo come 
quello occorso a Chernobyl. Le sezioni d’urto di cella per lo Xeno sono state 
calcolate con il codice al trasporto deterministico DRAGON.   
 
In conclusione, le analisi avanzate effettuate nell’ambito di questa Tesi di 
Dottorato, hanno confermato il migliorato grado di sicurezza di tali impianti, 
ottenuto grazie alle importanti modifiche effettuate a seguito dell’incidente di 
Chernobyl.  
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ABSTRACT  
This PhD thesis is evaluating the safety level of the graphite-moderated boiling 
water cooled nuclear power reactors (RBMK reactors) by the use of best estimate 
three dimensional neutron kinetics coupled thermal-hydraulics codes. The 
availability of such sophisticated tools has allowed detailed and realistic analyses 
of these kind of reactors, also known as “Chernobyl-type” reactors. Chernobyl is 
the name of a RBMK reactor where, in 1986, a severe accident occurred, leading 
to the destruction of the plant and to a major release of radioactivity into the 
environment. Parts of the activities of this PhD thesis were developed in the 
framework of the European Union funded TACIS Project R2.03/97 “Software 
development for the RBMK and WWER reactors”. This project was awarded to the 
“Gruppo di Ricerca Nucleare San Piero a Grado” of the University of Pisa and 
managed by it in collaboration with the RBMK designers (NIKIET, Kurchatov 
Insititute) and the licensee (RosEnergoAtom, now EnergoAtom Concern OJSC). 
 
The research activities dealt with the development and the validation of a 
sophisticated thermal-hydraulic nodalization of the Smolensk-3 Nuclear Power 
Plant. This thermal-hydraulic model was then coupled with a three dimensional 
neutron kinetics model of the core. The code used was RELAP5-3D system code. 
Suitable RBMK cross sections libraries were developed in collaboration with the 
Pennsylvania State University, using the deterministic lattice physics code 
HELIOS. 
 
After the validation of the developed models, the most relevant transients for the 
plant safety at full power were calculated, e.g. the group distribution header 
rupture, the break of the control and protection system cooling circuit. A special 
emphasis was put in the simulation of the single fuel channel transient, using also 
the Monte Carlo code MCNP5.  
 
The last part of the PhD activities concerned the analysis of a low power transient. 
In particular, the Chernobyl extreme scenario was reconstructed. Xenon fuel cell 
cross sections were calculated using the deterministic transport code DRAGON. 
 
Finally, all the analyses performed in the framework of this PhD confirmed the 
upgraded level of nuclear safety of the RBMK reactors, obtained also as a 
consequence of the relevant hardware modifications implemented in the aftermath 
of  the Chernobyl accident. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. State of the Art on the RBMK Safety Analyses 
The Russian designed Water-Cooled Graphite-Moderated reactors RBMK were the 
subjected to an extensive campaign of studies, researches and upgrades in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster (26 April 1986).   
 
In particular, immediate actions focused on plant modifications, and concerned 
about a complete review of the neutronic design (e.g., increase of Uranium 
enrichment, insertion of Additional Absorber (AA)), hardware modification (e.g., 
modification of Control Rods (CR) design, improvement of the core electronic 
calculator) and plant operating procedures [1], [2].  
 
After the Soviet Union collapse (26 December 1991) and during the whole ‘90s, the 
European Commission (EC) and the United States Department of Energy (US-
DOE) financed a series of international projects (e.g., the TACIS Projects from the 
European side), in collaboration with Russian Institutions, for a further improvement 
of the safety of RBMK Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and for the uniformities of safety 
technology methods and understanding [3], [4], [5]. 
 
Objectives of these Projects were NPP hardware upgrading, personnel training, 
nuclear safety codes improvements, accident analyses and accident management 
procedures development.  
 
The TACIS project R2.03/97 “Software Development for the WWER and RBMK 
reactors”, managed by the Gruppo di Ricerca Nucleare San Piero a Grado 
(GRNSPG) of the University of Pisa (UNIPI) during 2005 and 2006, concerned the 
nuclear safety codes improvements and the accident management procedures 
developement. An important part of the work for this PhD thesis was developed in 
the framework of this Project, in collaboration with Russian RBMK designers 
(NIKIET), researchers (Russian Research Center “Kurchatov Institute”) and 
licensee (RosEnergoAtom, Russian nuclear electric utility, now Energoatom 
Concern OJSC). 
 
At the beginning of the present PhD thesis (January 2005), RBMK systems were 
thoroughly analyzed by a series of mainly thermal-hydraulic or stand-alone 
neutronic codes, e.g. [87], [88], [89]. Coupled codes analyses were also executed 
by few leading Western Institutions (e.g., Idaho National Laboratory, USA, or GRS, 
Germany, see [98], [99], [100]) and by Lithuanian Institutions (e.g., Lithuanian 
Energy Institute (LEI), see [26], [77], [78]).  
 
Chernobyl-type events were anymore simulated and most of the analyses found in 
the literature, were executed in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, with 
simplified (for the today’s standards) numerical tools (see section 6.3). 
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1.2. Scope  
The safety of nuclear power plants, understood as its capability to keep the 
radiation exposure of personal and population within specified limits, is ensured by 
maintaining the integrity of safety barriers, which are part of the plant defence in 
depth concept. A series of barriers prevents the release of radioactive fission 
products from their source beyond the reactor containment and into the 
environment. In analyzing the NPP safety, it is essential to assess the integrity of 
these barriers and to decide to what degree the response of the whole NPP and its 
systems to a certain initiating event is acceptable from the viewpoint of the plant 
safety. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the integrity of the safety barriers is 
related to certain threshold values, which are referred to as acceptance criteria. 
Essentially these are the design limits for design basis accidents (DBA), adopted 
with a conservative margin so that the safety barrier integrity is guaranteed as long 
as the parameters do not exceed the relevant criteria. 
 
Safety analysis for an RBMK NPP should assess the integrity of the following 
barriers in the path of radioactivity transport and release: 
• Fuel matrix. 
• Fuel cladding. 
• Circulation circuit pressure boundary and, in particular, the components 
most susceptible to damage, namely fuel channel (pressure) tubes. 
• Metal structures forming the reactor cavity. 
• Structural components of the leak-tight Accident Localization System (ALS) 
compartments and other buildings of the NPP housing circulation circuit 
pipelines. 
 
Should any safety barrier fail, thus opening the pathway for the release of 
radioactivity beyond the plant boundaries, the amount of radioactivity and the 
population exposure should be assessed. Beyond design basis accidents (BDBA) 
are analyzed for the following purposes: 
 
a) To assess the degree of reactor protection and the time available for taking 
countermeasures. 
b) To determine the emergency and other signals available to the operator for 
identifying the plant status and to devise appropriate accident management 
steps. 
c) To develop a package of organizational and technical measures 
(management strategy) for prevention and mitigation of the accident 
consequences. 
d) To assess the possible consequences of the BDBA as input information for 
planning protection of the population and personnel. 
 
According to the requirements of the Russian nuclear regulatory authority 
RosTechnadzor (Russian Federal Ecological, Technological and Nuclear 
Inspectorate, the former Gosatomnadzor (GAN)), both deterministic and 
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probabilistic approaches for BDBA analysis should be used. According to 
requirements OPB-88/97: 
 
• The estimated probability of an event with large release should be 
less than 10-7 within one reactor year. 
• The estimated probability of severe reactor core degradation or 
melting should be less than 10-5 within one reactor year. 
 
However, if some initiating events can lead to severe consequences and the inside 
features of reactor are not able to prevent this, accident mitigation means should 
be foreseen without drawing the attention to the probability of these events. 
 
The deterministic approach for analysis BDBA is therefore also very important. 
According to the Russian nuclear regulatory authority RosTechnadzor the 
deterministic approach should be based on the method of postulating accidental 
conditions. This method is based on determination of connections between the 
plant conditions, level of severity of accident consequences (how many physical 
barriers are violated: fuel assembly including fuel pellet and fuel cladding, pressure 
tube, reactor cavity, main circulation circuit, accident localization system) and 
availability of critical safety functions. 
 
Thus, according to requirements OPB-88/97 of the Russian nuclear regulatory 
authority RosTechnadzor, a list of BDBA scenarios for further detailed 
investigations should be developed. The analysis results will be the basis for the 
development of the accident management program for RBMK reactors. 
 
1.3. Objectives  
The key objective and the key products of the present PhD Thesis are: 
1) the development of a set of advanced Best-Estimate (BE) computational 
models (i.e, codes input-decks) for the safety analyses of the RBMK, 
focusing on the core behavior;  
2) the execution of safety analyses, investigating a broad spectrum of 
accidents, comprehensive of both DBA and BDBA 
 
1.4. Structure 
The road-map of the PhD activities is outlined in the Chapter 4 and hereafter the 
structure of this document is presented. Eight main chapters (including this one) 
constitute the PhD thesis report. The contents and the reasons for each main 
chapter are outlined in the following. 
 
1) Chapter 2. This chapter deals with the description of the RBMK system 
focusing on the safety features. The description essentially duplicates 
information available in the literature. However, the self-standing nature of 
the PhD thesis report and the need to avoid repeating NPP data in the 
other chapters suggested the consideration of this chapter. Some basic 
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considerations about the neutronics characteristics were derived during the 
PhD activities and are reported here. 
2) Chapter 3. The status of RBMK safety technology and the related needs 
are discussed in this chapter. The outcomes contributed to finalizing the 
research and development activities. Namely, accident scenarios were 
selected whose expected phenomena are envisaged to encompass the 
relevant RBMK safety technology areas for the core. The list of transients 
by itself constitutes a result from the PhD Thesis. 
3) Chapter 4. This Chapter deals with the presentation of the chain of codes 
used and the methodologies for codes application. A short description of 
codes used is also given. Then, the description of the developed codes 
input decks and their qualification according to GRNSPG/UNIPI criteria are 
reported.  
4) Chapter 5. This Chapter reports the results for some Hot Full Power (HFP) 
realistic transient analyses. Calculations results for CR and CR group 
withdrawal, Group Distribution Header (GDH) Loss of Coolant Accident 
(LOCA) and GDH Blockage, Control and Protection System (CPS) LOCA 
and Fuel Channel (FC) blockage accident are given. Results were 
obtained mainly by the use of 3D Neutron Kinetics (NK) coupled thermal-
hydraulics (TH) system code RELAP5-3D©. In the case of the FC 
Blockage scenario, calculations were supported by the use of Monte Carlo 
MCNP5 code. 
5) Chapter 6. The Chapter deals with the results of the accident analyses 
performed at low power conditions, in order to simulate a “Chernobyl-type” 
event (Loss of Main Circulation Pumps (MCP) at low power with Xenon 
poisoned reactor). Calculations were performed using RELAP5-3D 3D NK 
TH code. DRAGON lattice physics code was used in order to derive Xenon 
cell nuclear Cross Sections (XSecs). 
6) Chapter 7. The Chapter reports the list of the main results achieved during 
the execution of the PhD activities. 
7) References. The list of documents mentioned in the main body of this 
report is given.  
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2. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE RBMK 
Twelve RBMK units are installed in Russia and Lithuania, [6]. In the case of Russia 
the RBMK contribute for about 50% of the electricity generated by the nuclear 
source. Information of general validity for the RBMK systems is provided below. 
However, specific information is related to the reference reactor for the PhD 
activities, i.e. Smolensk 3 NPP. This is a “3rd generation RBMK reactor” 
constructed in the Russian Federation about 400 Km Southwest of Moscow. The 
unit 3 was put into operation on January 17, 1990. Relevant information for the 
chapter is derived from refs. [7] and [9], the last one dealing with the Ignalina NPP. 
Additional details about RBMK generations can be found in section 3.2.1.5.  
 
An overall sketch of the RBMK NPP can be seen in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 and key 
system data are given in Tab. 1. Information is provided hereafter about system 
hardware relevant for safety technology. 
 
 
1) Core
2) Water pipe
3) Reactor bottom plate
4) Group Distribution Header
5) Shield
6) Steam Drum
7) Steam Water Pipe
8) Reactor top plate
9) Refuelling machine
10) Reactor lid structure
11) Top reactor channel
12) Downcomers
13) Pressure Header
14) Suction header
15) Main Coolant Pump
 
Fig. 1 – Overall view of the RBMK NPP system 
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Fig. 2 – Smolensk-3 NPP view 
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Tab. 1 – Key parameters of the Smolensk-3 RBMK-1000  
Key-parameters of core 
Total Left Part Right Part Power, MWth 
3213 1629 1583 
Flow rate Kg/s 10118 5158 5104 
Number of FC 1568 794 774 
Number FC with AA 90 45 45 
Fuel Channel parameters 
Full length, mm 18325 
Number of channels 1660 
Upper part diameter, mm and thickness, mm 95x5 
Middle part diameter, mm and thickness, mm  88x4 
Lower part diameter, mm and thickness, mm 60x5.5 
Fuel rod overall length, m 3.46 
Active core length, m 6.92 
Spacer/support grids 20 per FC 
Key dimensions of the down-comers 
Diameter, mm and thickness, mm 325 x 15 
Average length, m  29.15 
Total volume, m3 47.7 
Key dimensions of the Steam Header 
Diameter, mm and thickness, mm 1020x60 
Length, mm  21 080 
Volume  m3 17.3 
Volume cylindrical part, m3 13.4 
Key MCP thermal-hydraulic parameters (at 265 oC) 
Q, m3/h (Kg/s) 8000±200 (2.22) 
Head, m 200±20 
P inlet, bars 70.5 
Power, MW 4.3±0.3 
Speed, rpm 1000 
Torque, N-m 39400 
Key-parameters of Group Distribution Header 
Diameter, mm and thickness, mm 325x15 
Length, mm 5400 
Design pressure, bar 100 
Design flow, t/h 1700  
Total volume of GDH, m3 16.5 
Key-parameters of steam lines 
Diameter, mm and thickness, mm 76x4  
Average length, m 32 
Design flow, t/h 40 
Design pressure, bar 75 
Key-parameters of Drum Separators 
Number per reactor 4 
DS length, m 30.98 
DS internal diameter, m 2.6 
DS volume, m3 150.2  
Operation pressure, bar 68.9 
Design pressure, bar 73.5 
Nominal water level (above the central axis) mm  380±50 
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2.1. The Primary System 
2.1.1. The pressure boundary 
The MCC consists of two loops, whose components are arranged symmetrically 
with respect to the vertical axis of the reactor. Each loop has two separator drums 
(1) (number in parenthesis refers to legend of Fig. 3, which separate the steam 
from the steam-water mixture exiting from the core block. The separator drums are 
horizontal cylindrical vessels interconnected both at the lower liquid level and at the 
upper steam level.  
1-separator drum, 2-downcomers, 3-suction header, 4-suction piping of the MCP, 
5-MCP, 6-pressure piping of the MCP, 7-bypass between headers, 8-pressure 
header, 9-group distribution header with flow limiter, check valve and mixer, 10-
water bottom piping, 11-fuel channel before the core, 12-fuel channel within the 
core, 13-fuel channel above the core, 14-steam water pipes, 15-steam pipelines.
  
2 
3
1
4 
9
5 6
8
7
10
11 
12 
13 
14
15
From 
ECCS 
 
 
Fig. 3 – RBMK Main Circulation Circuit (MCC) flow diagram 
In the bottom section of each separator drum (SD) a feed-water header is installed 
which provides through special mixers feed-water to the down-comer pipes. The 
separated water mixed with the feed-water reaches the suction header (3) through 
24 down-comer pipes per each loop (2). The flow path continues through four 
suction pipes (4) connected to the four Main Circulation pumps (MCP). During 
normal reactor operation, only three pumps are operating in each loop, the fourth is 
a reserve. They are single stage vertical and centrifugal type. 
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From the MCP, water flows through pressure header pipes (6) to the pressure 
header, PH, (8). The suction and pressure headers are connected by bypass lines 
(7), provided with a gate and a check valve. The bypass ensures that natural 
circulation of the coolant takes place in case of main circulation pumps shut-off.  
From the pressure header (8) water continues through twenty two pipes to twenty 
two group distribution headers (GDH) (9). Mechanical filters are provided inside the 
pressure header while at GDH exit there are a flow limiter, a check valve and a 
mixer to which ECCS are connected. 
 
Each GDH is connected to liquid pipes (10) leading to an average of forty-five fuel 
channels (12). The flow in each pipe, and therefore in each fuel channel (12), is set 
by isolation and control valves and is measured by a ball flow-meter. The steam-
water mixture generated in the fuel channel flows through the steam-water pipes 
(14) to the separator drums (1).  
 
The elevations for the most important components of the MCC are presented 
schematically in Fig. 4. The total, top-to-bottom elevation of the primary system is 
over 30 m. The elevation driving the natural circulation loop, measured from the 
bottom of the core to the bottom of the separator drums, is ~ 21m. These large 
elevation heads determine the flow parameters of the system under natural 
circulation conditions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 –  Key elevations in the MCC of the RBMK system (Smolensk 3) 
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From the separator drums the generated steam is directed to the turbines. 
Discharge steam from the turbines is accumulated in condensers, from there the 
condensate flows down through filters, heaters and deaerators to the main feed 
water pump and is finally returned to the separator drums. 
 
The purification and the cooling of the primary cooling circuit water is performed by 
the Purification and Cooling System (PCS) which is an equivalent of the Chemical 
and Volume Control System (CVCS) in Western LWR. Part of the water is taken 
from the MCC, cooled down and filtered by a mechanical filter and by an ion-
exchanger in the purification bypass. The treated water then joins the feed-water 
flow. The reactor also contains a number of channels for control rods and metering 
devices. These are cooled by a separate circulation system, which is called the 
Control Rod Cooling Circuit (CRCC). 
 
The twelve down-comer pipes direct the water from the separator drums to the 
suction header, thus each of the two circulation loops contains twenty-four down-
comers. The geometrical dimensions of each down-comer are given in Tab. 1. The 
suction headers collect water from the down-comers and supply coolant to four 
suction pipes in such a way a mixing of the water from the drum separator occurs. 
The geometrical dimensions of the suction headers are also given in Tab. 1. 
 
For the forced circulation of cooling water through the RBMK reactor type CVN-8 
(‘wet stator’ type) MCP are employed, Fig. 5. The CVN-8 type is centrifugal, 
vertical, single-stage pump with a sealed shaft. Four pumps are installed per each 
loop, three of them are normally in operation, and the fourth is kept as a reserve. 
The basic parameter of the pump at nominal conditions are reported in Tab. 1 and 
the pump curves for hot and cold water are given in Fig. 6, left and right sides, 
respectively. 
 
Fig. 5 – The MCP for RBMK NPP. 
1-service platform, 2- 
flywheel, 3- electric motor, 
4- junction coupling, 5- 
support of electric motor, 
6- foundation frame, 7- 
tank of the pump, 8- water 
outlet, 9- water inlet 
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Fig. 6 – RBMK MCP (CVN-8) performance data (left: high temperature conditions, 
265 ºC;  right: low temperature conditions, 90 °C) 
 
The main function of each PH is to collect the water that comes from the pressure 
pipes connected to all main pumps exit and supply the coolant to the twenty-two 
GDH through twenty-two pipes. The pressure header has 1040 mm outside 
diameter and 70 mm thick walls. 
 
The coolant is distributed to individual GDH by means of twenty-two pipes 325x15 
mm. Each pipe has a manual control gate valve, a check valve and a mixer to mix 
(in case of accident) the cold water from the Emergency Core Cooling System 
(ECCS) and the hot water from the MCC. The check valve prevents back-flow from 
the fuel channels in case of failure of the pressure header. Mixers protect the MCC 
from thermal or hydraulic shocks. Flanges designed to prevent pipe whip in the 
event of a pressure surge are fixed to the structural beams of the plant and to a 
special framework 
 
The coolant is supplied to the individual fuel channels via group distribution header, 
Fig. 2.6 which are horizontal cylinders, Tab. 3.1 The GDH are securely fastened to 
support structures to prevent any sliding in case of failure. Each header distributes 
coolant to 40-43 bottom water pipes. These pipes are provided with isolation and 
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control valves between the GDH outlet and the fuel channel inlet. Isolation and 
control valves are used to adjust channel flow on the basis of channel power. Flow 
rates can be controlled by varying the flow-area of the valves. This is achieved by 
manual operation from a separate room in the vicinity of the reactor block. The 
bottom water pipes leading into the reactor block drive the water into the fuel 
channels that remove the heat generated in the fuel assemblies. The liquid water 
starts to boil and the steam-water mixture flows from the top of the fuel channels by 
way of individual steam - water pipe to the separator drums. The exiting steam-
water pipes include several bends. This aids in reducing gamma streaming. 
 
 
1 – isolation and control valve, 2 – ball type flow-rate
meter, 3 – coolant water pipe leading to the fuel
channel, 4 – group distribution header
 
Fig. 7 – Geometrical configuration of RBMK GDH 
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a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 8 – Geometrical configuration of RBMK SD:  a) overall view; b) cross section 
 
The separator drum has the following functions: 
• separation of steam from the steam-water mixture flowing from the fuel 
channels,  
• mixing of the separated water with feed-water, 
• storing of coolant for the MCC.  
 
The steam water mixture arrives at the separator drum, through inlet pipes (9), (see 
Fig. 9 for numbering). A part of the steam is separated in the distribution 
compartments because the flow looses its kinetic energy in impact to the special 
plates (3).  
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Fig. 9 – Steam Drum – Component Specifications 
This steam then penetrates the submerged perforated sheet (4) and the 
“barbotage” layer above it. Final separation occurs because of gravity force.  
The separated steam goes through the perforations of the upper shields (5) into 
the steam-flow piping, the separated liquid flows downward from pipes at the 
bottom (13). The feed-water line has a nominal diameter of 500 mm (10). It enters 
into the separator drum at a 45 degree angle, and extends to a distribution header 
in the lower part of the drum. The feed-water is injected from the header (6) (7) to 
the down-comer (13) via jet spray nozzle in order to cool the water to be supplied 
to the MCP. Both the steam and liquid containing regions of the two separator 
drums are connected by number of pipes. The non uniform generation of power in 
fuel channels can lead to a non homogeneous steam-water distribution in the 
steam drum. This requires design features which serve to reduce both transverse 
and longitudinal variations of the steam content. This is accomplished by a 
submerged perforated sheet (4) with a 150 mm thick downward frame. A down-flow 
passages is provided between the frame and the drum wall for the part of the 
water, which penetrates the perforations together with steam. The down flow 
passages functions as a hydraulic lock against any penetrations of steam at the 
side of the perforated sheet. The sink is covered by safety plates spaced at 75 mm 
from the frame. Traverse and circumferential variations of pressure at the entrance 
of the steam pipes are reduced by a similar perforated shield in the upper part of 
the drum (5) and by inside diameter bushing installed in the steam outlet pipes.  
 
The two separator drums within each loop are interconnected both in the liquid and 
steam region, Fig. 10. There are five connecting (300x15) mm pipes in the steam 
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zone and four pipes (300x15) mm in the water zone. The total length of the pipes is 
19.8m in the water zone and 16.2m in the steam zone. These connections ensure 
that equal water levels and steam pressures are maintained in both drums.  
 
Fig. 10 – Layout of the two DS and related connection 
 
2.1.2. The core  
2.1.2.1. The fuel 
The RBMK core is mounted in a graphite stack with a lattice of vertical channels 
loaded by fuel assemblies, additional absorbers and regulators. A ring of periphery 
channels forms a radial reflector. Top and bottom reflectors are core-wide and are 
0.5 m width each one. The graphite stack is enclosed in a space, named reactor 
cavity, formed by lower and upper metal constructions and ringed by a steel 
cylindrical structure, see section 2.2.1. The graphite stack of the RBMK-1000 
reactors serves several functions. The primary one is the neutron moderation and 
reflection, but it also provides structural integrity and in the event of a temporary 
cooling malfunction, a relatively large heat capacity. A general view of the core 
region and of a portion of the graphite stack are given in Fig. 11. More details in 
Tab. 1. 
 
The FC together with the fuel rod is reported in Fig. 12. A key feature for the RBMK 
is the FC housed by graphite blocks. The core contains 1570 fuelled channels 
separated from its nearest neighbors by the wall of the pressure tube and graphite 
blocks. Each pressure tube has considerable autonomy. For example the coolant 
flow rate of each tube is controlled online by an individual isolation and control 
valve. In such a way any pressure tube can be isolated from the rest of the primary 
cooling system while the reactor remains under operation. This peculiarity makes 
possible to change fuel clusters online and also has a significant impact on the 
potential consequences of loss-of-coolant accidents.  
 
A fuel assembly consists of an upper and a lower fuel bundle, symmetrically placed 
around the core middle plane. Each section is formed by 18 active rods and a 
central steel rod that ensures structural rigidity together with 11 spacer grids 
equally distributed along the section. Each fuel rod has a zirconium alloy clad that 
recovers the fuel pins, see Fig. 12. The top, centre and bottom segments of a 
typical reactor fuel channel are shown schematically in Fig. 13. The central 
1 – separator drums, 2 – 
connecting pipes at the 
water level, 3 – connecting 
pipes at the steam level, 4 – 
submerged perforated sheet 
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segment usually called Pressure Tube (PT) is made of a zirconium-niobium alloy 
(Zr+2.5% Nb). The top (3) and bottom (11) segments are stainless steel. The 
choice of zirconium-niobium for the centre part was made because of the relatively 
low thermal neutron absorption cross section of the material and its adequate 
mechanical and anticorrosive properties at high temperature (up to 350 oC). 
 
1 – top ring, 
2 – diaphragm,
3 – bottom ring,
4 – bushing,
5 – steel support
plates,
6 – graphite rods,
7 – shield plates,
8 – standpipe,
9 – guide pipe,
10 – reinforcing tube  
(reflector cooling),
11 – outer steel shell,
12 – ring plate
 
Fig. 11 – Geometrical configuration of RBMK core: a) detail of active region; b) 
overall view 
The interaction of fast neutrons can lead to dimensional changes in various 
materials. For example, in graphite moderated reactors, initial accumulation of the 
fast neutron dose produces a gradual shrinkage of the graphite blocks. For the 
RBMK reactors this results in a decrease of the bore diameter through which the 
fuel channel passes. For the pressure tube made of a Zr+2.5% alloy, the effect is 
opposite, due to thermal and irradiation effects the tube diameter increases. As a 
result, the gap between the pressure tube and the graphite, which has a nominal 
thickness of 1.5 mm is gradually diminished leading to an eventual closure of the 
gap itself. 
 
Referring to the Smolensk 3 plant data, [7], the reactor core is composed by 2488 
graphite columns, of which 1570 are fuel channel columns and 314 are non-fuel 
channels columns. The non-fuel channel columns are subdivided as follows: 211 
Control and Protection System (CPS) channels, 12 ADC, 90 AAC and 1 water 
column. In addition, 604 are Radial Reflector Channels (RRC). The reference 
height for FC is 8.0 m, however the core active region is 7.0 m and the graphite top 
and bottom reflector have 0.3 m width. 
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1 – suspension bracket, 2 – top plug, 3 –
adapter, 4 – connecting rod, 
5 – fuel element, 6 – carrier rod, 7 – end 
sleeve, 8 – end cap, 9 – retaining nut.
 
                               a)      b) 
 
Fig. 12 – Geometrical configuration of a) RBMK fuel bundle, b) fuel rod 
1 – steel biological shield 
plug, 2,10 – top and bottom 
metal structures, 
respectively, 3 – top part of 
the fuel channel, 4 –
welding-support ledge, 5 –
fuel assembly support 
bracket, 6 – encasement 
cylinder, 7 – seal plug, 8 –
graphite cylinder, 9 –
central part of the channel, 
11 – bottom part of the 
channel, 12 – thermal 
expansion bellows 
compensator, 13 – stuffing 
box
 
Fig. 13 – Geometrical and material configuration of RBMK FC 
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2.1.2.2. The Absorbers and the Power Control System 
AAC are located symmetrically around core midline. 90 AAC are placed inside the 
core in order to increase the Operative Reactivity Margin (ORM). Regular AAC and 
cluster AAC (two FC) shall be distinguished that have the configuration (cross 
section) depicted in Fig. 14. Namely the cluster-type additional absorber consists of 
two bundles, where inner displacer is surrounded by 18 small-size, stainless-steel 
tubes, 2 tubes are empty while 16 tubes are filled with boron carbide (density 1678 
Kg/m3). The height of the column is 3.50 m and the distance between boron 
columns of two bundles in the middle of the core is 0.044m. The displacer is a tube 
with a graphite block inside. 
 
 
   a) regular 
 
 
 
 b) cluster 
 
Fig. 14 – Geometrical and material configuration of regular and cluster type AAC of 
RBMK core 
Control rods are inserted in special channels of the CPS that is hydraulically 
independent from the fuel channel system. The CPS can be kept in operation in 
case of emergency when the FC fail. There are three types of control rods: a) 32 
short CR (SHR), b) 24 safety or fast scram CR (SR), c) 155 manual CR (MCR). 
SHR move upward from the bottom when inserted, all others move downward from 
the core top. A sketch of the three CR types is given in Fig. 15 and a cross section 
(for regular CR) in Fig. 16. 
1 – support tube, 2 – absorbing 
sleeves, 3 – channel tube 
 
1 – graphite displacer, 2 – 
support tube, 3 – absorbing pins, 
 4 – empty tube, 5 – channel 
tube 
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a) Short CR    b) Safety CR  
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    c) Manual CR 
  
Fig. 15 – Longitudinal view of RBMK CRs (Short, Safety and Manual types) 
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Fig. 16 – Cross sectional view of RBMK regular CR 
Control rods are placed in an independent cooling loop, as already mentioned, with 
its own pumps and heat carrier (see Fig. 17).  
 
 
Fig. 17 – Flow diagram of the CPS cooling system 
 
The piping of Control Rod Cooling Circuit (CRCC) cools the channels of the CPS 
rods, fission chambers, Power Density Distribution Monitoring System (PDDMS) 
1 – top storage tank 
circulation tank; 2 – 
Circulation pump (CPS-P); 3 
– Emergency tanks; 4 – 
Distribution header; 5 – CPS 
channel, 6 Reflector cooling 
channel , 7 – Scram channel, 
8 – CPS discharge collector, 
9 – CPS heat exchanger, 10 
– Supporting device, 11 – 
CPS-P bypass with valves 
for  flow-rate regulation, 12 – 
channel (train) for insertion 
of nitrogen in the scram 
channel, 13 – line for de-
aeration, 14 – excess water 
sink overflow pipe, 15 – 
mechanical filter, 16 – 
Distribution header, 17 – 
purification bypass, 18 – 
Reflector cooling channel 
distribution header. 
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sensor and Radial Reflector Cooling Channels (RRCC). The coolant must be 
distributed in the circuit to ensure that proper temperature fields prevail in the 
channels of the control meters and of the graphite moderator. The cooling in this 
circuit is gravity driven, see Fig. 17.  The cooling circuit includes: a) 211 CPS 
channels containing rods and safety instrumentation, b) 12 channels containing the 
in-core Power Density Sensors of the Axial Monitoring (PDMS-A), c) 604 channels 
of RRCC. 
 
2.1.2.3. The scram signals 
Several modes of scram operation are possible for the Smolensk-3 NPP and are 
summarized in Tab. 2. The BAZ mode is initiated from both neutronic signals 
(excess power and reduced period), two process trips (increase of pressure in 
selected rooms and increase of reactor cavity pressure) and by manual action. The 
more normal shutdown mode of AZ-1 is initiated by 16 process parameters and by 
failure of more than 3 local protection zones to reduce power satisfactorily. The 
other modes are initiated by a variety of upset conditions (see [8] for more info).  
 
Tab. 2 – CPS Modes of Operation 
Name Rods Used / Insertion Times Conditions Power reduction 
BAZ 24 SR + All CRs <2.5s       12-14 s 5 initiating signals 
Operating power to 
zero 
AZ-1 24 SR + All CRs 7s       12-14 s 17 initiating signals 
Operating power to 
zero 
AZ-3 
LAC CR 
0.4 m/s insertion 
0.2 M/s withdrawal 
3 initiating signals 
power deviation 
<1% (LAR) 
power deviation 
<5% (LAP) 
From 100% to 50 % 
at 2%/s 
AZ-4 LAC CRs 6 initiating signals From 100% to 60% at 1%/s 
AZ-5  NOT USED  
AZ-6 LAC CRs Local Protection 1 initiating signal 
Operates until LAP 
signal disappears 
(up to 50% power) 
 
The following should be noted concerning the CPS CR grouping: 
• 24 SR belong to the fast active scram system (FASS) 
• 9 MCR are automatically moved for controlling the local power (LAR) 
• 32 ShR (inserted from the bottom) 
• 146 MCR including 18 CR of the Local Automatic Protection (LAP) 
• 27 rods are provided for the local automatic control (LAC) which consists of 
18 LAP CR and 9 LAR CR (LAC= LAP + LAR) 
• 4 of the peripheral LARs are used for automatic control of the power level 
under 10% of nominal power.  
 
This information gives an idea of the complexity of the power control for RBMK 
system. 
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2.1.2.4. The fuel cell neutronic characteristics 
Several considerations on the RBMK lattice design can help in obtaining the core 
neutronics characteristics. The use of graphite as moderator gives the opportunity 
to use natural or (in the case of RBMK) slightly enriched uranium as fuel thanks to 
its low Capture Cross Section (Sc = 2.4*10-4 cm-1). On the other hand, the weaker 
slowing down power of graphite (ξSs of C is 400 smaller than ξSs of H2O) implies a 
greater neutron thermalization length, resulting in the use of large lattice pitch (25 
cm for the RBMK). The relevant neutronics characteristics of the graphite, 
compared to the light and heavy water are given in Tab. 3. 
Tab. 3 – Comparison between diffusion parameters of Graphite, Light Water and 
Heavy Water 
Moderator Density (g/cm3) 
D  
(cm) ξSs ξSs/Sa 
Sa  
(cm-1) 
L 
(cm) 
tth
1/2 
(cm) 
M  
(cm) 
Graphite 1.6 0.84 0.06 175 2.4*10-4 59 19 62 
D2O 1.1 0.87 0.18 6670 2.9*10-5 170 11.4 170 
H2O 1.0 0.16 1.5 70 2.9*10-2 2.9 5.1 5.8 
 
Therefore, for the graphite, the mean-squared distance that a neutron travels from 
birth as fast fission until the “death” by capture as a thermal neutron is: 
1734006)(6 222 =≡+= MLr thτ cm2, 
resulting in an average distance of =r 416 cm.  
Hence, considering the reactor lattice main parameters, diffusion parameters can 
be recalculated obtaining representative values for the whole reactor core. In Tab. 
4, the diffusion parameters for RBMK and LWR cores are given. 
Tab. 4 – Comparison of diffusion parameters for RBMK and LWRs 
Reactor L (cm) tth1/2 (cm) M (cm) Diameter (L) Diameter (M) 
RBMK 14.1 14.4 20.2 100 69 
BWR 2.2 7.1 7.3 180 50 
PWR 1.8 6.3 6.6 190 56 
 
From Tab. 4, it is clearly evident the reasons of the greater geometrical dimensions 
of RBMK reactors compared with those of LWR of comparable thermal power. 
Neutronic characteristics have some immediate consequences in the MCC 
hardware design (e.g., no such large reactor pressure vessel can be constructed) 
and in the containment feature (e.g., no full pressure containment). The safety 
considerations about these issues are reported later in this document.  
 
Coming back to the RBMK neutron cell characteristics, other relevant neutronics 
parameters can be easily calculated considering the elementary fuel element (FA 
and graphite) reproduced in Fig. 18. 
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Fig. 18 – Fuel Cell basic model  
Monte Carlo analyses of the Fuel Cell (see section 4.5.5 of this report), showed the 
following interesting characteristics reported in Tab. 5. 
 
Tab. 5 – Neutronic characteristics of a RBMK fuel cell 
 
Neutronic characteristics of a RBMK fuel cell 
 
Percentages of fissions 
caused by neutrons for 
various energy ranges 
thermal range (E<0.625 eV): 91.67% 
intermediate range (0.625 eV< E < 100 KeV): 5.39% 
fast range (E>100 KeV): 2.94% 
Average number of 
neutrons produced per 
fissions (n) 
2.44 
Average fission neutrons 
produced per neutron 
absorbed in the fuel (η) 
1.57 
Energy corresponding to 
the average neutron 
lethargy causing fission 
0.0933 eV 
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Monte Carlo calculations shows also the distribution of the thermal, fast and total 
flux into the fuel cell, see Fig. 19, Fig. 20 and Fig. 21.  
 
 
Fig. 19 – Thermal neutron flux distribution 
It is clear in Fig. 19 the neutron thermalization and accumulation in the graphite 
brick. In Fig. 20 it is instead clear the born of the fast neutrons into the fuel rods 
and their loss of energy into the zone of graphite close to the pressure tube.  
 
 
Fig. 20 – Fast neutron flux 
Total flux distribution is showed in the Fig. 21. The accumulation of the neutron flux 
in the graphite is also here very clear.  
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Fig. 21 – Neutron flux distribution 
Tab. 6 is finally summarizing the fuel performance and the core power density, 
comparing it with those of a 900 MWe BWR. 
Tab. 6 – Comparison between BWR and RBMK core parameters 
Reactor  
Type 
Thermal 
Power 
(MW) 
Power Density 
(KW/l) 
FA 
Average 
Linear 
Power 
(KW/m)  
FA 
Maximum 
Linear 
Power 
(KW/m) 
Maximum 
Burnup 
(GWd/tonHM) 
RBMK 
(Smolensk-
3) 
3159 
2.9 
(56 considering 
only the coolant 
volume) 
14.8 31 22 
 
BWR-6 
 
2894 56 19.8 44 ~54 
 
2.1.2.5. Reactivity Control 
The dynamic analysis of large and strongly heterogeneous cores like those of the 
RBMK reactors is quite complex. In the following sections, the most relevant 
peculiarities and parameters affecting RBMK neutron kinetics are reported and 
discussed. 
 
2.1.2.5.1. Fuel Cell Overmoderation 
 
RBMK fuel cell neutronic design is based on a slightly over-moderated lattice. This 
is clearly evident in the Fig. 22, where the kinf versus the ratio of the moderator are 
on fuel area is given. The kinf values were obtained performing Monte Carlo 
 
 
 
 27 
MCNP5 calculations for a RBMK and for a BWR typical fuel cell, changing the pitch 
of the lattice. 
 
Operating conditions of the BWR are in the under-moderated zone while the RBMK 
are slightly in the over-moderated zone. This over-moderation has, as a 
consequence, that a lack of water in the RBMK FCs is causing an increase of 
reactivity, with all the obvious consequences for the reactor control and safety. 
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Fig. 22 – kinf versus moderation ratio of Moderator area on Fuel area 
The last generation of RBMK reactor, the Kursk-5 NPP (currently under 
construction), is addressing this issue, using a new design for the fuel cell graphite 
brick that removes the overmoderation [2]. 
 
2.1.2.5.2. The Operating Reactivity Margin 
All reactors require an ORM in order to provide reactivity control as fuel burnup 
increases and to allow power maneuvering. In most reactors this reactivity reserve 
is provided by either CRs or by soluble or burnable poison (e.g., boron in the 
moderator or Gadolium in the fuel pins). In the case of power reduction, sufficient 
ORM is also required in order to compensate the loss of reactivity caused by the 
Xenon build up. 
In the case of channel reactors with on-power fuelling (like the CANDU or the 
RBMK), a sufficient ORM is also necessary in order to provide with the CRs the 
suppression of power peaks in the vicinity of the newly fuelled channel. Removal of 
CRs can also provide reactivity for continued reactor operation in the event that the 
refuelling machine is unavailable. 
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Therefore the ORM has a multi purpose function and the choice of its magnitude 
during the reactor core design phase has an important consequence on the fuel 
burnup and consequently on the economy of the plant. 
 
In the RBMK the magnitude of the ORM has added safety significance. The 
presence of absorbers in the core reduces the relative importance of neutron 
absorption in the water in the FC. In the event of loss of that water during an 
accident, the reactivity addition is smaller than would be the case with no in-core 
absorbers. Thus the CRs used to provide the ORM, in conjunction with the 
permanent in-core absorbers (the AAs) added to RBMK cores since the Chernobyl 
accident, reduce the magnitude of the void reactivity effect. The upper magnitude 
of the ORM, while specified as an operating limit, has safety implications in that 
enough CRs must remain available out-of-core to provide the appropriate sub-
criticality margin to ensure the reactor can be shut down for the most reactive core 
configuration possible.  
 
Consideration of the above effects has resulted in an ORM of between 43 and 48 
rods for Smolensk-3 [8]. A lower safety limit of 30 rods has been established so 
that the shutdown system can overcome the positive void effect. Summarizing, the 
four main reasons for being within these two bounding limits are: 
• reactor dynamics are improved by reducing the reactivity void coefficient 
(in conjunction with the added fixed AA); 
• there must be enough CRs in the core to control the radial and axial power 
distribution; 
• there must be sufficient reactivity holdup within the inserted rods to 
compensate for Xenon buildup during power maneuvering; 
• the upper limit is required to ensure there is enough negative reactivity 
available to provide guaranteed cold shutdown, in most reactive core 
condition, upon insertion of all CRs. 
 
If the ORM margin drops below 30 rods, the operator must manually scram the 
reactor. 
 
2.1.2.5.3. The Reactivity Coefficients 
Measurement of reactivity coefficients is a complex task for RBMK reactors. They 
strongly depend by the particular reactor conditions (e.g., average fuel burnup, CR 
positions, number of AAs, etc.) and some of them (e.g., the core total voiding 
coefficient) can never be practically measured. Therefore, some of the values given 
in Tab. 7 were derived from a posteriori calculations or simply extrapolated by 
small perturbations operated at the plant. They should be considered as 
representative (especially the void coefficient) of the Smolensk-3 configuration 
during the ‘90s.  
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Tab. 7 – Typical Reactivity coefficient for the Smolensk-3 NPP [8]. 
Reactivity Coefficient Value (pcm) Notes 
Power (aw) -0.23/MWth  
Doppler (at) -1.2/°C  
Coolant Temperature 
(acool)  ~0 /°C  
Graphite Temperature 
(at) 4-5/°C Measured at cold conditions 
Void (aφ) 1.65/%  
or +0.3 β±0.2 β for full core 
voiding (assuming β = 0.0055) 
±0.2 β is the allowed 
systematic and statistical error  
 
The most important parameter monitored and controlled in regard ot neutronic 
effects is generally the void reactivity coefficient. As a result of the safety 
modifications made at Smolensk 3 following the Chernobyl accident, the void 
reactivity coefficient with an ORM of between 43 to 48 rods at HFP SS conditions, 
with 97 AAs, is maintained at a value < 0.3 β.  
 
The void coefficient is an integral reactor parameter and it is generally done the 
assumption that it remains constant throughout the whole range of void fraction. In 
order to calculate the void reactivity effect this constant value is used assuming 
total core voiding (0 to 100%). This explains why the total core voiding and the void 
coefficient are both quoted frequently with the same value. 
 
2.1.3. The Balance of Plant  
An overall sketch of the RBMK BOP can be found in Fig. 23. Separated steam 
flows from each of the 14 SD outlet nozzles, passes through 300 mm nominal 
diameter pipes with 198 mm diameter flow restrictors to two 400 mm nominal 
diameter steam headers situated parallel to the drum separator axis. Connections 
to each header are from alternate nozzles along the separator length to provide 
uniform steam extraction from the separators and uniform steam supply to each 
header.  For each reactor half, outlet pipes from the midpoints of each of the four 
steam headers are connected in pairs, one steam header from each drum 
separator, to form 600 mm nominal diameter main steam lines, as shown in Fig. 
24. 
 
The 600 mm nominal diameter main steam lines downstream of the drum 
separator are each fitted with four 250 mm internal diameter branch connections, 
pairs of which lead to main safety valves. 
 
The four main steam lines therefore provide a total of 8 main safety valves, two per 
line. These eight main safety valves each open and close at one of three pressure 
set-points, two opening at 7.45 MPa and closing at 7.15 MPa, four opening at 7.55 
MPa and closing at 7.25 MPa and two opening at 7.64 MPa and closing at 7.35 
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MPa, relieving steam through discharge pipes with hydrolocks into the pressure 
suppression pool. 
 
Downstream the branch connections to the main safety valves, two of the 600 mm 
diameter main steam lines, from different halves of the reactor, are linked by a pipe 
of 300 mm nominal diameter, Fig. 25. This link is provided to promote uniformity of 
steam flow and pressure between the main steam lines from the reactor halves.  
 
Additional smoothing of the steam pressure and flow is provided by the leveling 
header of, where all four main steam lines are interconnected through flow limiters. 
In this area, branch connections are made to four pressure reducing turbine bypass 
valves (BRU-K) each with capacity of 725 t/h which relieve excess steam to the 
turbine condenser during steam pressure transients, to avoid unnecessary opening 
of the main safety valves.  
 
The opening set points of the BRU-K valves is 7.1 MPa, with an opening/closing 
time of 10 s, but once open are operated in a controlled mode to reduce drum 
separator pressure back to 6.86 MPa.  
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1 – reactor; 2 – fuel channel; 3 – feeding pipelines; 4 – steam-water pipelines; 5 – DS; 6 – DC; 7 – MCP suction 
header; 8 –MCP; 9 – bypass; 10 – MCP header; 11 – mechanical filter; 12 – flow limiter; 13 – GDH; 14 – control-
throttling valve; 15 – mixer; 16 – feed-water valves; 17 – steam header; 18 – ГПК; 19 - BRU-K; 20 – SCV; 21 –
turbo generator; 22 – condenser; 23 – condensate pumps; 24 – condensate polishing; 25 – heater; 26 –
deaerator; 27 – AFWP; 28 – FWP; 29 – make up regenerator; 30 – cool down pump; 31 – make up cool down; 
32 – bypass clearing; 33 – bubbler; 34 – water tank  
Fig. 23 – Flow diagram of the BOP system of the RBMK core 
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Fig. 24 – Flow diagram of SL from the SD region till the MSVs 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 25 – Flow diagram of RBMK SL from the MSIV till the turbines 
 
When the load of either turbine is rejected, a signal to open both BRU-K valves 
associated with that turbine is generated by the AZ-3 signal, which reduces reactor 
power to 50%. This signal anticipates a subsequent pressure increase and 
controlled flow through the valves maintains the drum separator pressure close to 
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the nominal value. The same logic is used for load rejection by both turbines or a 
single operating turbine through the AZ-1 scram signal.  
 
Branch connections are also provided to six pressure reducing valves (BRU-SN) 
with a capacity of 100 t/h each, supplying steam to the unit auxiliaries. These 
valves are used during depressurization and cool down to bleed steam through the 
technological condenser, cooled by service water, to maintain the deaerator level 
for use by the emergency feed-water pumps.  
 
Downstream of the BRU-K and BRU-SN branch connections, the four 600 mm 
nominal diameters are routed in pairs to each turbine, each dividing into two of 400 
mm nominal diameter. The 400 mm diameter pipes are each fitted with two turbine 
isolation valves. Of these, the upstream valve is closed for maintenance purposes 
only and the downstream valve is the main stream isolation and control valve 
during plant operation.  
 
Pairs of main steam isolation and control valves are bypassed by linking pipes, 
each ling fitted a slide valve and control valve. This bypass line is intended for pre-
operational testing and all bypass valves are closed during power operation. 
Downstream of the main steam isolation valves two turbines are connected. The 
exhaust steam is condensed, passes through the deaerators, the pre-heaters and 
finally it is pumped by the feed-water pump into the SD. 
 
2.2. The Confinement System 
The RBMK confinement constitutes a very complex system. The following main 
subsystems can be distinguished which contribute to mitigate or preventing 
possible radioactivity releases from the MCC, Fig. 26 and Fig. 27: a) the reactor 
cavity, b) the ALS, c) the reactor building, d) the fuel loading and unloading 
machine hall, e) the turbine hall.  
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Fig. 26 – Sketch of the confinement system of the RBMK NPP with main sub-
systems (numbers refer to components identified in Fig. 3.1, where applicable) 
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The RC is connected to the ALS through the pool suited for lowering the pressure 
in case of  accident inside the RC itself. The RC is connected to the environment 
via valves that open in case of high pressure where high pressure is such to have 
the potential of lifting the upper core plate. After opening these valves do not close.  
The RC can be connected with the hall of the fuel loading and unloading machine 
only in case of lifting of the upper core plate. 
 
The ALS is connected with the RC and the environment. This last connection 
occurs through valves that open at assigned pressure set-points.  The ALS allows 
the characterization of the break location and the retention of the FP in case of 
mass and energy releases from the MCC. The connection via energized flow line 
(SL) between ALS, RB and Turbine Hall is depicted by a dotted line in Fig. 27. The 
zone of the fuel loading and un-loading machine is connected to environment by a 
bare line to show that there is not pressure boundary between this zone and the 
environment. 
 
The RB and the Turbine Hall are characterized in Fig. 27 by bare lines connections 
with the environment for the same reason as above (no pressure boundary 
separation between each of these and the environment). However high energy flow 
lines or components are located in these regions as depicted by red dotted line in 
Fig. 26. 
 
Fig. 27 – Cross sectional view of the RBMK confinement system 
 
 
 
 34 
 
2.2.1. The Reactor Cavity 
The cavity is a metal structure made up of a lateral cylindrical shroud a top and a 
bottom metal structures, Fig. 28. The lateral shroud is fitted with a lenticular 
compensator to compensate for longitudinal heat expansion. The pipes that are 
connected with the reactor cavity (e.g. fuel channels integrity monitoring system) 
are also defined as part of the reactor cavity, up to the first isolation valve.  
 
The core with its graphite stack are enclosed into the reactor cavity that has a free 
volume of about 750 m3. All the penetrations through the top (named E) and 
bottom (named OR) metal structures (e.g. pressure tubes) are welded and sealed. 
To avoid overpressure of the cavity in case of accident a set tubes are located at 
the top and bottom of the cavity to drain water and/or steam to the Pressure 
Suppression Pool. 
 
Fig. 28 – Longitudinal view of the RC of a RBMK NPP 
 A He-N mixture (coming from the pressure tube integrity monitoring system) 
continuously flows in the reactor cavity (flow ranging from 200 to 400 m3/h at 
normal conditions). Maximum gas flow is 900 m3/h.  
 
The gas circuit system, Fig. 29, has the function to extract the gases from the 
reactor cavity which are product from the steam-graphite reaction or from leaking 
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pressure tubes and to lead them through different technical devices for their 
drainage and purification.  
 
In order to avoid leaks of the gases, all the volumes surrounding reactor cavity (e.g. 
between the shroud and the lateral water shield) are filled with pure Nitrogen at 
higher pressure (2-5 KPa gauge), part of which flows into the reactor cavity. The 
residual flow of about 10-20 m3/h of nitrogen coming from the outer structure is 
finally discharged to the high stack after having passed through filters for Iodine, 
delay tanks and particulate filters.  
 
 
Fig. 29 – Gas removal system of the RC of a RBMK NPP 
The pressure tube (fuel channel) integrity monitoring system is designed to 
continuously monitor temperature and humidity around each fuel channel. In 
addition, during plant outages, ultrasonic, visual and geometry measurements 
checks are performed on the pressure tubes. 
 
2.2.2. The Accident Localization System 
The Accident Localization System (ALS) is designed to avoid environment 
contamination as a consequence of a LOCA in the Main Circulation Circuit (MCC). 
The ALS is a seal space including the lower part of the down-comers from the 
Steam Drum (SD), the inlet and the outlet headers of the Main Coolant Pumps 
(MCP) and all the piping system downstream the MCP up to the cavity inlet. The 
ALS does not cover some relevant parts of the plant as SD, feed-water system and 
steam lines. 
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Another relevant function of the ALS is to make possible to recognize the damage 
side of the core by the pressure increase in the different compartments constituting 
the ALS. The main compartments of the system are: 
• Leak-tight compartment (LTC): two compartments, one for each side of the 
core; these compartments include lower down-comers from the SD and the 
inlet header to the MCP. 
• Pressure suppression pool (PSP): this part of the ALS is subdivided in 
three parts connected together; the main function is condensating the 
steam discharged from the break in a LOCA 
• Steam corridor distribution (SDC): this part receive the steam released into 
the URC.  
• Under reactor compartments (URC): these compartments include the 
piping down stream the MCP up to the cavity inlet. 
 
LTC and SDC are connected with the PSP by discharge tubes in order to 
condensate the steam flowing from a break in the MCC covered by the ALS 
compartments. Other connections exists between the different compartments; 
these connections are constituted by valves and are designed to avoid any 
dangerous increase of the pressure inside a single compartment as a 
consequence of a large LOCA. 
 
Some systems capable to reduce the pressure inside the ALS are part of the ALS 
itself. The main systems are: 
• Sprinkler system: this system injects cold water in the pool water and in the 
atmosphere of the PSP. The system is composed two identical 
subsystems; each system includes pumps taking water from the pool, 
coolers and distribution headers injecting in the PSP. This system works in 
emergency conditions and in normal conditions to control the pressure and 
the temperature in the PSP compartment. 
• Surface coolers: they are located in the SDS and are actuated by ECCS 
intervention signal. 
• Ejector coolers: they are located in the LTC; these coolers are used to 
control pressure and temperature in the LTC. The ejectors coolers are also 
used in emergency conditions. 
• Hydrogen removal system: this system remove the hydrogen from the 
atmosphere of the ALS and provide a purification of the air of the ALS. This 
system works during normal operation; in emergency condition is isolate to 
realize the sealing of the ALS, but it can be put in to operation by the 
operator. 
 
The sketch of the ALS of Ignalina NPP is provided in Fig. 30, [10]. 
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1. fuel channel 2. main circulation pumps 3. MCP suction header 4. MCP 
pressure header 5. group distribution header 6. ECCS headers 7. hot 
condensate chamber (HCC) 8. CTCS pumps and heat exchangers 9. 
discharge pipes section 10. pipe from the steam relief valves 11. steam
gas mixture from the reactor cavity 12. condensing pools 13. steam
distribution headers 14. bottom steam reception chamber (BSRC) sprays. 
15. water seals/S traps between HCC and BSRC 16. BSRC vacuum
breakers 17. air removal corridor sprays 18. air venting channel 19. gas 
delay chamber tank 20. gas delay chamber 21. reinforced leaktight
compartments 22. Lower Water Piping compartments 23. steam relief
valves from LWP compartments to RLC 24. top steam reception chamber
25. tip up hatches 26. knock down hatches 27. main safety valve and fast 
acting steam discharge valve 28. drum separators 29. Bottom Steam
Reception Chamber 30. Reactor Cavity.  
Fig. 30 – Sketch of the Ignalina ALS 
 
2.2.3. The Reactor Building and the Turbine Hall 
The reactor building and the turbine hall bound high energy lines and pressurized 
components. As such they are possible location of piping break. No pressure 
resistant wall are provided. Therefore, steam water releases to the environment are 
predicted in case of break occurrence. This does not imply significant radioactivity 
release because significant part of possible FP releases can be trapped in these 
confinement zones.  
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2.2.4. The fuel loading machine hall 
 
The fuel loading machine hall is sketched in Fig. 1 (i.e. zone No. 9) and Fig. 2 (i.e., 
component No. 14). It has not a direct (or immediate) confinement role. However, 
in case of displacement of the top reactor plate, steam water mixture and FP from 
the reactor cavity may enter this zone. 
 
In addition, during the (frequent) process of fuel loading and un-loading, accidents 
may happen that cause releases of high pressure two-phase mixture and 
eventually FP in this zone. Refueling-events were not considered during this PhD 
activities. 
 
2.3. The Engineered Safety Features and the Emergency 
System 
The Engineered Safety Features (ESF) include all components relevant to safety 
(therefore ECCS are part of ESF). The ECCS are characterized by suitable quality 
in the design and maintenance and are mostly addressed in the section below.  
 
The pipes of ECCS trains, shown in Fig. 31, are 300 mm nominal diameter. Each 
of these terminated in ECCS headers, three per core region. From each header a 
pipe of 75 mm nominal leads through a 24.5 mm minimal diameter flow limiter and 
a check valve to each GDH. In addition a special connecting pipe of 75 mm 
nominal diameter is installed between the MCP pressure header and all the ECCS 
headers per each core side.  
 
Delivery of the cooling water to the ECCS trains is provided by three subsystems, 
each of which is divided into three trains, namely: a)  main (or short-term) 
subsystems, b) long term subsystems, further divided into the damaged core side 
and undamaged core side systems.  
 
Flow from each train of each subsystem is delivered by a single pipe of either 200 
or 300 mm nominal diameter. This pipe branches into two, and one of the branches 
is connected to each core side pipe of the corresponding train. Cooling water is 
delivered to the appropriate core side by an electrically powered fast-acting gate 
valve situated in each branch pipe, at inlet to the ECCS train.  
 
 
 
 39 
 
 
Fig. 31 – Main (or Short-term) ECCS subsystem, RBMK damaged core side 
delivery system 
The main delivery subsystem consists of three separate trains, to deliver water to 
the trains. Trains 1 and 2 are identical, Fig. 31, each consisting of six pressurized 
accumulator tanks containing a total of 80 m3 of water and 70 m3 of nitrogen at 9.8 
MPa pressure, per train. Each accumulator tank is fitted with water level indication.  
 
A low water level signal automatically closes the isolation valve downstream the 
tank outlets of each train, but in addition, a float type cut-off valve avoids gas 
ingress to the trains following water discharge. One tank of each train has a 
pressure relief valve.  The six tanks of each train deliver water at up to 40oC 
through a single 300 mm nominal diameter pipe to the corresponding ECCS train.  
 
Prior to the actuation of the two trains of the main subsystems, all valves in the flow 
path downstream the tank outlets leading to the trains are open. Two valves in 
each flow path, bypassed by a line fitted with a flow restrictor, are open on 
actuation of the accumulator tank trains. These are closed by a signal of 27 
seconds after reactor trip, to provide intermediate throttling of the water flow, 
matching the reduction in decay heat of the reactor core and extending the total 
flow duration to at least 2 minutes.  
 
Train 3 of the main subsystem delivers emergency cooling through a 400 mm 
nominal diameter connection from the main feed-water header. After any actuation 
of this train in an emergency without loss of offsite power, water at 165 oC is drawn 
from the deaerators by the main feed-water pumps for at least 10 minutes before 
the deaerators are emptied. Following loss of offsite power (LOOP) the main feed-
water pumps stop. The coast-down time is approximately 55 s. In this period the 
pumps are powered by the running down TG.  
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The long-term subsystem is divided in two parts, one for delivery to the damaged 
core side  and the other to the undamaged core side, Fig. 32 and Fig. 33, 
respectively.  
 
The damaged core side delivery is constituted by three trains, each consisting of 
two damaged core side cooling pumps (DCSCP) operating in parallel, drawing 
suction from the Pressure Suppression Pool (PSP) which has a capacity of 3200 
m3. The six pumps of the three trains are each capable to provide 250 m3/h of 
water at 7.8 MPa pressure. This system is required to operate within 2 minutes of 
the main subsystem actuation signal, before the main subsystem water tanks are 
exhausted.  
 
The undamaged core side delivery is constituted by three trains, with one 
undamaged core side cooling pump (UCSCP) per train drawing suction through a 
common inlet line from the clean condensate tanks. There are three clean 
condensate tanks (1000 m3 each) backed up by three makeup tanks, each of 750 
m3 in the makeup tanks is available for ECCS use. Other systems can use this 
same water source, but overridden by the ECCS actuation signal.  
 
The three pumps of the three trains are identical to those of the damaged core side 
system, delivering 250 m3/h at 7.8 MPa pressure. Water to the undamaged core 
side is provided by the main circulation pumps in coast down for at least one 
minute after any fault considered. The undamaged core side system is therefore 
required to initiate flow within one minute of the emergency.  
 
 
Fig. 32 – Long-term ECCS subsystem, RBMK damaged core side delivery system 
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Fig. 33 – Long-term ECCS subsystem, RBMK un-damaged core side delivery 
system 
In case of loss of offsite power, each train of power supplies is provided by a 
separate diesel generator, with power available 25 s after diesel start to the 
DCSCP and 35 s after diesel start to the UCSCP. Each pump can reach its rated 
flow rate within 1.0 to 1.5 s from the signal.  
 
The special connection between the pressure header and the three ECCS headers 
per each core side is installed to provide a short term cooling to the affected GDH 
in case of MCC break between pressure header and GDH upstream the check 
valve at GDH inlet. In this emergency situation the signal for ECCS activation 
comes from differential pressure between pressure header and drum separator. 
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2.4. The reference plant and the reference conditions: 
Smolensk-3, 16 October 1996 
2.4.1. Reference fuel load map  
The map of the fuel load of the Smolensk NPP Unit-3 referring to the core status at 
October 16 1996 is represented in the Fig. 34 [11]. 
 
 
Fig. 34 – The reference map of fuel load of the Unit-3 of Smolensk NPP (16.10.96) 
 
In Tab. 8 is reported the legend for the Fig. 34, listing the different type of channels 
present in the core, and their number. 
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Tab. 8 – Characteristics of FC and control rods 
ID on Fig. 34 Description Quantity 
1 Fuel rod bundle with enrichment of 2% U235 48 
2 Fuel rod bundle with enrichment of 2.4% U235 1552 
3 High-altitude power gauge  12 
4 Control rod (design 2091) 155 
6 Shortened control rod (design 2093) 32 
7 Fast Acting Safety System Rod (design 2505) 24 
8 Rod with additional absorber (design 1814) 90 
12 Water column in the channel 1 
13 Graphite reflector 604 
 
As it can be seen from the table, 211 control rods of various design and purposes 
are present in the core. The cartogram of the different type of control rods, with 
their arrangement in the core is reported in Fig. 35. A detailed geometrical 
description of the different control rods type can be found in the section 2.1.2 of 
this document. 
 
Fig. 35 – Control Rods Cartogram 
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In Tab. 9 is reported the initial condition of the tip of the control rods. It has to be 
noted that the numeration of the control rods was done according to their 
arrangement in the core reported in the cartogram of Fig. 35 and according to the 
rule “from left to right, from top to bottom”. The insertion depth is measured in 
centimeters (cm) and it reports the distance between the tip of the control rod and 
the upper part of the top reflector. It has to be remarked that the insertion depth of 
the shortened control rods is negative because they move from the bottom to the 
top of the reactor core. 
 
In Fig. 36, it is reported the map of the coolant mass flow in each of the core 
channels, except for the radial reflector channels. 
It is important to remark that in all of these kinds of maps here reported the colors 
have always the following meaning: 
• yellow is indicating a MCR channel; 
• green a SR channel; 
• orange a SHR channel; 
• blue an Additional Absorber channel; 
• grey an Axial Detector channel; 
• dark blue the Water Column. 
 
All the other colors used in such a kind of maps are indicating Radial Reflector 
Channels or FC grouping. 
 
Tab. 9 – CR Standard Position 
 
CR 
# 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type 
CR 
# 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type 
CR 
# 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type 
CR 
# 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type 
1 30 MCR 55 30 SR 109 30 SR 163 20 MCR 
2 220 MCR 56 30 MCR 110 30 MCR 164 -270 SHR 
3 60 MCR 57 30 SR 111 610 MCR 165 30 MCR 
4 30 MCR 58 30 MCR 112 30 MCR 166 -290 SHR 
5 -240 SHR 59 30 MCR 113 30 MCR 167 30 MCR 
6 20 MCR 60 670 MCR 114 470 MCR 168 -270 SHR 
7 -370 SHR 61 30 MCR 115 30 MCR 169 30 SR 
8 30 SR 62 30 MCR 116 20 MCR 170 -280 SHR 
9 -370 SHR 63 30 MCR 117 520 MCR 171 30 MCR 
10 150 MCR 64 20 MCR 118 180 MCR 172 -310 SHR 
11 -370 SHR 65 20 MCR 119 30 MCR 173 220 MCR 
12 30 MCR 66 30 MCR 120 200 MCR 174 -260 SHR 
13 30 SR 67 20 MCR 121 30 MCR 175 30 MCR 
14 680 MCR 68 170 MCR 122 -310 SHR 176 30 MCR 
15 170 MCR 69 20 MCR 123 30 MCR 177 20 MCR 
16 30 MCR 70 30 MCR 124 -270 SHR 178 150 MCR 
17 40 MCR 71 30 MCR 125 30 MCR 179 590 MCR 
18 30 SR 72 520 MCR 126 -330 SHR 180 110 MCR 
19 250 MCR 73 30 MCR 127 30 SR 181 340 MCR 
20 20 MCR 74 30 MCR 128 -290 SHR 182 460 MCR 
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Tab. 9 (cont.) – CR Standard Position 
 
CR 
# 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type CR # 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type CR # 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type CR 
# 
Insert. 
depth, 
cm (*) 
CR 
Type 
21 20 MCR 75 90 MCR 129 30 MCR 183 360 MCR 
22 30 MCR 76 210 MCR 130 -290 SHR 184 280 MCR 
23 30 MCR 77 30 MCR 131 210 MCR 185 30 MCR 
24 30 MCR 78 -370 SHR 132 -270 SHR 186 30 MCR 
25 30 MCR 79 680 MCR 133 30 MCR 187 30 MCR 
26 30 MCR 80 -340 SHR 134 80 MCR 188 30 MCR 
27 30 MCR 81 120 MCR 135 260 MCR 189 30 MCR 
28 210 MCR 82 -290 SHR 136 20 MCR 190 30 MCR 
29 600 MCR 83 30 SR 137 30 MCR 191 30 MCR 
30 110 MCR 84 -290 SHR 138 20 MCR 192 30 MCR 
31 20 MCR 85 30 MCR 139 550 MCR 193 30 SR 
32 30 MCR 86 -270 SHR 140 30 MCR 194 640 MCR 
33 140 MCR 87 30 MCR 141 20 MCR 195 80 MCR 
34 680 MCR 88 -310 SHR 142 100 MCR 196 550 MCR 
35 30 MCR 89 130 MCR 143 30 MCR 197 30 MCR 
36 20 MCR 90 170 MCR 144 20 MCR 198 30 SR 
37 -270 SHR 91 30 MCR 145 30 MCR 199 220 MCR 
38 680 MCR 92 30 MCR 146 650 MCR 200 -250 SHR 
39 -270 SHR 93 30 MCR 147 60 MCR 201 30 MCR 
40 30 MCR 94 30 MCR 148 30 MCR 202 -300 SHR 
41 -270 SHR 95 20 MCR 149 30 MCR 203 30 SR 
42 30 SR 96 80 MCR 150 80 MCR 204 -310 SHR 
43 -290 SHR 97 30 MCR 151 30 MCR 205 60 MCR 
44 20 MCR 98 100 MCR 152 660 MCR 206 -160 SHR 
45 -280 SHR 99 30 MCR 153 30 SR 207 30 MCR 
46 660 MCR 100 700 MCR 154 20 MCR 208 30 MCR 
47 -230 SHR 101 30 SR 155 30 SR 209 20 MCR 
48 30 SR 102 150 MCR 156 680 MCR 210 110 MCR 
49 30 MCR 103 30 SR 157 30 MCR 211 30 MCR 
50 30 SR 104 30 SR 158 20 MCR    
51 30 MCR 105 150 MCR 159 30 MCR    
52 670 MCR 106 30 SR 160 30 SR    
53 30 MCR 107 30 SR 161 30 MCR    
54 300 MCR 108 490 MCR 162 30 SR    
(*) Insertion Depth for MCR and SR is measured from the Upper Edge of the Top 
Reflector. Insertion Depth for SHR is measured from Bottom of Reactor Core 
(negative values because SHR are bottom to top inserted) 
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Fig. 36 – Core Channels Flow Map (Kg/s) 
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3. THE BACKGROUND FOR RBMK ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
One of the bases for the safety and the safety evaluations in NPP is constituted by 
the knowledge of phenomena that are envisaged following hypothetical transients 
and accidents. The present chapters introduces the safety of the RBMK starting 
from the expected phenomena.  
 
Introductory general remarks are provided in section 3.1. The safety needs focused 
on the ‘binding’ acceptance criteria and the reasons for them are discussed in 
section 3.2. A more comprehensive description of expected physical phenomena 
and scenarios with connected relevant parameters is given in section 3.3. 
 
3.1. The technological status for RBMK safety 
3.1.1. The background 
The safety of a nuclear power plant (NPP), understood as its capability to keep the 
radiation exposure of personnel and population within specified limits, is ensured 
by maintaining the integrity of safety barriers, which are part of the plant defense in 
depth concept. A series of barriers prevents the release of radioactive fission 
products from their source beyond the reactor containment and into the 
environment. In analyzing the NPP safety, it is essential to assess the integrity of 
these barriers and to decide to what degree the response of the whole NPP and its 
systems to a certain initiating event is acceptable from the viewpoint of the plant 
safety. For the sake of clarity, the integrity of the safety barriers is related to certain 
threshold values, which are referred to as acceptance criteria. Essentially these are 
the design limits for design basis accidents (DBA), adopted with a conservative 
margin so that the safety barrier integrity is guaranteed as long as the parameters 
do not exceed the relevant criteria. 
 
Safety analysis for an RBMK NPP should assess the integrity of the following 
barriers in the path of radioactivity transport and release: 
 
• Fuel matrix. 
• Fuel cladding. 
• Circulation circuit pressure boundary and, in particular, the components 
most susceptible to damage, namely fuel channel (pressure) tubes. 
• Metal structures forming the reactor cavity. 
• Structural components of the leaktight accident localization system (ALS) 
compartments and other compartments of the NPP housing circulation 
circuit pipelines. 
 
Should any safety barrier fail, thus opening the pathway for the release of 
radioactivity beyond the plant boundaries, the amount of radioactivity and the 
population exposure should be assessed. Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA) 
are analyzed for the following purposes: 
 
 
 
 
 48 
• To assess the degree of reactor protection and the time available for taking 
countermeasures. 
• To determine the emergency and other signals available to the operator for 
identifying the plant status and to devise appropriate accident management 
steps. 
• To develop a package of organizational and technical measures 
(management strategy) for prevention and mitigation of the accident 
consequences. 
• To assess the possible consequences as input information for planning 
protection of the population and personnel. 
 
Related to BDBA analyses, according to the requirements of the Russian nuclear 
regulatory authority RosTechnadzor, both deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches should be used. Namely, according to requirements OPB-88/97: 
 
• The estimated probability of an event with large release should be less 
than 10-7 within one reactor year. 
• The estimated probability of severe reactor core degradation or melting 
should be less than 10-5 within one reactor year. 
 
However, if some initiating events can lead to severe consequences and the inside 
features of reactor are not able to prevent this, accident mitigation means should 
be foreseen without drawing the attention to the probability of these events. 
 
The deterministic approach for analysis BDBA is therefore also very important: this 
should be based on the method of postulating accidental conditions. The method is 
based on determination of connections between the plant conditions, level of 
severity of accident consequences, i.e. how many physical barriers are violated: 
fuel assembly including fuel pellet and fuel cladding, pressure tube, reactor cavity, 
Main Circulation Circuit (MCC), Accident Localization System (ALS) and availability 
of critical safety functions. According to the above requirements (OPB-88/97), a list 
of BDBA scenarios for further detailed investigations should be developed. The 
analysis results will be the basis for the development of the accident management 
program for RBMK reactors. 
 
3.1.2. The relevant aspects 
Because the RBMK comprises a pressure tube design with a number of unique 
features, the results of much Western work, mainly done for LWR on severe 
accidents, may not be directly applicable. Where work has been done on channel 
type reactors, there are always differences that make direct comparisons difficult. 
The main system characteristics can be summarized as follows (some of these 
also constitute differences between RBMK and other LWR systems): 
 
1. The channel design; each fuel assembly is contained in a separate 
thermal-hydraulic environment. 
2. The moderator is graphite; this has implications for structural performance 
and heat transfer. The graphite provides a very large heat sink and source 
and, as a result, slow core heating in case of hypothetical accidents 
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involving the loss of all heat removal systems and additional heat supply to 
pressure tubes following core cooling.   
3. RBMK reactors have a large core, where local effects may have a 
significant role in safety analyses of the several initiating events (e.g. 
blockage of one hydraulic channel). 
4. The MCC is divided into two symmetric loops; a pipe break in one of these 
directly affects the thermal-hydraulic and neutron kinetics behavior on one 
side of the core. The resulting asymmetry in reactivity and power has to be 
assessed by three-dimensional codes. 
5. The accident localization system design has important implications for 
accident management and fission product retention under accident 
conditions involving radioactivity releases from the fuel. 
6. Redundancy of safety system components gives very low probability of 
severe accidents.  
 
Evaluating the unique features of RBMK reactors specific phenomena should be 
reflected in the modeling of transients. These phenomena are described below.  
 
• The spatial feedback between the neutron intensity, the fuel temperature, 
the graphite temperature, and the coolant void fraction (coolant density) in 
the core and in separate fuel channels shall be considered. To fulfill this 
condition a 3D-space dynamic neutron kinetics code shall be coupled with 
a thermal-hydraulics code and properly qualified. The coupled code must 
also feature high computational speed and stability. 
• The specific thermal-hydraulic processes in the primary circuit and the 
reactor core. At first, the thermal-hydraulic processes in the reactor 
channels (pressure drop, relative motion of phases, counter-current flow, 
reflood) should be considered. The abstract ‘reactor channels’ implies the 
fuel channels, channels in which the reactor control rods are placed and 
the instrumentation channels. The reactor core model should include the 
following types of processes (some of these are typical processes for a 
boiling channel in a BWR): 
? Heat transfer prior to the onset of critical heat flux (CHF). Heat transfer 
under steady state conditions and transients. 
? Critical heat flux. Sharp decrease of heat transfer from fuel elements to 
coolant (high L/D value typical of the RBMK channel, i.e. much higher 
than in the case of BWR). 
? Post-CHF heat transfer (heat transfer to coolant after the CHF onset, 
same note as above applies). 
? Radiation heat transfer. Radiant heat transfer through layer of the 
saturated steam–water mixture or superheated steam between fuel 
elements and fuel channel (FC) wall (the relevance of this process 
upon the overall scenario should be checked, at least by sensitivity 
studies). 
? The heat transfer in radial direction between the pressure tubes and 
the graphite stack through the gaps and bushes and the heat transfer 
between neighboring graphite columns should be considered. 
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• The specific natural circulation in the MCC that takes place after the main 
circulation pump (MCP) shut-off and coast-down should be considered, 
namely: 
? During transients, after reactor shutdown, natural circulation of the 
coolant provides adequate cooling of the reactor.  
? During loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) breakdown of natural 
circulation due to flashing in the down- comer piping may occur.  
? Analogously, during accidents involving the opening of the main safety 
valve, breakdown of natural circulation might occur due to failure of the 
valves to close. 
• The specific phenomena in drum separators of RBMK should be 
considered: 
? The boiling and condensation in the drum separator (DS). The 
structure and dynamics of the coolant flow in the DS varies with 
changes of pressure and feed-water supply. 
? Separation and water entrainment from DS into steam lines. The 
phenomenon is typical for regimes with considerable level increase 
above submerged perforated plate. 
? Steam entrainment into down-comers. The phenomenon is typical for 
regimes with considerable decrease of total collapsed level and 
pressure in DS. 
• During the analysis of LOCA-type accidents the modeling of the coolant 
discharge from the circulation loop break is important. Sub-cooled liquid, 
two-phase mixture and steam flows are involved. Modeling of possible 
internal critical sections (e.g. at the abrupt geometric discontinuities of the 
long pipelines connected with the FC) is also important. 
• Occurrence of thermal-hydraulic instabilities following LOCA, connected 
with the (large) number of parallel channels and  the (high) value of the L/D 
for individual channels, should be investigated.  
• The flow instability in parallel steam generating channels is relevant in 
RBMK. This can take place both at forced and at natural circulation 
conditions. Under such oscillations the cladding temperatures can reach 
unsafe values.  
• During the analysis of LOCA-type accidents the coolant through the break 
is discharged into the compartments of the Accident Localization System 
(ALS), unless the accident is constituted by the break of the FC (see 
below). In the former case, other than the modeling of pressure and 
temperature behavior inside the Reactor Cavity (RC) and the ALS, the 
generation-transport-accumulation-distribution of H2, fission products and 
products of the physical and chemical reaction between graphite and 
primary system coolant shall be considered. 
• In case of fuel channel rupture, the steam–water mixture is discharged into 
the reactor cavity. The calculation of the venting capacity of a damaged 
core, including the local phenomena which may have an impact on the 
temperature and pressure transient in the reactor core cavity (mixing of 
He-N2 mixture with flashing steam, evaporation of discharged water, heat 
transfer from the graphite, liquid carry-over through the break, etc) shall be 
performed. 
 
 
 
 51 
 
Overheating of pressure tube (PT) in the case of “fuel assembly power – coolant 
flow rate mismatch” at high pressure in the fuel channels is the most probable 
reason for fuel channel failure. Three known single FC failures in RBMK reactors 
(Leningrad NPP [LNPP] in 1975, Chernobyl NPP [ChNPP] in 1982, LNPP in 1992) 
occurred as a consequence of the pressure tube overheating mentioned. The 
assessment of PT rupture due to accidental overheating is the key element of 
RBMK safety analysis. 
 
Combined calculations of fuel assembly, pressure tube, and graphite stack 
behavior under accident conditions with channel voiding show that, up to the 
moment of pressure tube rupture, the fuel rod cladding may reach a very high 
temperature, in some cases approaching the melting temperature (of the cladding). 
In such conditions fuel clad oxidation (H2 production), fuel melt and rod 
deformation can be expected. The PT rupture is possible owing to the combined 
effect of high temperature and pressure. Following PT rupture, hydrodynamic 
forces acting on the fuel assembly during the break and caused by the escaping 
steam–water mixture into the reactor cavity may lead to further fuel rod failure and 
to failure of the fuel assembly.  
 
As an example of such a situation, the accident at unit 3 of LNPP in 1992 may be 
considered. The decrease of coolant flow through the individual control valve at 
nominal power happened and caused overheating of the channel, its rupture and 
graphite stack destruction. The accident investigation showed that the pressure 
tube rupture took place at the channel power of 1.94 MW, pressure about 7.0 MPa 
when temperature of the channel reached 650°C. Examination of the central 
stringer of the fuel assembly gave the evidence that the stringer material was 
heated up to 1200°C. 
 
In the case of heating up of a FC thermal mechanical behavior of fuel assembly 
should be considered to wit elongation of fuel rods and hanger, inter action of fuel 
rods having pressed out claddings with stringers and hanger, possible bowing of 
assembly due to azimuthal temperature irregularity, steam-zirconium reaction, 
possible formation of low temperature eutectics. 
 
On the basis of the results obtained in the experimental study of deformation and 
rupture of regular (i.e. full scale) PT and scaled PT mock-ups, as well as from 
inspection results after the incidents involving PT rupture at ChNPP and LNPP, it 
has been ascertained that the process of PT deformation from the start of accident 
heating to the moment of rupture can be subdivided into three stages: 
 
Stage one: regular axial-symmetric ballooning of the tube up to the moment of 
closing all the gaps in the system PT – slit graphite rings – graphite blocks. 
 
Stage two: the pressure load of the FC is partly released to the graphite rings and 
graphite blocks. Joint deformation of the tube, rings and blocks and tube material 
causes “pouring” into the slits of graphite rings. As a result, one or several radial 
cracks appear on the internal surface of the blocks under the influence of the 
ballooned PT. Their propagation results in graphite blocks destruction. 
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Stage three: the deformed PT comes in contact with fragments of the graphite rings 
and blocks and under the conditions of high temperature (caused by coolant 
overheating and possible contact between clad and FC walls) and high pressure 
(the system pressure is, typically, not affected by an event occurring in a single FC 
or limited to a small number of FC and keeps its nominal value) swells up to the 
tube rupture. Hydraulic loads cause fuel fragmentation and transport across the PT 
rupture. Under the influence of differential pressure loads the gap space between 
adjacent graphite stacks tends to increase. 
 
When deriving the model of stress-strain state of a pressure tube, it is assumed 
that the deformation process at the first and third stages takes place with keeping 
of the axial symmetry. The deformation at the second stage is assumed to be close 
to zero, which is justified by the low plasticity of graphite blocks. The irradiation 
level of the graphite has a role at this stage. 
  
Possible deformation of the pressure tubes in the RBMK core will occur in 
interaction with the graphite stacks. Analysis of tube ruptures taking into account 
the constraints provided by the graphite block and results of inspections after the 
channel rupture at LNPP and ChNPP suggest that under full pressure the graphite 
blocks cannot withstand the forces caused by PT ballooning and hence break.  
 
For a pressure exceeding 4.0 MPa the failure criteria for tubes with graphite do not 
differ from the general pattern of data obtained under conditions of free-standing 
tubes. Therefore, the failure criteria of PT obtained largely in the experiments 
without graphite can be used for the evaluation of PT failure in case of accidental 
over heating under pressures exceeding 4.0 MPa. Under FC-pressures lower than 
4.0 MPa the graphite blocks can prevent the PT rupture. 
 
When the pressure tube ruptures, coolant discharges into graphite stack where it 
flashes and residual water evaporates on hot surfaces. The relationship between 
steam sources and sinks determines the reactor cavity (RC) pressure history in this 
case. Steam sources are steam–water mixture discharge from the ruptured FC and 
liquid phase evaporation on hot surfaces of graphite and metal in the reactor 
cavity. Steam sink is provided first of all by steam dumping via the reactor cavity 
venting system (RCVS) pipelines to the ALS and to the environment (RC-SRV). 
Some steam may condense on cold surfaces of pipes of the RCVS. 
  
Large coolant discharge into the stack may cause essential displacement of core 
components under the influence of the forming pressure field, which produces 
complex deformations with gaps growth in some areas (e.g. around the broken PT) 
and reduction in others (neighboring FC). The following phenomena have to be 
analyzed for the pressure tube rupture accident: 
• Flow regime and heat exchange in non-equilibrium two-phase flow 
conditions in the circulation loop (MCC), inside the graphite stacks and 
outside the stacks, before and after the PT rupture. 
• Deformation and rupture of pressure tubes and fracture of graphite blocks 
due to overheating. 
• Oxidation of fuel pins with H2 production and possible melting of the UO2. 
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• Deformation and destruction of fuel pins and fuel assembly owing to 
hydraulic and thermal loads. 
• Release of fuel gap radioactive gases and fuel particles into the coolant 
(FP source term into the FC): FP transport and physical and chemical 
interactions between steam–water mixture and graphite. 
• Displacement and deformation of graphite stack elements as a result of 
loads caused by PT rupture. 
• PT zirconium and graphite oxidation leading to generation of hydrogen and 
hydrocarbons. 
• Operation of the reactor cavity venting system and accident localization 
system. 
• Transport of radioactive fission products from the FC to the RC (or gaps 
among the graphite stacks) and finally to the ALS. 
 
The estimation of the possible evolution of a single FC failure (i.e. PT rupture) 
toward the Multiple Pressure Tube Rupture (MPTR) should be performed. This 
implies the evaluation of the structural-mechanics resistance of parallel stacks of 
graphite bricks and PT, following bending loads orthogonal to the PT axis, as a 
function of the PT position inside the core. The resulting ‘resistance’ loads shall be 
compared with differential pressure loads caused by the release (through the PT 
rupture) of MCC fluid and consequent thermal-hydraulic interactions with graphite. 
 
3.2. The safety needs 
Activity in the field of RBMK safety research including the identification of safety 
limits covers the entire history of RBMK design and operation. Obviously, one can 
split this activity into two parts: before 1986 and the post-Chernobyl era.  
 
Parameters of steady state operation under nominal conditions were the main 
purposes of the work during the first twenty years of RBMK technology (i.e. in the 
pre-Chernobyl era). The steady state experiments concerning thermal-hydraulic 
problems of the core (FC) were accomplished mainly by the Kurchatov Institute on 
its KS facility (full-scale electrically heated 18-pin fuel channel model). Correlations 
for heat transfer in the bundle, pressure drop, CHF, post dry-out modes, critical 
discharge data, etc., were obtained at that time. Some aspects of these problems 
were then investigated at the reactor vendor organization (NIKIET) on its BM 
facility (seven-pin electrically heated model), including pressure drop and void 
fraction distribution. In the same period, phenomena of a dynamic nature were also 
addressed: experiments were performed concerning accident conditions, including 
ECCS injection and FC quenching and multiple channel stability (one- and six-
channel loops of the facility #108 at EREC). 
 
After the Chernobyl accident efforts were devoted to the investigation of the 
dynamic nature of RBMK: improved 3-D codes for neutron kinetics were 
developed, new facilities were constructed and instrumentation on existing ones 
was essentially enhanced to provide good conditions for fine dynamic experiments. 
Data were obtained related to the following problems: steam binding and counter-
current flow limit (KS semi-scale facility), flow blockage in the channel and 
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overheating (KSB facility, RRC KI), low-pressure steam condensation in the outlet 
feeding pipe and FC (‘PWK tube’ facility at NIKIET) and some others. Interesting 
and informative experiments were accomplished at RBMK NPP sites. New facilities 
(e.g. PSB RBMK) have been constructed at EREC. 
 
Thus the methods for accident analysis as well as the basis for acceptance criteria 
have been considerably improved during the last two decades due to a better 
insight into the physical phenomena through experimental research, enhancement 
of the computer codes and computational capabilities. These improvements have 
made it possible to switch from simplified codes to more sophisticated and 
mechanistic integral system codes. The ongoing improvements in computer 
capabilities have removed the main constraint of computational tools. In this 
context, the use of advanced coupled 3-D neutron kinetics and thermal-hydraulic 
codes is of utmost importance. 
 
The accident analysis should demonstrate that parameters (acceptance criteria) 
defined by the designer and the regulatory authority must not be violated during 
accident events. Also the evaluation of the adequacy of the safety system design 
involved in the occurrence shall be based on the comparison of these limits with 
the calculation results.  
 
The calculations can be provided using ‘conservative’ or ‘best estimate’ 
approaches. Now the trend in accident analysis has continued to move to best 
estimate approach. If this approach is used, the code and model uncertainty should 
be evaluated. Code predictions are uncertain due to a number of uncertainty 
sources, e.g. code models, initial and boundary conditions, plant state, scaling and 
numerical solutions algorithm. As it is shown in Fig. 37, [12], usually the best 
estimate approach gives the lower calculated values in comparison to conservative 
approach. The conservative approach does not give any indication of the actual 
margins between the actual plant response and the conservatively estimated 
response.  
 
By contrast, the uncertainty estimate provided in the best estimate approach is a 
direct measure of such margins. As a result, the best estimate approach may allow 
for the elimination of unnecessary conservatism in the analysis and may allow the 
regulatory body and plant operating organization to establish a more consistent 
balance for a wide range of acceptance criteria.  
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Safety Limit (design limits for accident)
Acceptance Criterion (Regulatory Requirement)
Margin to Acceptance
Criterion
Upper Limit of Calculated
Uncertainty Range
Calculated Uncertainty Range
Real Value
Actual Safety
Margin
Calculated conservative
value
 
 
Fig. 37 – Best estimate and conservative safety analysis: definitions of acceptance 
criteria and safety margins, [12]. 
However for some cases, conservative modeling approaches could be used (to a 
large extent in analysis of DBA, for example) simply to avoid the cost of developing 
a more realistic model, even though conservative models are not specified by 
regulation. In this case, the conservative models are selected and evaluated on a 
case by case basis. 
 
For both cases, ‘best estimate’ or ‘conservative’, it is necessary to distinguish two 
groups of limits: the safety limit and the acceptance criteria. The safety limit is a 
critical value of an assigned parameter associated with the failure of a system or a 
component. The acceptance criterion is the quantitative limitation of selected 
parameter or qualitative requirement set-up for the results of accident analysis. The 
specific safety limits and acceptance criteria for RBMK plants are presented below, 
together with selected (not-systematic) recommendation for evaluating safety 
margins corresponding to those criteria. 
 
 
3.2.1. The RBMK acceptance criteria 
The IAEA guidance at [13] deals with the RBMK acceptance criteria and was 
issued when the present report was completed. The content of this section reflects 
and summarizes the content of the mentioned IAEA guidance. 
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3.2.1.1.  Fuel clad integrity 
For the integrity of fuel claddings to be confirmed it is essential to ensure that the 
following maximum values of fuel rod parameters are not exceeded: 
 
• Pellet volume – average fuel enthalpy of 710 kJ/Kg. 
• Cladding temperature of 700 °C. 
 
If the above mentioned acceptance criteria are exceeded, the safety limit on fuel 
melting temperature should be checked: 
 
• Fuel temperature of 2800 °C. 
 
Additional analysis for design basis accidents has to demonstrate that the cladding 
temperature, does not exceed the 1200 °C safety limit and the local depth of fuel 
cladding oxidation should not exceed 18% of the original thickness.  
 
The additional analysis should also confirm the compliance with the requirement 
that the mass of zirconium cladding that reacted with steam should not exceed 1% 
of the total mass of fuel claddings in the core. This sets a limit to the release of 
hydrogen into the ALS.  
 
3.2.1.2. Fuel channel integrity 
It was agreed that for normal operation and with the re-tubing approach adopted in 
Russia (complete reactor re-tubing at a certain power production level, due to 
uncertainties in material properties and fabrication tolerances when local gas gap 
closure occurs), no fuel channel degradation mechanisms have been identified that 
could influence the fuel channel integrity. 
 
The computational assessment of the pressure tube integrity in thermal-hydraulic 
and thermal-mechanical codes uses various experimental high temperature failure 
criteria: rupture temperature versus channel pressure (temperature criterion), 
rupture strain versus tube temperature (strain criterion), rupture stress versus tube 
temperature (stress criterion) and rupture strain power versus tube temperature 
(energy criterion). 
 
The temperature failure criterion in the form of the tube rupture temperature Twr 
dependence on the channel pressure is given in Fig. 38. The data are classified by 
the heating rates, the experiments with graphite blocks are marked with black 
symbols. The shaded region covers all combinations of Tw and p parameters in 
case of rupture. At higher heating rates the values of rupture temperature (dark-
gray region) proved to be higher than the values obtained for low rates (light-gray 
region). 
 
An energy criterion may be adopted for the thermal-mechanical code employed for 
calculating the deformation and for assessing the pressure tube integrity under 
accident conditions as shown in Fig. 39. This criterion is a specific rupture strain 
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power ji (W/Kg) which is determined through the stress intensity si, the material 
density ρw and the strain rate intensity ζi: 
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Fig. 38 – Pressure tube rupture temperature versus internal pressure 
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Fig. 39 – Specific rupture strain power as a function of tube temperature. 
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Simplified acceptance criteria can be used. If the following criteria are not 
exceeded the integrity of the pressure tubes will be maintained (see Fig. 38): 
 
• Maximum fuel cladding temperature is less than 700°С. 
• Maximum fuel channel pressure tube temperature less than 650 С. 
 
Multiple pressure tube rupture sequence is a BDBA. In this case, the potential 
hazards are loss of the reactor cavity integrity and damage of metal structures of 
the reactor. To define the scope of MPTR beyond which the threat of reactor cavity 
destruction lies, it is necessary to perform analysis of the venting capacity of the 
system for reactor cavity protection against overpressure. The results of this 
analysis are useful in assessing the consequences of the beyond design basis 
accident leading to MPTR.  
 
Events leading to multiple pressure tube rupture have received considerable 
attention in safety evaluation of RBMK, since they might develop into extended FP 
releases. Studies performed so far by Russian specialists indicate that the 
probability of such events is very low.  
 
The partial break of a group distribution header was identified as a potential 
precursor for the MPTR. The present Project aims, among the other things, at 
establishing the realism of the MPTR as a consequence of identified precursor 
events, the reference one being the single channel blockage and the consequent 
(single) PT rupture. 
 
3.2.1.3. MCC integrity 
Various MCC sections are capable of withstanding different maximum (or design) 
pressures. 
 
The MCC section between the gate valves of the MCP inlet pipes and the gate 
valves at the group distribution header (GDH) inlets, which can be shut off by 
isolating valves, can tolerate the greatest pressure. The permissible hydraulic test 
pressure at this section is 13.4 MPa.  
 
Fuel channels are also tested under 13.4 MPa. The hydraulic test pressure 
adopted for the remaining MCC components, which is determined primarily by the 
strength of drum separators and steam lines, ranges from 10.1 to 10.4 MPa.  
 
Since the MCC operates as a single system, the last of these values should be 
taken as an acceptance criterion. 
 
3.2.1.4. RC integrity  
The reactor cavity is formed by three metal structures: the top plate, the bottom 
plate and the barrel with a thermal expansion compensator. The barrel is 
hermetically welded to the top and bottom plates. The excessive pressure of 300 
KPa in the reactor cavity may be regarded as a less conservative, ‘realistic’ 
criterion of reactor cavity failure. But more conservative value of 214 KPa is 
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adopted in analyses of the design basis accidents (in the case of Smolensk 3 NPP 
it was found that RC-SRV open at 277 KPa, [14]). 
 
It was repeatedly shown in previous RBMK safety analyses that none of the design 
basis accidents would lead to MPTR, as already mentioned. Should analysis of any 
beyond design basis accident encounter a sequence of events with the ensuing 
rupture of more than one fuel channel, and if the MPTR extent can be determined, 
in such a case by analyzing the maximum capacity of the reactor cavity venting 
system (RCVS) it is possible to assess the reactor cavity integrity, i.e. the likely 
structural and mechanical consequences of such BDBA. 
 
The methodology for assessing the venting capacity of the system involves 
modeling of the system thermal-hydraulics for an MPTR with various boundary 
conditions. The parameters conservative from the point of view of the maximum 
venting capacity should be selected based on phenomenological analysis. The 
ranges of possible variations of such parameters should be validated. 
Consideration should be given to the parameters affecting the flow rate of steam 
entering the stack and to the steam generation in case of pressure tube ruptures 
as well as to the parameters that influence the rate of steam venting from the 
reactor cavity under various boundary conditions. 
 
Phenomenological analysis of the effect of various parameters on the maximum 
venting capacity allows classifying them into key parameters and those of 
secondary importance. Variation ranges are determined for the former, while the 
latter have the ‘worst’ values set for them, i.e. the values detracting from the 
maximum capacity of the RCVS. 
 
The maximum venting capacity should be defined in terms of the number of broken 
pressure tubes with the resultant pressure in the reactor cavity, considering the 
venting capacity through the RC-SRV. The parametric results should demonstrate 
compliance with the acceptance criteria. Analysis of the maximum venting capacity 
should determine the dependence of the number of broken tubes on such a crucial 
parameter considering the RC-SRV. 
 
3.2.1.5. ALS integrity  
Accidental release upon a break in a circulation circuit pipe will be confined in a 
system of leaktight compartments equipped with devices for emergency steam 
condensation (pressure suppression system). However, the ALS does not cover all 
the circulation circuit pipes. Upper regions such as steam–water lines, the top part 
of the down-comers, equalizing pipes of the drum separators, and all the steam 
lines are found outside the ALS, in compartments designed to general building 
standards and rules. This means that these compartments afford no leak-tightness 
and are not nearly as strong as most of the ALS rooms. Analysis of the integrity of 
the ALS and other compartments of a power plant is an essential requirement of 
the safety analysis of NPP for all design basis accidents and beyond design basis 
accidents.  
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The maximum permissible pressures in compartments for MCC pipes and 
components and for ALS are reported in Tab. 10, [13]. Among the RBMK plants of 
the second generation, two different ALS configuration can be identified. Namely: 
- At Leningrad 3 & 4 and Ignalina 1 &2, the system for condensation of 
accidental steam is housed in accident localization towers (ALT). 
- At the other power plants, the system is found at lower elevations of the 
main building. In the case of a coolant leak, pressure relief in the ALS 
relies on passive condensing devices, i.e. pipes submerged under water 
on two decks of the PSP. 
 
Leaktight compartments of Smolensk 1 and 2 and Kursk 3 and 4 have safety 
valves with an opening pressure difference of 270 KPa. Opening them allows the 
steam and gas mixture to be vented from the ALS to the atmosphere. The ALSs at 
Leningrad 3 and 4 and Ignalina 1 and 2 operate in this different manner: in the 
case of MCC pipe breaks inside leaktight compartments or in DGH-LWL 
compartments, the steam and gas mixture will be vented into the ALT via a steam 
discharge passage. With pipe breaks in the upper part of the circuit (DS 
compartment or the space above the reactor), excess steam will be vented directly 
to the atmosphere.  
Tab. 10 – RBMK generations. 
RBMK reactors  Generation 
Leningrad 1 & 2 
Chernobyl 1+ & 2+ 
Kursk 1 & 2 
I 
Leningrad 3 & 4 
Ignalina 1+ & 2 
Chernobyl  3+ & 4+ 
II A 
Smolensk 1 & 2 
Kursk 3 & 4 II B 
Smolensk 3 
Kursk 5(*) III 
( + ) permanently shut-down; (*) under construction 
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Tab. 11 – ALS evolution in the various RBMK generations (see Tab. 10) and 
acceptance criteria 
Permissible (excess) pressure (kPa)   
Generation II Compartment with MCC components Generation I A B 
Generation 
III 
MCP pipes, suction and PH 40    
GDH, LWLs 40.0 80 80 80 
SWL, SD, DC & SL 25    
DC 40    
Leaktight compartments  300 440 (270) 440 (270) 
Steam distribution passage  80 (300)* 440 440 
Air space of PSP   440 440 
Air space of the enclosure   440  
Central Hall  2 (5)* 5 5.0 
SD and space above reactor  25 25 25.0 
Accident Localization Tower  80   
  (*) Number in brackets refer to Ignalina 1 & 2 
 
The ALSs of these units have two major distinctions from their counterparts at 
plants of the second generation: they have no enclosure to receive steam and gas 
from the reactor cavity and their PSP has only one elevation.  
 
However, the ALS may loose its function of a safety barrier at a lower excess 
pressure due to opening of safety valves in the leaktight compartments, whereupon 
a radioactive release may occur at upper elevations of the reactor building.  
 
The leaktight compartments and the air space of the PSP may suffer overpressure 
during LOCA with failure of the PSP cooling system (loss of ultimate heat sink), 
when steam condensation in the pool water is less effective at water temperatures 
exceeding about 85° C.  
 
Therefore, either the maximum permissible water temperature (for example < 85° 
C) or the operating pressure difference of the safety valves may be adopted as an 
acceptance criterion for the PSP. 
 
Hydrogen ignition is also a threat to the ALS integrity. The maximum permissible 
hydrogen concentration in any single ALS compartment is taken equal to 4% by 
volume in the analysis. Should this criterion value be reached, Н2 flammability must 
be comprehensively assessed, taking into consideration the time dependence and 
the characteristic boundary conditions of the accident scenario for the ALS. 
 
 
3.2.1.6. The permissible radiation doses 
According to the rules laid down by the national nuclear regulatory authority, the 
consequences of a DBA should never result in any population exposure that would 
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require any countermeasures to protect the people in the early period of the 
radiation accident. 
 
The early phase (initial period) of an accident covers the time from its beginning to 
the time when the atmospheric release of radioactive substances is arrested. This 
period is assumed to be up to ten days. According to national regulatory 
requirements, the dose limits below which no urgent decisions have to be made 
during the early period of a radiation accident are: 
 
• 0.5 cSv (rem) for the whole body. 
• 5.0 cSv (rem) for the thyroid. 
 
The design radius of the control area around an RBMK NPP is 3 km. 
 
The main pathways of radiation effects on the population during this period are: 
- External γ and β irradiation during the passage of the radioactive cloud. 
- Internal irradiation through inhalation of radioactive substances. 
 
The permissible radiation doses in DBA analysis should be confirmed with the 
following conservative assumptions: 
a) The radioactive release to the environment is a single event of short 
duration, and the release height is equal to the source altitude above 
ground level. 
b) The plume rise due to its buoyancy is disregarded. 
c) The radiation doses are calculated for the worst weather conditions and for 
the specific elevation of the release source, with the wind speed and 
atmospheric conditions producing the greatest possible near ground 
concentrations of radionuclides. 
 
According to national regulatory requirements, the probability of large radiological 
release for BDBA should be less than 10-7 per reactor-year. 
 
 
3.2.2. Recent requirements by RosTechnadzor pertaining to BDBA 
analysis including SA  
The concept of management of BDBA was finally generated in Russia after 
Chernobyl accident as an additional fourth level of in-depth safety barriers of the 
nuclear power plant. As a result, the concept of a ‘beyond design basis accident’ 
has appeared, i.e. an accident caused by initial events that have not been taken 
into account or accompanied by beyond additional single failures of safety systems 
in comparison with design basis accident, realization of erroneous decisions of the 
personnel which can lead to severe damages or melting of the reactor core. It is 
natural that consequences of such accident can be much severe, than at design 
basis accidents. 
 
Management of BDBA according to [15] constitutes the envelope of the actions 
directed on prevention of development of DBA into BDBA and on mitigation of 
consequences of BDBA. For this purpose any technical means available in an 
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efficient condition intended for normal operation and providing safety at design 
basis accidents or for mitigation of consequences at beyond design basis accidents 
can be used. All these actions and special means form the mentioned above fourth 
level of in-depth safety barriers. 
 
ОПБ-88/97 [15] — the Russian regulating document of the maximum conceptual 
level of hierarchy — defines the concept of safety accepted in Russia today. It was 
developed after the Chernobyl accident simultaneously with the IAEA document 
INSAG-3, [16], reflecting the modern concept of safety at the international level. As 
the comparative analysis of these documents performed by special consulting 
IAEA group in the report [17] has shown, the concept of safety reflected in ОПБ-
88/97 basically corresponds to a modern international level. 
 
The concept of beyond design basis accidents accepted in Russia is most 
completely reflected in ОПБ-88/97. In other normative documents of Russia it is 
supplemented only with some more specific requirements. The concept is based 
on the requirement of restriction of radiation influence at the BDBA level by 
employing of measures on their management and realization on a site of the 
nuclear power plant and surrounding it area of actions on protection of the 
personnel and the population. These measures are part of in-depth safety barriers 
and in item 1.2.3 ОПБ-88/97 are specified into detail. 
 
For some BDBA, the level of restriction of radiation influence is caused by criterion 
of the radiation safety, established in the document [18] determining the 
requirements on layout of the nuclear power plant. This criterion limits so-called 
limiting emergency discharge at beyond design basis accidents so that irradiation 
doses of the concerned population (critical group) on the border of the  zone of 
planning of protective actions and outside did not exceed 5 mSv for all body and 50 
mSv for separate organs in the first year after the accident. 
 
According to the requirement of item 1.2.17 ОПБ-88, the probability of limiting 
emergency discharge should be lower 10-7 on reactor in one year. It is necessary 
to avoid evacuation of the population located outside the specified zone of planning 
anti-emergency actions. If the given requirement is not achieved, additional 
technical measures on management of BDBA for mitigation its consequences 
should be accepted (first principle based on probability). 
 
The second principle (item 1.2.14 ОПБ-88/97) establishes for any hypothetic 
(including BDBA) event that, on the basis of intrinsic features of the NPP or in case 
any AM procedure is not applicable, the development of measures on management 
of this event must be provided irrespective of its probability.  
 
Additional means and strategies useful for the management of BDBA are 
discussed in ОПБ-88/97.  
 
The Russian regulatory requirements regarding the mandatory execution of 
suitable probabilistic safety studies of nuclear power plants is defined by item 
1.2.16 ОПБ-88 where PSA level 2 analyses are specifically mentioned. The IAEA 
recommendations of INSAG-6, [19], continue to remain valid. 
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In the mentioned regulatory documents it is recognized that lists of beyond design 
basis accidents cannot be developed only on the basis of probabilistic criteria. The 
application of deterministic principles and approaches is necessary, as outlined 
below.  
 
Deterministic safety analysis is based upon the method of “postulated initial event” 
and the principle of “single failure” with the definition, for each accident, of 
meaningful sequence of events (i.e. DBA) and calculation transient scenarios and 
radiological consequences. This approach in essence is systematic and provides 
the necessary completeness and reliability for the safety analysis. 
 
For beyond design basis accidents such an approach cannot be applied. BDBA 
arise at beyond design initial events or at occurrence of additional failures beyond 
the postulated “single failure”. As a result, the number of possible scenarios of 
beyond design basis accidents is practically unlimited. Therefore the possibility of 
application of the event-based approach for the management of BDBA shall be 
excluded. Rather BDBA management should be based on a symptom approach. 
 
Levels of severity may characterize symptoms of BDBA conditions and are 
connected with the  damage (or damage rate) of physical barriers and with the 
possibility of fission product release to the environment the on a way of release of 
radioactive products into an environment. For the nuclear power plants with RBMK 
reactors such barriers are fuel element, including a fuel matrix and cladding, fuel 
channel tube, bounds of reactor cavity, bounds of coolant circulation circuit and the 
leaktight protection of the reactor (reactor building). For the nuclear power plants 
with VVER reactors instead of fuel channel tube and bounds of reactor cavity, the 
reactor vessel is considered. 
 
BDBA symptoms not related to any specified scenarios shall be adopted for the 
transition from DBA emergency (i.e. the domain of EOP) to the BDBA emergency 
(i.e. the domain of AM). The formation of a scale of emergency conditions and the 
possibility of their identification is rather essential. If any BDBA emergency 
condition cannot be identified, it should be excluded from the consideration for the 
planning of countermeasures. 
 
The management of any emergency condition requires the identification and 
management of certain safety functions which performance could stop the further 
development of the accident (i.e. preventing transition of the given emergency 
condition to another with the higher level of severity), thus making possible to 
improve the starting emergency condition. Such safety functions can be named as 
critical. 
 
Therefore, alongside with levels of severity of (BDBA) emergency conditions, the 
symptoms related to them and the critical safety functions should be determined. 
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In this way the entire set of considered BDBA emergency conditions is not defined 
in an objective way, but depends on our choice, so the selected BDBA emergency 
conditions can be considered as postulated. Making the analogy with the DBA 
conditions, where the method of “postulated initial event”  is adopted, in the case of 
BDBA the method of “postulated emergency conditions” can be adopted. 
 
For the development of manuals on management of BDBA it is necessary to define 
time and parametrical frameworks of occurrence of postulated emergency 
conditions (i.e. characterizing the concerned BDBA), in order to address the 
actions of operators, to establish diagnostic and functional priorities for each level 
of severity and to form a set of  general functional instructions connected with the 
status of the relevant (and critical) safety functions. For this purpose it is necessary 
to execute detailed analyses of some characteristic BDBA scenarios. As a result 
from the above task, suitable lists of BDBA postulated emergency conditions shall 
be developed together with the corresponding symptoms and critical functions.  
 
It shall be emphasized again  that in this context, the development of the lists of  
BDBA (including the related predicted scenarios) play an important, but an auxiliary 
role. Definitely, the BDBA in the Russian normative documents is treated the same 
as the DBA i.e. a combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches that 
meet the modern practice standard in the world is recommended. 
 
3.3. Identification and characterization of selected RBMK 
accident scenarios and phenomena 
The detailed analysis of phenomena relevant for the transient scenarios that 
constitute the objective of the PhD thesis are discussed hereafter. Then, in the 
following chapters of this document, details are given about results of codes and 
methods applications that have been achieved within the present framework and 
are connected with the quantities that control the concerned phenomena or 
transient scenarios.  
 
Hereafter, introductive remarks are provided that also characterizes the state of the 
art in the knowledge of those RBMK accident scenarios and phenomena prior to 
the execution of the PhD activities. Most of the information is taken from 
documents issued within TACIS Project R2.03/97, [20]. References listed in this 
report are relevant for the characterization of RBMK scenarios. 
 
3.3.1. Thermal-hydraulics of PS 
The RBMK is a water cooled reactor. Therefore, transient phenomena studied for 
LWR are also supposed to be applicable in RBMK conditions. However, attention 
should be paid to the relevant range of parameters that can be largely different in 
LWR and RBMK situations. Typical examples are constituted by the length of the 
core active region, almost twice the value that characterize BWR, the presence of 
long (L/D >> 100) pipes at the inlet and the outlet of FC and of large volume (> 50 
m3) steam drum. All of this has large influence upon the nominal conditions 
pressure drop across the loop, upon the LOCA depressurization and upon stability 
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performance. An overview of key-subject and of phenomena taken from the 
validation of the Korsar code can be found in Tab. 12, [20]. The application of the 
table-of-phenomena approach is well established in nuclear reactor safety (e.g. 
including code validation), following the pioneering study performed by 
OECD/CSNI at the end of ‘80s, [21], [22], [23]. In the present case it also gives an 
idea of different relevance of thermal-hydraulic phenomena in the cases of VVER 
and RBMK. More detailed RBMK thermal-hydraulic phenomena can be found in 
Tab. 13, [20]. 
 
Tab. 12 – List of key-subjects and phenomena utilized for the assessment of 
Korsar code and comparison between VVER and RBMK. 
Key-Subject Phenomena VVER RBMK 
Reactor kinetics (Point 
model)  
R R 
Reactor kinetics (Spatial 
model)  
R R 
Modeling of liquid 
absorber  
R N/A 
Modeling of non-
condensable gases Non condensable gas  R R 
Critical discharge of the 
coolant Break flow R R 
Core sub-critical heat transfer R R 
Core critical heat transfer R R 
Core supercritical heat transfer R R 
Quench front formation and 
propagation R R 
Radiation heat transfer R R 
Flooding of counter-current flows 
of water and steam in vertical 
channels 
R R 
Reflood R R 
Flow regimes in reactor 
core, core heat transfer 
(in the rod assemblies) 
Heat transfer in radial direction 
between different heat structures N/A R 
Sub-critical, critical and 
supercritical heat transfer R N/A 
Quench front formation and 
propagation R N/A 
Radiation heat transfer R N/A 
Counter-current flow R N/A 
Reflood R N/A 
Flow regimes and heat 
transfer in the steam 
generating channels 
Steam–water–gas mixture flow 
and heat transfer in reactor cavity N/A R 
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Tab. 12 (cont.) – List of key-subjects and phenomena utilized for the assessment of 
Korsar code and comparison between VVER and RBMK. 
Key-Subject Phenomena VVER RBMK 
Stratification of the two-fluid flow 
in the horizontal channels R R 
   
Natural circulation R R 
Separation of phases in tees N/A R 
Steam condensation during ECCS 
injection R R 
Counter-current water–air flow 
through perforated plates R R 
Flashing and condensation in DS N/A R 
Flow regimes in reactor 
cooling circuit 
Two-phase pump behavior R R 
Fuel melting and relocation R R 
Zirconium–steam reaction R R 
Steam–graphite interaction N/A R Severe accident propagation 
Fuel melt – pressure tube – 
graphite interaction N/A R 
 
Tab. 13 – List of RBMK specific thermal-hydraulic phenomena for MCC. 
Processes in drum separator 
•  Separation, water entrainment, steam carry under:  
− void fraction of ‘water’ volumes of DS. 
• Dynamics of mass levels, their variation during power and/or pressure 
decrease: 
− Axial effects in DS:  
o Heat exchange steam–water–metal during variation of pressure. 
Two-phase severely non-homogeneous phenomena and natural 
circulation in complex circuit during decrease of pressure, water 
inventory and velocity 
• Separation in T-joints, headers, W-sections. 
• Steam plugs and oscillations in steam water pipelines, group distribution 
headers, down-comers. 
• CCF/ CCFL in parallel channels and inlet water pipelines. 
• Self-sustaining flow oscillations in parallel channels. 
• Degradation of natural circulation. 
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Tab. 13 (cont.) – List of RBMK specific thermal-hydraulic phenomena for MCC. 
 
Fast thermal processes 
• Water blowdown from the circuit, water blow down from fuel channels 
during drop of flow rate or pressure, overflows between parallel channels. 
• Stagnation, oscillations, reverse and resumption of flow in different-heated 
channels. 
• Fronts of flooding and quenching in the channel with fuel assembly, 
distribution of ECCS water over differently heated fuel channels and GDH. 
• Dynamics of temperatures in fuel assemblies and pressure tubes; 
convection, radiation and heat conductivity from ‘steamed’ fuel channels to 
graphite column. 
Slow processes in drained part of channels 
• Dynamics of formation of back flow during leak in the pressure part of the 
circuit. 
• Formation and movement of a physical level in fuel channels, water 
entrainment, heat removal above level. 
• Axial and longitudinal transport of heat to graphite and cooled channels. 
• Steam–zirconium reaction. 
Quasi-stationary processes 
• Critical heat fluxes and critical powers of fuel channels. 
• Void distribution. 
• Post-dryout heat transfer under emergency conditions. 
• Oscillation in parallel channels. 
• Hydraulic resistance of fuel channel during sub-cooling at the inlet and 
overheating at the outlet. 
• Natural circulation. 
• Thermal-hydraulics (dryout, post-dryout heat transfer, formation of level) in 
downward two-phase flow. 
Phenomena in reactor space, outside the channels 
• Two-phase flow after rupture, 3-D distribution of flow and pressure, 
separation in reactor space outside fuel channel during distortion of 
graphite columns. 
• Steam generation (quenching of graphite). 
• Condensation on CPS channels, role of non-condensable gases. 
Processes in CPS channels 
• Hydraulic dynamics of low pressure downward flow in CPS channels. 
• Formation and stability of water film during decrease of flow rate, transfer 
and release of gases. 
• Dynamics of emergency drainage of CPS channels, processes of water 
drainage and dryout. 
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3.3.2. Three-dimensional neutron kinetics 
The RBMK core consists of FC embedded into graphite stacks, subdivided into 
bricks (see Chapter 2). Looking at the neutron kinetics point of view, the core of a 
RBMK largely differs from the core of a LWR (namely a BWR) producing the same 
thermal power owing to the following: 
a. Overall dimensions and, consequently, power per unit volume, that are 
respectively, much larger and much smaller (for a factor greater than 10, see 
Tab. 6). 
b. Presence of the graphite as moderator. 
c. Presence of a large variety of ‘neutron kinetics cell types’ (i.e. association of a 
graphite stack and of a different component): 
1. Active fuel. 
2. Additional absorber (high pressure bypass).  
3. Water column, i.e. w/o inside absorber (high pressure bypass). 
4. Reflector (low pressure circuit). 
5. CPS or 3 CR types (low pressure circuit): 
i. Manual CR, 
ii. Short CR, 
iii. Safety CR. 
6. Axial detector (low pressure circuit). 
d. Lower enrichment and, consequently, need to control a lower excess reactivity 
owing to the ‘continuous-fuel-reloading’. 
 
Specific RBMK core features for 3D neutron kinetics are given in Tab. 14, [20]. All 
of this makes more stringent (related to BWR) the need to use 3D neutron kinetics 
for transient safety analyses. 
 
The two-group cross-section libraries used to predict RBMK core physics are 
usually corrected for uncertainties in axial burn-up distribution, control rod positions 
and thermal-hydraulic feedback. Flux reconstruction methods or other correction 
procedures are applied. In the flux reconstruction method, the calculated 3-D flux 
distribution is compared to the readings of the in-core detectors and cross-sections 
are adjusted accordingly. 
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Tab. 14 – List of RBMK specific design features for the core neutron kinetics 
Fuel cell: 
• Coolant density 
(0.0g/cm3 up to 1.0g/cm3). 
• Graphite temperature 
(300 K up to 1100 K). 
• Fuel temperature 
(300 K up to 1500 K). 
• Xenon-concentration. 
• Coolant temperature. 
(300 K up to 557 K). 
 
Non-fuel cells: 
• Control rod channels. 
• Additional absorber channels.  
• Reflector channels. 
• CPS-detector channels.  
The cross-sections are typically derived as 
function of: 
• Fuel burn-up. 
• Graphite temperature. 
• Water density  
(0÷0.78 g/cm3 for cells in MCC loop) 
(0÷0.98 g/cm3 for cells in CPS loop for hot power 
conditions) 
(0÷1.0 g/cm3 for cold conditions in any cell). 
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4. THE TOOLS, THE METHODOLOGIES AND THE 
QUALIFICATION OF 3D NK COUPLED TH CODES ANALYSES 
The execution of detailed and realistic NPP nuclear safety analyses requires the 
use of the state-of-the-art codes and methodologies. Information about these 
topics is given this chapter, together with some details about the procedure for 
codes and input decks qualification. 
 
4.1. Neutron Transport codes 
Performing reactor dynamic core calculations solving the neutron transport 
equation is something that is still impossible nowadays, because of the limits of 
current computational tools. For the RBMK, this is particularly true, considering its 
enormous geometrical dimensions (14 m of diameter per 7.5 m of height).  
Therefore, the use of these codes should be limited to the investigation of small 
parts of the reactor (e.g., the single fuel cell or small part of the reactor lattice). 
Nevertheless their use is precious in conducting in-depth calculations for assessing 
the effects of some local phenomena (e.g., for the RBMK, the assessment of the 
effects of a single channel voiding) and for performing the derivation of cell 
homogeneous cross sections to be used for the whole reactor core calculations by 
nodal diffusion codes. 
During this PhD research activity, the situations for using neutron transport codes 
were identified and both deterministic and stochastic transport codes were applied.  
Stochastic neutron transport simulation by the MCNP5 [24] Monte Carlo based 
method code was performed for obtaining detailed simulation of fuel cells during a 
flow blockage event. Instead, deterministic neutron transport codes DRAGON [56] 
and HELIOS [54] were applied in order to perform repetitive fuel lattice cells 
calculations for the production of several fuel cell homogenized cross-section 
database at several burnup steps. The description of the physical and numerical 
methods of all these codes and their structure is given hereafter. 
 
4.1.1. The Monte Carlo code MCNP5 
A comprehensive description of the MCNP code can be found in [24]. We reported 
here the main relevant features of the code for the use we did for the RBMK 
analysis.  
 
4.1.1.1. General features 
MCNP is a general-purpose, continuous-energy, generalized-geometry, time-
dependent, coupled neutron/photon/electron Monte Carlo transport code. It can be 
used in several transport modes: neutron only, photon only, electron only, 
combined neutron/photon transport where the photons are produced by neutron 
interactions, neutron/photon/electron, photon/electron, or electron/photon. 
The neutron energy regime is from 10-11 MeV to 20 MeV for all isotopes and up to 
150 MeV for some isotopes, the photon energy regime is from 1 keV to 100 GeV, 
and the electron energy regime is from 1 KeV to 1 GeV. The capability to calculate 
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keff eigenvalues for fissile systems is also a standard feature and was heavily 
exploited for this PhD work. 
 
The user creates an input file that is subsequently read by MCNP. This file contains 
information about the problem in areas such as: the geometry specification, the 
description of materials and selection of cross-section evaluations, the location and 
characteristics of the neutron, photon, or electron source, the type of answers or 
tallies desired, and any variance reduction techniques used to improve efficiency. 
 
4.1.1.2. Monte Carlo Method vs. Deterministic Method 
Monte Carlo methods are very different from deterministic transport methods. 
Deterministic methods, the most common of which is the discrete ordinates 
method, solve the transport equation for the average particle behavior. By contrast, 
Monte Carlo obtains answers by simulating individual particles and recording some 
aspects (tallies) of their average behavior. The average behavior of particles in the 
physical system is then inferred (using the central limit theorem) from the average 
behavior of the simulated particles. Not only are Monte Carlo and deterministic 
methods very different ways of solving a problem, even what constitutes a solution 
is different. Deterministic methods typically give fairly complete information (for 
example, flux) throughout the phase space of the problem. Monte Carlo supplies 
information only about specific tallies requested by the user. 
 
4.1.1.3. The Monte Carlo Method  
Monte Carlo can be used to duplicate theoretically a statistical process (such as 
the interaction of nuclear particles with materials) and is particularly useful for 
complex problems that cannot be modelled by computer codes that use 
deterministic methods. The individual probabilistic events that comprise a process 
are simulated sequentially. The probability distributions governing these events are 
statistically sampled to describe the total phenomenon. In general, the simulation is 
performed on a digital computer because the number of trials necessary to 
adequately describe the phenomenon is usually quite large. The statistical 
sampling process is based on the selection of random numbers—analogous to 
throwing dice in a gambling casino—hence the name “Monte Carlo.” In particle 
transport, the Monte Carlo technique is pre-eminently realistic (a numerical 
experiment). It consists of actually following each of many particles from a source 
throughout its life to its death in some terminal category (absorption, escape, etc.). 
Probability distributions are randomly sampled using transport data to determine 
the outcome at each step of its life. 
 
Fig. 40 represents the random history of a neutron incident on a slab of material 
that can undergo fission. Numbers between 0 and 1 are selected randomly to 
determine what (if any) and where interaction takes place, based on the rules 
(physics) and probabilities (transport data) governing the processes and materials 
involved. In this particular example, a neutron collision occurs at event 1. The 
neutron is scattered in the direction shown, which is selected randomly from the 
physical scattering distribution. 
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Fig. 40 – A typical neutron history simulation by MNCP5 (from [24]) 
A photon is also produced and is temporarily stored, or banked, for later analysis. 
At event 2, fission occurs, resulting in the termination of the incoming neutron and 
the birth of two outgoing neutrons and one photon. One neutron and the photon 
are banked for later analysis. The first fission neutron is captured at event 3 and 
terminated. The banked neutron is now retrieved and, by random sampling, leaks 
out of the slab at event 4. The fission-produced photon has a collision at event 5 
and leaks out at event 6. The remaining photon generated at event 1 is now 
followed with a capture at event 7. Note that MCNP retrieves banked particles such 
that the last particle stored in the bank is the first particle taken out.  
 
This neutron history is now complete.  
 
As more and more such histories are followed, the neutron and photon distributions 
become better known. The quantities of interest (whatever the user requests) are 
tallied, along with estimates of the statistical precision (uncertainty) of the results. 
 
4.1.1.4. Nuclear Data and Reactions 
MCNP uses continuous-energy nuclear and atomic data libraries. The primary 
sources of nuclear data are evaluations from the Evaluated Nuclear Data File 
(ENDF) system [61], the Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (ENDL) [62], [55], 
Evaluated Photon Data Library (EPDL) [63], the Activation Library (ACTL) 
compilations from Livermore, and evaluations from the Nuclear Physics (T–16) 
Group at Los Alamos. Evaluated data are processed into a format appropriate for 
MCNP by codes such as NJOY [64], [65]. The processed nuclear data libraries 
retain as much detail from the original evaluations as is feasible to faithfully 
reproduce the evaluator’s intent. 
Nuclear data tables exist for neutron interactions, neutron-induced photons, photon 
interactions, neutron dosimetry or activation, and thermal particle scattering S(α,β). 
 
Each data table available to MCNP is listed on a directory file, XSDIR. Users may 
select specific data tables through unique identifiers for each table, called ZAIDs. 
These identifiers generally contain the atomic number Z, mass number A, and 
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library specifier ID. Over 836 neutron interaction tables are available for 
approximately 100 different isotopes and elements. Multiple tables for a single 
isotope are provided primarily because data have been derived from different 
evaluations, but also because of different temperature regimes and different 
processing tolerances. More neutron interaction tables are constantly being added 
as new and revised evaluations become available. 
 
4.1.1.5. Tallies and Output 
The user can instruct MCNP to make various tallies related to particle current, 
particle flux, and energy deposition. MCNP tallies are normalized to be per starting 
particle except for a few special cases with criticality sources. Fluxes across any 
set of surfaces, surface segments, sum of surfaces, and in cells, cell segments, or 
sum of cells are also available. Tallies such as the number of fissions, the number 
of absorptions, the total helium production, or any product of the flux times the 
approximately 100 standard ENDF reactions plus several nonstandard ones may 
be calculated with any of the MCNP tallies. In fact, any quantity of the form (1)  
 
C = ∫Φ dEEfE )()(  
(1) 
can be tallied, where F(E) is the energy-dependent fluence, and f(E) is any product 
or summation of the quantities in the cross-section libraries or a response function 
provided by the user. 
 
4.1.1.6. Estimation of Monte Carlo Errors 
MCNP tallies are normalized to be per starting particle and are printed in the output 
accompanied by a second number R, which is the estimated relative error defined 
to be one estimated standard deviation of the mean Sx divided by the estimated 
mean x . In MCNP, the quantities required for this error estimate −the tally and its 
second moment− are computed after each complete Monte Carlo history, which 
accounts for the fact that the various contributions to a tally from the same history 
are correlated. For a well-behaved tally, R will be proportional to 1/N1/2 where N is 
the number of histories. Thus, to halve R, we must increase the total number of 
histories fourfold. For a poorly behaved tally, R may increase as the number of 
histories increases. 
The estimated relative error can be used to form confidence intervals about the 
estimated mean, allowing one to make a statement about what the true result is. 
The Central Limit Theorem states that as N approaches infinity there is a 68% 
chance that the true result will be in the range x (1≤ R) and a 95% chance in the 
range  x (1≤ 2R). 
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4.1.2. The deterministic transport codes 
As stated before, HELIOS and DRAGON deterministic neutron transport codes 
were applied for the calculation of fuel cell homogenized cross sections database. 
Generation of a cross sections database for RBMK reactor, composed by several 
libraries, is considered a task requiring big efforts by the analysts. There are 
several reasons for this statement.  
 
One of this is the intrinsic complexity of the RBMK system due, for example, to the 
very large number of different elementary cells, to the different types of CR or to 
the physical separation between moderator and coolant.  
 
Difficulties are generally due also to some lack of accuracies in the acquisition of 
the basic input data (burn-up distribution, CR positions, coolant mass flow in each 
channel, graphite temperatures) in the NPP. Consequently, methods were 
introduced in the past for correcting the results obtained by the use of cross section 
libraries, in order to overcome the big uncertainties resulting in the transient core 
codes calculations. For example, in the flux reconstruction method, the calculated 
3-D flux distribution is compared to the readings of the in-core detectors and cross-
sections (e.g., the thermal fission cross sections, or νΣf ) are adjusted accordingly 
“a posteriori” [25]. Calculations of the cross section libraries of this PhD research 
activity did not required application of “a posteriori” methods. In fact, to overcome 
in-core detectors inaccuracy, a first correction of the channels burnup distribution 
was performed before libraries calculation [60]. Nevertheless, local channels 
correction was executed always preserving the reactor macro-areas power 
distribution. Before the use of the aforementioned codes, a process for identifying 
the RBMK fuel cell peculiarities was performed. Codes selection was based on 
their capabilities in handling these peculiarities. 
 
a) Geometric Capabilities 
The code has to be able to model the elementary RBMK core cell made by a 
square hollow block of graphite measuring 0.25 x 0.25 m and made by other 
components of different shapes like fuel pins, pressure tube, additional absorber, 
control rods parts, neutron detectors and graphite radial reflector. Therefore, the 
capability to use Cartesian geometry is required. The code has to have the 
capability to handle also a “poly-cell” model, in order to calculate the feedback 
effects of the neighbor cells. 
 
b) Physical Capabilities  
An adequate range of the relevant physical parameters has to be considered by 
the code in order to calculate a good transport solution and in order to include the 
relevant feedback effects during the fuel cell homogenized cross sections libraries 
calculations. Different requirements can be listed for fuel and non-fuel cells (see 
Tab. 15) according to the family of transients that it should be analyzed.  
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Tab. 15 – Range of the physical parameters  to be considered for Fuel and Non-
fuel cells 
Fuel cell Non-fuel cells 
• Fuel Burnup 
(0 – 20 MWd/KgU) 
• Coolant density 
(0.0 g/cm3 up to 1.0 g/cm3) 
• Graphite temperature 
(300 K up to 1100 K) 
• Fuel temperature 
(300 K up to 1500 K) 
• Xe135 concentration (0, 2.0E+13, 
4.5E+48 atoms/cm3) 
• Coolant temperature 
(300 K up to 557 K) 
• Graphite temperature 
(300 K up to 1100 K); 
• Water density  
(0÷0.78 g/cm3 for cells in  MCC loop) 
(0÷0.98 g/cm3 for cells in CPS loop 
for hot power conditions) 
(0÷1.0 g/cm3 for conditions in any 
neighbor cell) 
• CR position 
 
4.1.2.1. The lattice physics code DRAGON 
The computer code DRAGON [56] contains a collection of models that can 
simulate the neutron behavior of a unit cell or a fuel assembly in a nuclear reactor. 
It includes all of the functions that characterize a lattice cell code, namely: the 
interpolation of microscopic cross sections supplied by means of standard libraries; 
resonance self-shielding calculations in multidimensional geometries; multigroup 
and multidimensional neutron flux calculations that can take into account neutron 
leakage; transport-transport or transport-diffusion equivalence calculations as well 
as editing of condensed and homogenized nuclear properties for reactor  
calculations; and finally isotopic depletion calculations. 
 
The code DRAGON contains a multigroup flux solver conceived that can use a 
various algorithms to solve the neutron transport equation for the spatial and 
angular distribution of the flux. Each of these algorithms is presented in the form of 
a one-group solution procedure where the contributions from other energy groups 
are considered as sources. The current release of DRAGON contains five such 
algorithms.  
 
The JPM option that solves the integral transport equation using the J± method, 
(interface current method applied to homogeneous blocks); the SYBIL option that 
solves the integral transport equation using the collision probability method for 
simple 1D or 2D geometries and the interface current method for 2D Cartesian or 
hexagonal assemblies; the EXCELL/NXT option to solve the integral transport 
equation using the collision probability method for more general 2D geometries and 
for 3D assemblies; the MOCC option to solve the transport equation using the 
method of cyclic characteristics in 2D Cartesian, and finally the MCU option to 
solve the transport equation using the method of characteristics (non cyclic) for 3D 
Cartesian geometries. 
 
The execution of DRAGON is managed via the GAN generalized driver. After the 
collision probability or response matrices associated with a given cell have been 
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generated, the multigroup solution module can be activated. This module uses the 
power iteration method and requires a number of iteration types. The thermal 
iterations are carried out by DRAGON so as to rebalance the flux distribution only 
in cases where neutron undergoes up-scattering.  
 
The power iterations are performed by DRAGON to solve the fixed source or 
eigenvalue problem in the cases where a multiplicative medium is analyzed. The 
effective multiplication factor (keff ) is obtained during the power iterations. A search 
for the critical buckling may be superimposed upon the power iterations so as to 
force the multiplication factor to take on a fixed value. DRAGON can access 
directly microscopic cross-section libraries defined according to the following 
standard formats: DRAGLIB, MATXS, WIMS–D4 [66],[67],[68],[69], and WIMS–
AECL [70]. It has the capability of exchanging macroscopic cross-section libraries 
with a codes such as TRANSX–CTR or TRANSX–2 by the use of GOXS and 
ISOTXS format files. The macroscopic cross section can also be read in DRAGON 
via the input data stream. The code is modular and can be interfaced easily with 
other production codes.  
 
4.1.2.2. The lattice physics code HELIOS 
HELIOS [54] is a neutron and gamma transport code for lattice burnup, in general 
two-dimensional geometry. It was developed by Studsvik™ ScandPower since the 
1993. The code version released in April 2000, HELIOS-1.6, was used for this PhD 
activity. As can be seen in Fig. 41, HELIOS is composed by several modules. In 
particular, there are: 
- AURORA, the input processor code module 
- ZENITH, the output processor code module 
The data flow between these codes is via a data base that is accessed and 
maintained by the subroutine package HERMES.  
 
Fig. 41 – HELIOS package 
AURORA reads, processes and saves the User’s input. The result is a number of 
so-called ‘User-arrays’. The User-arrays are written into the HERMES database for 
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retrieval by HELIOS and/or ZENITH. For each case HELIOS retrieves the input 
from the database and executes calculations specified. The input, except for the 
basic nuclear data in the library which are not user-specified consists of the 
following data types: 
 
1. The nuclear data library with the basic nuclear data, which also defines the 
energy discretization (group structures) of the particle transport calculations. 
2. Data that define the (initial) number densities of materials, and the elements of 
the albedo matrix. 
3. Data that define the geometry of the system, including the spatial and angular 
discretization to be used in the transport calculations. 
4. Data that assign one or more property sets to the geometric system, thus 
defining one or more states of the system. 
5. Data that define the execution sequence of the calculations 
6. Data that define what output will be saved 
 
HELIOS consists of a main module, which calls nineteen computational modules, 
The first eleven modules treat the input data and they are called once per every 
case. Six of the remaining modules perform physics calculations, while the last two 
modules process the data for output and restart dumps. Most of these eight 
modules are called at least once per reactivity calculation point. The depletion 
module in only called if there is burnup or decay, while the module for the restart 
dumps is called only when such dumps are requested. 
 
Therefore HELIOS performs the lattice calculations in the following manner. The 
methods described cover three areas: 
• The geometric buildup of the system and its properties 
• The physical methods to obtain fluxes, currents and number densities. This 
consists of five parts: 
o Calculating resonance-shielded microscopic Cross Sections 
o Calculating fluxes and currents by the current-coupling collision 
probability (CCCP) method for particle transport 
o Evaluating first-flight probabilities 
o Evaluating, with the B1 method, the criticality spectrum, which is used 
to rebalance the spectrum of the CCCP solution 
o Solving the burnup chains to obtain new number densities. 
• Output processing to obtain the output data arrays. 
 
Almost all data in the library are based on the ENDF/B-VI data. The exceptions are 
the cross-sections of erbium and thulium isotopes and the (n,γ) matrices of many 
fission products. In the thermal and resolved-resonance energy regions, below 2 
keV the cross-sections of the erbium and thulium isotopes are constructed by the 
RABBLE code.  
 
Fig. 42 shows the flow scheme of library generation. The ENDF/B-VI files are 
processed with a version of NJOY91.13 [65] – with upgrades through version 
91.105 that includes code RABBLE as a module. The main task of NJOY is to 
generate infinite-dilution neutron and gamma Cross Sections in 190 neutron and 
48 gamma groups. Another NJOY task is to generate PENDF’s which are files with 
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Cross Sections in many thousands of energy points that are input to RABBLE. 
While all isotopes must be processed with NJOY, only those to be treated as 
resonance isotopes by HELIOS have to be processed by RABBLE. 
 
The GENDF group Cross Sections and the resonance-shielded Cross Sections 
produced by RABBLE are collected in the HERMES file, the master database. The 
creation of the database is one of the activities of HEBE code. Another activity of 
the HEBE code is to construct a master library for HELIOS from selected data in 
the database. With the master library HELIOS runs are made to generate flux 
spectra in different regions, at different temperatures and at different burnups. 
 
In the third activity HEBE adds these spectra to the master database. In the fourth 
activity they are used to group-collapse the database into a condensed database, 
from which the condensed library is made.  
 
 
Fig. 42 – Flow scheme of library generation. 
Presently, three libraries exist: the master library with 190/48 neutron/gamma 
groups: a fast reactor library with 112/18 neutron/gamma groups and a production 
library with 45/18 neutron/gamma groups. For the cross-section generation the 
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master library with 190/48 neutron/gamma groups were used. A comparison with 
the results from the 45/18 group library showed a good agreement to the master 
library.  
 
286 isotopes, elements and mixtures are included in the HELIOS database, 28 
heavy isotopes and 121 fission products. The code also contains resonance tables 
for 39 resonance isotopes (11 heavy isotopes, 28 fission products) and 23 
burnable absorber and control isotopes. Isotopic compositions are automatically 
saved if they are to be used for branch-off calculations. Compositions (e.g. boron 
contents, water density, temperatures and material densities) can be changed in 
branch-offs. 
 
One of the advantages of HELIOS is its geometry flexibility, which allows 
representing fully the RBMK cell geometry. The HELIOS modeling capabilities 
permit also to represent exactly non-homogeneous assembles (i.e. each rod in the 
assembly). The HELIOS method is the CCCP technique. HELIOS was qualified for 
RBMK applications based on cross code comparisons and using measured data of 
critical facilities [26]. 
 
First, in summary the important issues in the RBMK cross-section generation are: 
• Input library – evaluated nuclear data files, 
• Resonance treatment, 
• Energy condensation, 
• Main transport calculations, 
• Homogenization, 
• Depletion. 
 
Interface to run the lattice physics code HELIOS in an automated manner to 
perform depletion and branch calculations, extract macroscopic cross-section and 
neutron kinetics data, and assemble them in the format of cross-section libraries 
was developed at the Reactor Dynamics and Fuel Management Group (RDFMG) 
of the Pennsylvania State University (PSU). 
 
4.2. The RELAP5-3D system code  
4.2.1. Introduction 
The RELAP5 series of codes has been developed at the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) under sponsorship by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and a consortium of several countries and 
domestic organizations that were members of the International Code Assessment 
and Applications Programme (ICAP) and its successor, the Code Applications and 
Maintenance Programme. Specific applications of the code have included 
simulations of transients in LWR systems, such as loss of coolant, anticipated 
transients without scram (ATWS), and operational transients such as loss of 
feedwater, loss of offsite power, station blackout, and turbine trip. 
RELAP5-3D, the latest code version in the series of RELAP5 codes, is a highly 
generic code that, in addition to calculating the behavior of a reactor coolant 
system during a transient, can be used for simulation of a wide variety of hydraulic 
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and thermal transients in both nuclear and nonnuclear systems involving mixtures 
of steam, water, non-condensable, and solute. Development of RELAP5-3D The 
RELAP5-3D code version is a successor to the RELAP5/MOD3 code that was 
developed at the INL for the NRC. Development of the RELAP5 code series 
began at the INL under NRC sponsorship in 1975 and continued through several 
released versions, ending in October 1997 with the soon to be released 
RELAP5/MOD3.3.  
 
The U.S. DOE began sponsoring additional RELAP5 development in the early 
1980s to meet its own reactor safety assessment needs. Following the accident at 
Chernobyl, DOE undertook a re-assessment of the safety of all of its test and 
production reactors throughout the United States. The RELAP5 code was chosen 
as the thermal-hydraulic analysis tool because of its widespread acceptance. 
Systematic safety analyses were carried out for the DOE that included the N 
reactor at Hanford, the K and L reactors at Savannah River, the Advanced Test 
Reactor (ATR) at INL, the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and Advanced 
Neutron Source (ANS) at Oak Ridge, and the High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR) at 
Brookhaven. DOE also chose RELAP5 for the independent safety analysis of the 
New Production Reactor (NPR) proposed for Savannah River before that 
programme was cancelled in the wake of the end of the cold war. 
 
The application of RELAP5 to these various reactor designs created the need for 
new modelling capabilities. For example, the analysis of the Savannah River 
reactors necessitated the adding three-dimensional flow model and heavy water 
properties to the code. ATR required a new critical heat flux correlation applicable 
to its unique fuel design. All together, DOE sponsored improvements and 
enhancements have amounted to a multimillion-dollar investment in the code. 
 
Toward the end of 1995, it became clear that the efficiencies realized by the 
maintenance of a single source code for use by both NRC and DOE were being 
overcome by the extra effort required to accommodate sometimes conflicting 
requirements. The code was therefore “split” into two versions, one for NRC and 
the other for DOE. The DOE version maintained all of had been sponsored by the 
DOE before and after the split. 
 
4.2.2. Relationship of RELAP5-3D to prior versions 
At the outset of the decision to split the code into NRC and DOE versions, the INL 
recognized the importance of retaining the pedigree stemming from the extensive 
validation history of RELAP5/MOD3. Consequently, the developmental activities 
with respect to RELAP5-3D since the split have been carefully integrated so as not 
to compromise this legacy validation. In fact, virtually all of the enhancements in 
RELAP5-3D are optional and supplemental to the proven performance of 
RELAP5/MOD3.2. Consequently, users of RELAP5-3D can confidently apply the 
code using existing, one-dimensional RELAP5/MOD3.2 input decks and expect 
their results to be the same or improved. 
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4.2.3. The Thermal-hydraulic part: the RELAP5-3D code 
RELAP5-3D is a highly generic code that, in addition to calculating the behavior of 
a reactor coolant system during a transient, can be used for simulation of a wide 
variety of hydraulic and thermal transients in both nuclear and nonnuclear systems 
involving mixtures of vapor, liquid, non-condensable gases, and non-volatile solute. 
 
The mission of the RELAP5-3D development program was to develop a code 
version suitable for the analysis of all transients and postulated accidents in LWR 
systems, including both large- and small-break loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) 
as well as the full range of operational and fusion reactor transient applications.  
 
Additional capabilities include space reactor simulations, gas cooled reactor 
applications, fast breeder reactor modeling, and cardiovascular blood flow 
simulations. 
 
The RELAP5-3D code is based on a non-homogeneous and non-equilibrium model 
for the two-phase system that is solved by a fast, partially implicit numerical 
scheme to permit economical calculation of system transients. The objective of the 
RELAP5-3D development effort from the outset was to produce a code that 
included important first-order effects necessary for accurate prediction of system 
transients but that was sufficiently simple and cost effective so that parametric or 
sensitivity studies were possible. 
 
The code includes many generic component models from which general systems 
can be simulated. The component models include pumps, valves, pipes, heat 
releasing or absorbing structures, reactor kinetics, electric heaters, jet pumps, 
turbines, separators, annuli, pressurizers, feedwater heaters, ECC mixers, 
accumulators, and control system components. In addition, special process models 
are included for effects such as form loss, flow at an abrupt area change, 
branching, choked flow, boron tracking, and non-condensable gas transport. 
 
The system mathematical models are coupled into an efficient code structure. The 
code includes extensive input checking capability to help the user discover input 
errors and inconsistencies. Also included are free-format input, restart, 
renodalization, and variable output edit features. These user conveniences were 
developed in recognition that generally the major cost associated with the use of a 
system transient code is in the engineering labor and time involved in accumulating 
system data and developing system models, while the computer cost associated 
with generation of the final result is usually small. 
 
The development of the models and code versions that constitute RELAP5-3D has 
spanned more than two decades from the early stages of RELAP5 numerical 
scheme development (circa 1976) to the present. RELAP5-3D represents the 
aggregate accumulation of experience in modeling reactor core behavior during 
accidents, two-phase flow processes, and LWR systems. The code development 
has benefited from extensive application and comparison to experimental data in 
the LOFT, PBF, Semiscale, ACRR, NRU, and other experimental programs. 
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The RELAP5-3D version contains several important enhancements over previous 
versions of the code. The most prominent attribute that distinguishes the RELAP5-
3D code from the previous versions is the fully integrated, multi-dimensional 
thermal- hydraulic and kinetic modeling capability. This removes any restrictions on 
the applicability of the code to the full range of postulated reactor accidents. 
 
Enhancements include a new matrix solver for 3D problems, new thermodynamic 
properties for water, and improved time advancement for greater robustness. The 
multi-dimensional component in RELAP5-3D was developed to allow the user to 
more accurately model the multi-dimensional flow behavior that can be exhibited in 
any component or region of a LWR system. Typically, this will be the lower plenum, 
core, upper plenum and downcomer regions of an LWR. However, the model is 
general, and is not restricted to use in the reactor vessel. The component defines a 
one, two, or three- dimensional array of volumes and the internal junctions 
connecting them. The geometry can be either Cartesian (x, y, z) or cylindrical (r, θ, 
z). An orthogonal, three-dimensional grid is defined by mesh interval input data in 
each of the three coordinate directions.  
 
The new Border-Profile Lower Upper (BPLU) matrix solver is used to efficiently 
solve sparse linear systems of the form AX = B. BPLU is designed to take 
advantage of pipelines, vector hardware, and shared-memory parallel architecture 
to run fast. BPLU is most efficient for solving systems that correspond to networks, 
such as pipes, but is efficient for any system that it can permute into border-banded 
form. Speed-ups over the previously used sparse matrix solver are achieved in 
RELAP5-3D running with BPLU on multi-dimensional problems, for which it was 
intended. For one-dimensional problems, the BPLU solver runs as fast or faster 
than the previously used sparse matrix solver. 
 
4.2.4. The three dimensional neutron kinetics routine: the NESTLE 
code 
4.2.4.1. The Steady-State and the Transient Problem 
The RELAP5-3D code allows to calculate a 3D core power distribution thanks to 
multi-dimensional neutron kinetics models based on NESTLE code, developed by 
Paul Turinsky and his co-workers at the North Carolina State University. This 
feature allows to compute the reactor fission power in either Cartesian or 
hexagonal geometry [24].  
 
The subroutines taken from the NESTLE source code used to solve these 
problems were modified to be compatible with the coding standards and data 
storage methodology used in RELAP5-3D, and were inserted into RELAP5-3D. 
RELAP5-3D was modified to call the appropriate NESTLE subroutines depending 
upon the options chosen by the user. 
 
The Nodal Expansion Method (NEM) is used to solve the neutron diffusion 
equations for the neutron flux in either two or four neutron energy groups. Quartic  
or quadratic polynomial expansions for the transverse integrated fluxes are 
employed for Cartesian or hexagonal geometries, respectively. E.g., the one 
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dimensional flux obtained by the transverse integration can be written (in the case 
of Cartesian geometry) as: 
 
 
( 2 ) 
where φ1g is the node average flux, implying for Equation (2) to be true that fn(x) 
must be chosen such that the basis functions satisfy 
, N=1 to 4  
( 3 )  
Transverse leakage terms are represented by a quadratic polynomial or constant 
for Cartesian or hexagonal geometry, respectively. E.g., the x-direction spatial 
dependence of the y-direction transverse leakage is approximated by: 
 
( 4 )  
where L1gy  is the average y-directed leakage in node l, and the coefficients ρ1gy1 
and ρ1gy2 can be expressed in terms of average y-directed leakages of the two 
nearest-neighbor nodes along the x-direction (i.e. nodes l-1 and l+1) so as to 
preserve the node average leakages of these three nodes. Discontinuity factors 
(DFs) are utilized to correct for homogenization errors.  
 
Transient problems utilize a user specified number of delayed neutron precursor 
groups. Time discretization is done in a fully implicit manner utilizing a first-order 
difference operator for the diffusion equation, or: 
 
 
( 5 )  
The precursor equations are analytically solved assuming the fission rate behaves 
linearly over a time-step. 
 
Independent of problem type, an outer-inner iterative strategy is employed to solve 
the resulting matrix system. Outer iterations can employ Chebychev acceleration 
and the Fixed Source Scaling Technique to accelerate convergence [27], [28], [29], 
[30]. Inner iterations employ either a Red-Black Point or Line SOR iteration 
schemes, dependent upon problem geometry. Values of the energy group 
dependent optimum relaxation parameter and the number of inner iterations per 
outer iteration to achieve a specified L2 relative error reduction are determined a 
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priori. The non-linear iterative strategy associated with NEM is utilized. This 
technique was developed by Smith [31], [32], [33], and successfully implemented 
into the Studsvik QPANDA and SIMULATE code packages. 
 
The basic idea is applicable to the standard FDM solution algorithm of the multi-
group diffusion equation. Solving the FDM based equation utilizing an outer-inner 
iterative strategy, every ∆N0 outer iterations (where ∆N0 is somewhat arbitrary but 
can be optimized) the so-called “two-node problem” calculation (a spatially-
decoupled NEM calculation spanning two adjoining nodes) is performed for every 
interface (for all nodes and in all directions) to provide an improved estimate of the 
net surface current at that particular interface. Subsequently, the NEM estimated 
net surface currents are used to update (i.e. change) the original FDM diffusion 
coupling coefficients. Outer iterations of the FDM based equation are then 
continued utilizing the updated FDM coupling coefficients for ∆N0 outer iterations. 
 
The entire process is then repeated. This procedure of updating the FDM couplings 
is a convergent technique which progressively forces the FDM equation to yield the 
higher-order NEM predicted values of the net surface currents while satisfying the 
nodal balance equation, thus yielding the NEM results for the node-average flux 
and fundamental mode eigenvalue. The advantages of this technique come in 
many forms;  
• the storage requirements are minimal because the two-node problem 
arrays are re-usable (disposable) at each interface,  
• the rate of convergence is nearly comparable to that of the base FDM 
algorithm being used,  
• the number of iteratively determined unknowns is reduced by a factor of 6 
(node flux vs. partial surface current),  
• and the simplicity of the algorithm and ease of implementation, compared 
to any other nodal technique, is far superior. 
 
In addition, by selecting to not update the coupling coefficients in the non-linear 
iterative strategy, the finite difference method (FDM) representation, utilizing the 
box scheme, of the few-group neutron diffusion equation results. The implication is 
that the model can be utilized to solve either the nodal or FDM representation of 
the few-group neutron diffusion equation. In Fig. 43 the overall nested iterative 
solution strategy used within RELAP5-3D code for each attempted advancement is 
showed. 
 
Two or four energy groups can be utilized, with all groups being thermal groups 
(i.e. upscatter exits) if desired. Three, two and one dimensional models can be 
utilized. Various core symmetry options are available, including quarter, half and 
full core for Cartesian geometry and one-sixth, one-third and full core for hexagonal 
geometry. Zero flux, non-reentrant current, reflective and cyclic boundary 
conditions are treated. 
 
 
 
 
 86 
 
Fig. 43 – Overview of the nested iterative solution strategy 
The neutron kinetics subroutines require as input the neutron cross-sections in the 
computational nodes of the kinetics mesh. A neutron cross-section model has been 
implemented that allows the neutron cross-sections to be parameterized as 
functions of RELAP5-3D heat structure temperatures, fluid void fraction or fluid 
density, poison concentration, and fluid temperatures. Thus this feature allows 
RELAP5-3D to be suitable for RBMK studies, allowing to calculate the graphite 
moderator temperature, the coolant density and of course the fuel temperature 
feed-back effects. 
 
A flexible coupling scheme between the neutron kinetics mesh and the thermal-
hydraulics spatial mesh has been developed to minimize the input data needed to 
specify the neutron cross-sections in terms of RELAP5-3D thermal-hydraulic 
variables.  
 
A control rod model has been implemented so that the effect of the initial position 
and subsequent movement of the control rods during transients may be taken into 
account in the computation of the neutron cross-sections. The control system has 
been modified to allow the movement of control rods by control variables. 
 
4.2.4.2. The Cross Section and the feedbacks 
The inputs to the kinetics modules in RELAP5-3D consist of neutron cross 
sections, boundary conditions, control flags, control data, etc. Neutron cross 
sections are needed for each neutron energy group and kinetics node and consist 
of the diffusion coefficient (D), absorption cross section (Σa), fission cross section 
(Σf), the product of the mean number of secondary neutrons per fission and the 
fission cross section (νΣf), and the scattering cross section for scattering into the 
neutron energy group from the other neutron energy groups (Σsg‘g). Discontinuity 
factors (DFs) for each face of the kinetics nodes are also needed for each energy 
group. The user supplies the control information and the boundary conditions as 
part of the required input data. The neutron cross sections are computed from a 
function selected from a set of built-in functions or a user supplied function whose 
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independent variables are weighted averages of RELAP5-3D hydraulic or heat 
structure variables.  
 
There are four built-in neutron cross section functions from which the user can 
select or the user may supply his own function in the form of an external 
subroutine. The same user specified function is used for the computation of the 
neutron cross sections for all kinetics nodes. The coefficients in the first three built-
in cross section functions for each of the cross sections are supplied through user 
input and a set of coefficients for the neutron cross sections is called a 
composition.  
 
The user defines a number of compositions and specifies which composition is to 
be used for the computation of the neutron cross sections in each kinetics node in 
the reactor core model. The mapping of compositions to nodes is accomplished 
through the use of composition figures. A composition figure specifies the 
composition for all of the kinetics nodes in a single axial plane in the reactor model 
and composition figures are required for each axial plane in the reactor model. The 
user may specify as many composition figures as needed to describe the reactor 
and a composition figure may be assigned to more than one axial plane in the 
reactor model.  
 
The user specifies the volumes and heat structures to be used in computing the 
weighted averages of thermal-hydraulic variables as well as the values of the 
weighting factors. A set of volume averaged properties consists of an average fluid 
density (or fluid vapor fraction depending on which neutron cross section function is 
selected by the user), an average fluid temperature, and an average poison 
density, while the average heat structure property is simply the average heat 
structure temperature. 
 
The group of volumes and heat structures used to define sets of average thermal-
hydraulic properties is called a zone. One of the built-in cross section functions 
uses a single set of average properties in a zone while the other two built-in 
neutron cross section functions use multiple sets of average volume and average 
heat structure properties in a zone. The user defines a number of zones and 
specifies which set of zone average thermal-hydraulic properties is to be used for 
the computation of the neutron cross sections in each node of the reactor core 
through the use of zone figures. A zone figure specifies which zone is to be used 
for the computation of the neutron cross sections for each node in an axial plane of 
the reactor. Zone figures are required for each axial plane in the reactor model and 
the same zone figure may be specified for more than one axial level. In addition to 
the weighted averages of hydraulic and heat structure variables, the neutron cross 
section function uses the position of the control rods as another independent 
variable.  
 
A control rod model is used to determine the positions of the control rods and to 
compute the control rod variable needed by the neutron cross section function on 
each axial level in the reactor core. The three neutron cross section functions that 
the user may select to compute the neutron cross sections and the control rod 
model are described in the following section. 
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4.2.4.3. The GEN neutron cross section model 
The last built-in cross section model is the most general built-in cross section 
model and was developed [34] as part of the RELAP5-3D code development 
project. The GEN cross section function uses a form similar to the HWR 
formulation except that the variable portion of the cross section is defined for three 
control states, active controlled, driver controlled and uncontrolled states. The GEN 
cross section function is given by 
 
 
( 6 ) 
where: 
 
Cfla, d = control fraction for active and driver portions of the control rods in 
node l  
 
Σxc
a,d,u = base cross section of reaction type x for composition c for active 
controlled, driver controlled, or uncontrolled state 
 
δΣxc
a,d,u = variation of cross section for reaction type x for composition c 
due the changes in the thermal-hydraulic variables from the base thermal-
hydraulic state for active controlled, driver controlled, and uncontrolled 
state 
 
and composition c has been specified for node l. 
The variations for the active controlled, driver controlled, and uncontrolled states 
are given by: 
 
 
( 7 ) 
where the coefficients a, b, c, d, and e are input separately for the active 
controlled, driver controlled, and uncontrolled states.  
 
Therefore, each neutron cross section is the sum of the base cross section and the 
change in the cross section: 
 
 
 
 
 89 
 
( 8 ) 
Where: 
 
Σxl
base = base cross section of type x in node l 
 
δΣxl = change in cross section x in node l due to changes in the thermal-hydraulic 
state of the zone to which node l corresponds 
 
Cfl = control fraction in node l 
 
axin = coefficient for change in cross section x of composition n due to changes 
in average moderator temperature of volume region i 
 
∆Tmik = change in average moderator temperature in volume region i of zone k, 
(Tmik - Tminbase) 
 
Tmik = average moderator temperature in volume region i of zone k 
 
Tminbase = average moderator temperature in volume region i for composition n at 
base thermal-hydraulic conditions, e.g. full power steady state 
 
NV = number of volume regions in each zone 
 
bxin = linear coefficient in change of cross section x of composition n due to 
changes in average moderator density in volume region i 
 
∆ρmik = change in average moderator density in volume region i of zone k, (ρmik - 
ρmin
base) 
 
ρmin
base = average moderator density in volume region i for composition n at base 
thermal-hydraulic state 
 
cxin = quadratic coefficient in change of cross section x of composition n due to 
changes in average moderator density in volume region i 
 
dxin = coefficient for change in cross section x of composition n due to changes 
in average poison density in volume region i 
 
∆Bik = change in average poison concentration in volume region i of zone k, (Bik - 
Binbase) 
 
Binbase = average poison concentration in volume region i for composition n at base 
thermal-hydraulic condition 
 
exin = coefficient for change in cross section x of composition n due to changes 
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in average structure temperature of structure region i 
 
∆Tsik = change in the average structure temperature in structure region i of zone k 
(Tsik - Tsin base) 
 
∆Tsin base= average structure temperature in structure region i of composition n for 
base thermal-hydraulic state 
 
NS = number of structure regions in each zone. 
 
The nodal discontinuity factors are also computed from Equation (6) except that the 
thermal-hydraulic variations are identically zero and are therefore not included. 
 
The GEN model subdivides each zone into a number of regions and define 
averages of volume and heat structure quantities for each region of a zone. The 
number of regions in a zone for the computation of volume average properties may 
be different from the number of regions in a zone for the computation of the heat 
structure average properties, but the number of volume regions and the number of 
heat structure regions is the same for each zone. The region average moderator 
temperature, the region average moderator density, the region average poison 
density, and the region structure temperature are computed using equations like, 
e.g., equation (9): 
 
 
( 9 ) 
where: 
 
Tmik = average moderator temperature in volume region I of zone k 
 
Wmijk = moderator temperature weighting factor for volume j in volume region i of 
zone k. 
 
Other average quantities are calculated in a similar manner. The GEN cross 
section model can also use either the moderator density or the moderator void 
fraction depending upon which option the user specifies.  
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4.3. The Cross Section Processing methodology  
4.3.1. Introduction 
The execution of the 3D NK calculations requires the development and the use of a 
methodology for the cross section data processing. Each 3D NK code has its own 
input formalism for the use of these data and different approaches are possible. 
The GRNSPG was since, its institution, performing calculations with the most 
advanced of these methodologies and was actively participating in International 
Research Programs dealing with researches in such field, e.g. [43]. Thus, the PhD 
activities for the cross section processing were performed in such a framework.  
4.3.2. The State of the Art methodologies 
The need for a more accurate method of modelling cross-section variations for off-
nominal core conditions is becoming an important issue with the increased use of 
coupled three-dimensional (3-D) neutronics/thermal-hydraulic simulations. In 
traditional reactor core analysis for both steady-state and transient calculations of 
LWR conventional nuclear power plants, condensed few-group two-dimensional (2-
D) cross-section sets are used as input data.  
 
These cross-section sets are generated by separate database calculations using 
characteristic weighting spectra and are parameterized in terms of burn-up and 
thermal-hydraulic feedback parameters. Under the real reactor conditions, 
especially in transient situations, these spectra change and the 2-D cross-section 
modeling based on a parameterization model only approximately describes the 
effects of neutron flux distributions, which change in space, time and energy. This 
so-called 2-D off-line cross-section generation and modeling constitutes a basic 
input data uncertainty affecting the results of coupled 3-D neutronics/thermal-
hydraulic calculations. 
 
Historically, a two-step process is applied in traditional reactor core analysis for 
both steady-state and transient applications. The first step in the process is to 
calculate few-group cross-sections with different dependencies (i.e. as a function of 
burn-up and local feedback parameters) for various regions of a reactor core in 2-D 
geometry, employing lattice physics codes such as CASMO [35], [36] and HELIOS 
[54]. The second step is to use this cross-section data in a 3-D nodal diffusion code 
for determination of different parameters throughout the reactor core. There are 
several shortcomings in this approach associated with both cross-section 
generation and cross-section modeling. In regard to the cross-section generation 
two shortcomings are addressed: 
 
• The use of 2-D lattice physics codes for cross-section generation, based 
on the fact that the majority of current lattice physics codes use the 
collision probability method (CPM), becomes cumbersome and impractical 
in 3-D geometries. 
• Current methodology homogenizes representative assemblies assuming 
symmetry (reflective) boundary conditions. This approach introduces 
significant errors in the determination of neutron flow among assemblies in 
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a real reactor core configuration. The errors are somewhat mitigated by the 
use of ad hoc assembly discontinuity factors for conventional reactor core 
analysis. 
 
The amount of few-group cross-section data necessary for steady-state, depletion 
and transient analysis, is significant. Standard cross-section modeling for coupled 
3-D steady state and transient simulations are based on the data generated in the 
so-called base and branch calculations using a lattice physics code. The cross-
section history and instantaneous dependence models developed in this way are 
based on burn-up and local feedback parameters (i.e. fuel temperature, pressure, 
moderator temperature, void, boron concentration). The thermal-hydraulics model 
coupled with the neutronics simulator calculates these feedback parameters. 
Changing each of the parameters one at a time develops the instantaneous cross-
section dependencies. 
A typical dependence of a cross-section on a particular parameter is displayed in 
Fig. 44. This shows that over a large range of values the cross-section does not 
behave linearly.  
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Fig. 44 – Cross Section dependence 
More interesting cross-section behavior is shown in Fig. 45. The figure shows the 
interdependence of cross-sections when two parameters are varied at once. The 
cross-sections generated in this way are called cross-terms, since they are not 
dependent on just one parameter, but on all parameters. Such cross-term cross-
sections have to be taken into account in transient analysis since they are actual 
points on the curved surface. 
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Fig. 45 – Cross-section interdependence between fuel temperature and moderator 
temperature 
However, standard methods (currently used in core steady-state, depletion and 
transient analysis) such as the polynomial fitting procedure (usually based on 
Taylor expansions) do not take these cross-terms into account. Since these 
methods utilize no cross-term dependencies on local feedback parameters they are 
especially inaccurate for transients in which large departures from nominal 
conditions exist. 
 
The typical calculation points necessary to develop the cross-section derivatives 
used in the polynomial fitting procedure can be seen from the schematic given in 
Fig. 46. For simplicity only two parameters are shown, fuel temperature (TF) and 
moderator temperature (TM).  
 
This method uses a cross-section calculation at average conditions, shown as the 
black dot, as a reference value. From the reference value parameter perturbations 
are performed to develop cross-sections at different conditions, shown by the red 
dots. In this method only one parameter is varied at a time, all other parameters 
remain at average conditions.  
 
Once the new cross-section is established along with the magnitude of the 
individual parameter variation, a derivative can be constructed which is used 
directly in the polynomial equation. Using these derivatives along with the average 
cross-sections, a cross-section can be calculated at any reactor condition. 
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Fig. 46 – Cross-section calculation points for the polynomial fitting procedure 
 
The most significant problem with this procedure is that it becomes more 
inaccurate as the parameter variations get farther away from average conditions. 
The areas where the polynomial fitting procedure becomes inaccurate are shown 
as the blue hashes in Fig. 47. The increased inaccuracy of the cross-sections 
calculated in these regions is more important in transient analysis where parameter 
variations extend into this region during a typical transient calculation. 
 
 
Fig. 47 – Areas of inaccurate cross-section calculation using the polynomial fitting 
procedure 
The widely used CASMO/SIMULATE cross-section parameterization model 
attempts to model the cross-section cross-term dependence involving an 
approximate type of cross-section representation [35]. 
 
Each cross-section can be evaluated as a summation of base and partial values. 
The base cross-sections represent the burn-up dependence (exposure, spectral 
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history and control history) while the partial cross-sections represent the 
instantaneous dependence on local feedback parameters. Performing branch 
calculations generates the partial cross-sections, where again as with the 
polynomial fitting procedure only one feedback parameter is changed for a given 
perturbation. The model tries to account for the cross-term dependence by using 
separate partial cross-sections for different feedback effects. While the model is an 
improvement over the polynomial fitting procedure it is limited to small 
perturbations. 
 
To remedy the inaccuracies of the procedures described above, PSU has 
developed a sophisticated, unique cross-section representation methodology for 3-
D coupled transient calculations [37]. The method developed at PSU employs not 
only the cross-section at average conditions, but also the cross-term cross-
sections, as can be seen in Fig. 48. Cross-term cross-sections are cross-sections 
calculated by varying two or more parameters at the same time. The cross-sections 
are then tabulated in N-dimensional tables. The N-dimensional tables are then 
interpolated for the appropriate cross-section value. The tabulated cross-sections 
completely encompass the full range of conditions that may be present during the 
initial steady state and the transient. This method is called the Adaptive High-order 
Table Look-up Method (AHTLM) [38]. In the AHTLM the user develops an 
operating condition box-envelope. This box bounds the expected range of change 
of the feedback parameters during both steady-state and transient operation. The 
cross-sections are then calculated for the bounding box edges and within the box. 
These reference cross-section values are placed in multi-dimensional tables that 
are used in a sophisticated table interpolation method that is employed to calculate 
the cross-sections. 
 
 
 
Fig. 48 – The PSU transient cross-section representation 
 
The advantage of this method is that there is no chance that the calculation of the 
cross-section can be outside the bounds set by the user and to involve 
extrapolation procedure. In addition, this approach helps to improve the accuracy 
of modeling the cross-section variations by avoiding user-calculated coefficients 
that could contain errors. This method takes into account the non-linear thermal-
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hydraulic feedback parameter phenomena that are critical for the accurate 
prediction of cross-section behavior. 
 
4.3.3. The Methodology for the RBMK calculations 
The RBMK cross section libraries were developed according to the AHTLM 
procedures. As reported in section 4.5.2, data were parameterized considering a 
relevant set of variables (fuel temperature, moderator temperature, coolant 
density), and a their suitable range. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the RELAP5-
3D (NESTLE) did not allowed on-line cross section interpolation (see section 
4.2.4.2), several relevant modifications were performed.  
 
A 4D linear interpolation routine was used for calculating at the beginning of the 
transient the reference cross section. Cross section variation coefficients were 
instead calculated using a Least Square Methods interpolation routine. Thus, the 
resulting cross section representation was a standard “polynomial fitting” procedure 
(see section 4.5.2.2 for more details). A check of trend of the main cross sections 
as function of the main physical parameters confirmed their linear behavior, 
allowing the NESTLE GEN Cross Section representation without major 
approximations. An example of the main cross sections trends is given in Fig. 49, 
Fig. 50. 
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Fig. 49 – RBMK Libraries Cross Section – Thermal absorption trend for 
composition 29 (see section 4.5.2) 
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Fig. 50 – RBMK Libraries Cross Section – Thermal fission trend for composition 29 
(see section 4.5.2) 
Nevertheless, the calculated cross section libraries structure, allows a future use of 
an on-line interpolation as soon as RELAP5-3D will include this option. 
 
4.4. The coupling methodology 
Certain requirements with regard to the coupling of thermal-hydraulic system codes 
and neutron kinetics codes should be considered, e.g., [39], [40], [41], [42]. The 
objective of these requirements is to provide accurate solutions in a reasonable 
amount of CPU time in coupled simulations of detailed operational transient and 
accident scenarios.  
 
These requirements are met by the development and implementation of six basic 
components of the coupling methodologies: 
1) Coupling approach – integration algorithm or parallel processing. 
2) Ways of coupling – internal or external coupling. 
3) Spatial mesh overlays. 
4) Coupled time-step algorithms. 
5) Coupling numerics – explicit, semi-implicit and implicit schemes. 
6) Coupled convergence schemes 
 
Detailed explanation of the previous points can be found in [43]. It should be noted 
that for the execution of the plant SS and transient calculation, RELAP5-3D code 
exploits an integration algorithm (i.e., NESTLE code is fully integrated into the 
system code) performing an internal coupling. Mesh overlays between NESTLE 
and RELAP5-3D TH module are managed through the use of dedicated input deck 
cards. The time steps are instead governed by the TH module. 
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4.5. The procedure for code application including the 
nodalization 
4.5.1. Introduction 
The calculation of 3D NK TH transients by a system code like RELAP5-3D code 
requires several “auxiliary” steps, or development of cross section libraries and 
validation calculations. In Fig. 51 is given the main steps followed for the 
calculations performed during this PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
Fig. 51 – Codes and Models developed for 3D NK TH RBMK analyses 
The firs step concerned the developed of a Smolensk-3 TH nodalization for the 
RELAP5 TH code. A very detailed model of the plant was developed, 
comprehensive of both the MCC, the SD, part of the SL and with a core TH 
description based on 50 FC. Active and passive heat structures were also taken 
into account. This model is described in section 4.5.3. 
The second step concerned the development of a 3D NK model. This was then 
coupled with the full TH hydraulic model of the previous step and with a simplified 
one. The 3D NK model and its coupling scheme are described in section 4.5.4 and 
4.5.4.1 respectively. 
A third (parallel to the second one) step was the development, in collaboration with 
the RDFMG of PSU, of suitable RBMK cross section libraries by the HELIOS code. 
This model is described in section 4.5.2.  
Coupled codes calculations of a specific transient, the FC blockage, prompted the 
necessity to perform detailed Monte Carlo simulation of the involved Fuel Cells. 
This constituted the fourth step and it was performed developing a MCNP5 model, 
described in section 4.5.5. 
The fifth and last step was the development by the lattice physics code DRAGON 
of fuel cell spectrum-weighted microscopic cross sections libraries for Xenon, in 
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order to simulate by the 3D NK TH RELAP5-3D code the low power transient, i.e., 
a Chernobyl like accident. The DRAGON model is described in section 4.5.6 
 
4.5.2. The HELIOS code model 
4.5.2.1. Core geometry 
The developed HELIOS RBMK fuel assembly (cell) model was a single cell with 
reflective boundary conditions, with which depletion and branch calculations were 
performed. In addition a HELIOS RBMK non-fuel assembly (cell) model was 
developed. In this case the cell was surrounded by eight fuel cells (color set 
calculations).  
 
All of the fuel cells were assumed to have the same burnup. The graphite 
temperature was assumed to be uniform in the whole color set (macro cell). Only 
branch calculations were performed with this model by varying coolant density in 
the non-fuel cell, coolant density in surrounding fuel cells, and graphite 
temperature in the non-fuel cell  
 
The HELIOS sophisticated methods address properly all of these issues and 
HELIOS can be used for the RBMK cross-section generation and modeling. There 
was no need for additional ad-hoc corrections of the macroscopic cross-sections or 
burnup as it is generally done for RBMK with the cross-sections generated by other 
codes (e.g., WIMS, see section 4.1.2).  
 
Radially, the core was divided into square cells with a pitch 25.0 cm, each 
corresponding to one channel, plus a four rows of radial reflector blocks of the 
same size (shaded area in Fig. 35, Fig. 55 and Fig. 56).  
 
As reported in Chapter 2, there are a total of 2488 channels, 1570 fuel channels, 
314 non-fuel channels, and 604 reflector channels. Axially, the reactor core was 
divided into 10 layers with a height (starting from the bottom) of 70.0 cm, adding up 
to a total active core height of 700 cm. Both upper and lower axial reflectors have a 
thickness of 30 cm.  
 
The axial nodalization scheme accounts for material changes in the fuel design 
and for the exposure variations. Zero flux boundary conditions were specified on 
outer reflector surface for both radial and axial reflectors. The geometric model for 
the developed elementary cells is respectively shown in and in Fig. 52 for the Fuel-
Cell and Fig. 53 for the Non-Fuel Cell.  
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Fig. 52 – HELIOS modeling of RBMK FC cell 
 
Fig. 53 – HELIOS modeling of RBMK MCR cell 
The number of axial mesh used in the HELIOS core modeling is given in Fig. 54. A 
detailed description of the TH coupled part can be found further below in this 
document. 
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Fig. 54 – Core neutron kinetic mesh 
Fuel channels with different 235U enrichments are present in the core. 48 fuel 
channels have 2.0% enriched fuel and 1522 fuel channels have 2.4% enriched 
fuel. HELIOS model took into account these differences and the reactor fuel 
burnup map. The three different types of control rods were also modeled, or the 
155 manual control rods with its three parts – absorber, connecting rod, and 
displacer (made of graphite) –, the shortened control rods (32 in the core) with its 
two parts – absorber and displacer – and the safety control rod type (24 in the 
core) with their absorber. The rest of the non-fuel channels modeled were axial 
detector channels (12 in the core), additional absorber (90 in the core), and water 
column (1 in the core). Each of these different fuel channels, were identified by a 
number. Their physical characteristics (i.e., enrichment, burnup, fuel/non fuel 
channel) are reported in Tab. 16, Tab. 17. Their location in the reactor core lattice 
are instead given in Fig. 55, Fig. 56. 
 
Tab. 16 – Definition of fuel channel types 
 
Channel 
type Enrichment, % w/o Exposure, MWd/kgU 
1 2.0 6.75 
2 2.0 14.25 
3 2.0 14.75 
4 2.0 15.25 
5 2.0 15.75 
6 2.0 16.25 
1
12
CORE MESHING  
(10 x 0.7 m) 
2 to 11 
Bottom Reflector
Top Reflector
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Tab. 16 (cont.) – Definition of fuel channel types 
 
Channel 
type Enrichment, % w/o Exposure, MWd/kgU 
7 2.0 16.75 
8 2.0 17.25 
9 2.0 17.75 
10 2.0 18.25 
11 2.0 19.75 
12 2.0 20.25 
13 2.4 0.25 
14 2.4 0.75 
15 2.4 1.25 
16 2.4 1.75 
17 2.4 2.25 
18 2.4 2.75 
19 2.4 3.25 
20 2.4 3.75 
21 2.4 4.25 
22 2.4 4.75 
23 2.4 5.25 
24 2.4 5.75 
25 2.4 6.25 
26 2.4 6.75 
27 2.4 7.25 
28 2.4 7.75 
29 2.4 8.25 
30 2.4 8.75 
31 2.4 9.25 
32 2.4 9.75 
33 2.4 10.25 
34 2.4 10.75 
35 2.4 11.25 
36 2.4 11.75 
37 2.4 12.25 
38 2.4 12.75 
39 2.4 13.25 
40 2.4 13.75 
41 2.4 14.25 
42 2.4 14.75 
43 2.4 15.25 
44 2.4 15.75 
45 2.4 16.25 
46 2.4 16.75 
47 2.4 17.25 
48 2.4 17.75 
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Tab. 16 (cont.) – Definition of fuel channel types 
 
Channel 
type Enrichment, % w/o Exposure, MWd/kgU 
49 2.4 18.25 
50 2.4 18.75 
51 2.4 19.25 
52 2.4 19.75 
53 2.4 20.25 
54 2.4 20.75 
55 2.4 21.25 
56 2.4 21.75 
57 2.4 22.25 
58 2.4 22.75 
59 2.4 23.25 
60 2.4 23.75 
61 2.4 24.25 
 
 
Tab. 17 – Definition of non-fuel channel types 
 
Channel 
type Description 
Enrichment of 
surrounding Fuel 
Channels, % w/o 
Exposure of 
surrounding 
Fuel Channels, 
MWd/kgU 
62 Axial Detector Channel 2.4 10.00 
63 Manual Control Rods 2.4 10.00 
64 Shortened Control Rods 2.4 10.00 
65 Safety Control Rods 2.4 10.00 
66 Additional Absorber 2.4 10.00 
67 Water Column 2.4 10.00 
68 Radial Reflector 2.4 10.00 
69 Radial Reflector 2.4 10.00 
70 Radial Reflector 2.4 10.00 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 70 70 70 70 70 1
2 70 70 70 70 70 69 69 69 69 69 2
3 70 70 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 3
4 70 70 69 69 69 69 69 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 4
5 70 70 69 69 69 69 68 68 68 27 22 39 34 38 34 28 5
6 70 69 69 69 69 68 68 34 42 3 63 40 52 31 63 26 66 6
7 70 69 69 69 68 68 31 28 51 13 29 18 45 36 46 22 13 36 7
8 70 69 69 69 68 20 64 35 15 26 63 51 33 47 64 15 52 34 65 8
9 70 69 69 69 68 25 30 26 19 55 33 16 20 24 16 21 31 38 16 36 9
10 70 69 69 69 68 33 63 13 66 47 65 51 66 42 63 39 66 48 63 25 66 10
11 70 69 69 69 68 34 27 50 19 51 32 23 40 31 30 36 21 13 26 20 34 52 11
12 70 69 69 69 68 29 63 16 40 33 63 30 42 45 62 14 35 30 63 46 39 50 63 12
13 70 69 69 69 68 33 21 5 13 47 16 47 24 13 27 46 44 27 20 14 33 19 33 29 13
14 70 69 69 68 2 63 46 37 19 63 54 66 40 63 35 66 51 63 48 66 5 63 48 66 14
15 70 69 69 68 20 30 15 51 9 52 26 39 28 17 28 23 29 25 41 20 16 24 31 34 19 15
16 70 69 69 68 64 39 48 22 63 39 37 21 64 13 10 46 63 55 61 28 64 46 54 40 65 16
17 70 69 69 68 26 5 19 43 29 43 24 45 28 43 25 21 37 27 15 37 50 22 31 39 18 34 17
18 70 69 69 68 34 22 7 65 21 66 14 63 26 66 16 65 49 66 51 63 42 66 47 63 23 66 18
19 70 69 69 68 27 4 14 52 40 3 50 43 24 18 51 36 41 19 5 29 25 18 27 31 35 34 47 19
20 70 69 69 68 23 19 63 29 33 48 62 29 34 40 63 44 7 29 63 14 43 37 63 16 47 22 62 20
21 70 69 69 68 34 49 15 22 53 36 19 54 16 27 19 25 56 35 44 7 33 60 26 30 5 49 42 21
22 70 69 68 28 63 29 66 44 63 46 66 23 63 44 66 47 63 23 60 19 63 53 66 39 63 22 66 22
23 70 69 68 15 50 24 34 18 33 25 19 30 43 49 38 23 45 17 53 33 41 51 36 45 14 53 50 23
24 70 69 69 68 32 41 18 64 49 52 15 63 55 38 20 64 47 39 34 63 21 45 47 64 19 37 27 65 24
25 70 69 69 68 27 13 48 21 13 36 31 20 32 28 46 24 30 53 55 27 16 36 22 33 29 47 20 55 25
26 70 69 69 68 19 63 25 66 17 63 51 66 47 63 31 66 47 63 23 66 56 63 50 66 22 63 26 66 26
27 70 69 69 68 29 49 18 22 36 5 27 19 29 22 15 42 37 47 18 33 29 47 34 53 38 50 36 45 27
28 70 69 69 68 18 36 38 65 37 33 13 63 15 38 47 65 44 43 52 62 41 22 47 65 29 29 13 63 28
29 70 69 69 68 51 51 45 23 16 47 40 26 7 44 24 46 54 25 29 20 25 34 67 50 17 49 32 46 29
30 70 69 69 68 17 63 18 66 32 63 56 38 59 63 45 66 16 63 46 66 53 63 19 66 24 63 52 66 30
31 70 69 69 68 27 48 24 40 28 48 28 55 37 47 16 22 55 40 18 25 53 25 45 29 47 30 36 42 31
32 70 69 69 68 34 44 19 64 21 13 47 63 38 8 28 64 48 44 36 63 14 31 18 64 20 14 45 65 32
33 70 69 69 68 48 25 14 41 26 38 34 49 32 13 24 18 26 56 32 26 36 53 27 15 27 36 46 35 33
34 70 69 68 18 63 45 66 48 63 17 66 21 63 27 66 30 63 21 66 22 63 54 66 53 63 47 66 34
35 70 69 68 2 13 24 50 21 45 44 27 6 42 23 45 20 47 36 29 17 42 24 45 26 20 34 43 35
36 70 69 69 68 33 44 63 30 39 52 62 39 14 38 63 55 32 15 63 36 41 34 63 31 48 44 62 36
37 70 69 69 68 20 6 52 59 48 41 21 27 18 27 31 38 24 40 45 20 14 29 54 22 36 14 47 37
38 70 69 69 68 36 16 49 45 65 28 66 50 63 47 66 53 65 55 66 27 63 55 66 43 63 31 66 38
39 70 69 69 68 21 33 46 15 22 34 25 29 22 31 29 18 7 36 23 42 35 16 33 21 38 26 39
40 70 69 69 68 1 64 49 43 50 63 19 33 51 64 14 26 51 63 15 53 47 64 45 51 35 65 40
41 70 69 69 68 27 49 26 16 49 28 40 38 26 20 52 36 29 25 37 26 51 25 34 20 44 41
42 70 69 69 68 33 41 63 53 66 39 63 40 66 51 63 24 66 42 63 45 66 20 63 51 66 42
43 70 69 69 68 30 26 22 28 45 42 43 41 51 29 18 33 37 15 24 49 33 14 32 44 43
44 70 69 69 69 68 16 53 63 21 47 36 63 34 45 39 62 20 43 36 63 38 25 54 63 44
45 70 69 69 69 68 19 47 31 45 29 47 25 50 41 50 28 24 19 52 30 19 38 56 45
46 70 69 69 69 68 40 55 63 52 66 53 65 20 66 50 63 14 66 44 63 46 60 46
47 70 69 69 69 68 31 18 38 31 24 16 58 49 26 37 53 20 16 39 34 42 47
48 70 69 69 69 68 24 28 64 37 31 28 63 36 53 31 64 50 24 43 65 48
49 70 69 69 69 68 42 29 44 44 50 18 31 24 60 20 14 34 45 20 49
50 70 69 69 69 68 68 38 51 5 37 48 63 9 31 49 63 51 66 50
51 70 69 69 69 69 68 68 44 23 34 18 45 37 39 32 44 17 51
52 70 70 69 69 69 69 68 68 68 22 32 40 35 44 38 42 52
53 70 70 69 69 69 69 69 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 53
54 70 70 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 54
55 70 70 70 70 70 69 69 69 69 69 55
56 70 70 70 70 70 56
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28  
 
Fig. 55 – Two-dimensional channel type map (core left part) 
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29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
1 70 70 70 70 70 1
2 69 69 69 69 69 70 70 70 70 70 2
3 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 70 70 3
4 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 69 69 69 69 69 70 70 4
5 35 13 29 45 29 22 26 68 68 68 69 69 69 69 70 70 5
6 49 63 18 36 39 63 44 37 32 36 68 68 69 69 69 69 70 6
7 51 39 47 37 48 15 19 54 30 40 34 25 68 68 69 69 69 70 7
8 40 44 22 64 26 37 51 63 18 46 13 64 30 26 68 69 69 69 70 8
9 17 54 31 46 52 34 24 13 36 34 25 37 39 47 16 68 69 69 69 70 9
10 21 63 44 66 14 63 45 66 39 65 21 66 18 63 46 26 68 69 69 69 70 10
11 31 26 34 23 53 22 30 34 47 47 44 47 52 24 13 40 30 68 69 69 69 70 11
12 36 44 48 63 7 39 50 62 47 51 17 63 32 37 49 63 18 38 68 69 69 69 70 12
13 53 50 30 17 25 15 42 39 5 54 25 45 52 16 45 53 24 44 36 68 69 69 69 70 13
14 22 63 47 66 42 63 26 44 40 63 20 66 19 63 50 37 50 63 51 20 68 69 69 70 14
15 44 36 44 4 26 21 35 56 22 40 15 41 27 35 31 43 18 36 31 34 28 68 69 69 70 15
16 40 29 19 64 17 40 9 63 52 48 53 64 50 16 54 63 25 50 52 64 23 68 69 69 70 16
17 14 46 51 22 32 28 32 54 39 35 33 27 24 32 23 29 13 42 43 31 17 30 68 69 69 70 17
18 25 63 47 66 55 63 18 66 33 65 24 66 46 63 40 66 22 65 52 66 3 2 68 69 69 70 18
19 44 23 53 24 42 30 25 36 23 40 36 42 19 36 46 49 41 48 25 20 32 15 21 68 69 69 70 19
20 15 35 32 63 56 40 54 63 49 46 54 63 33 34 13 62 28 40 44 63 27 40 47 68 69 69 70 20
21 49 38 15 21 31 21 25 21 28 38 27 40 23 50 18 43 16 47 30 45 20 49 42 68 69 69 70 21
22 26 63 32 66 45 63 49 66 54 63 48 66 44 63 26 66 24 63 50 66 24 63 21 33 68 69 70 22
23 18 13 21 38 14 43 17 37 32 45 18 23 14 33 53 20 13 30 44 14 20 15 51 15 68 69 70 23
24 43 44 46 64 46 36 29 63 49 38 50 64 48 37 30 63 52 47 24 64 48 27 37 6 68 69 69 70 24
25 33 18 25 50 30 56 25 50 32 23 28 16 27 47 24 52 16 31 35 19 3 55 22 34 68 69 69 70 25
26 50 63 46 66 24 63 15 66 43 63 54 66 32 63 32 66 43 63 26 66 45 63 42 2 68 69 69 70 26
27 31 26 20 46 17 50 20 49 25 41 28 40 17 49 18 45 34 42 4 17 27 34 20 37 68 69 69 70 27
28 22 40 35 65 43 25 31 62 42 44 43 65 40 44 35 63 23 41 13 65 43 13 51 8 68 69 69 70 28
29 37 7 17 22 36 60 32 43 16 53 37 41 45 19 31 50 28 38 25 41 37 27 34 17 68 69 69 70 29
30 25 63 48 66 53 63 47 60 37 63 22 66 48 63 25 66 22 63 48 66 48 63 52 37 68 69 69 70 30
31 32 14 44 37 23 38 22 58 49 28 17 38 27 44 20 13 34 6 23 3 25 48 21 36 68 69 69 70 31
32 22 39 42 64 30 36 56 63 16 53 47 64 21 33 38 63 50 18 13 64 18 31 5 40 68 69 69 70 32
33 16 55 44 21 45 20 26 45 33 55 23 15 29 54 15 53 36 40 29 23 28 53 37 4 68 69 69 70 33
34 47 63 45 66 52 63 51 66 26 63 41 66 44 63 20 66 22 63 16 66 17 63 19 37 68 69 70 34
35 23 5 17 21 28 50 35 23 19 42 28 20 25 51 41 34 17 28 34 47 30 51 6 30 68 69 70 35
36 14 38 31 63 35 40 18 63 33 51 56 63 40 40 45 62 51 12 24 63 25 40 36 68 69 69 70 36
37 19 52 45 15 27 55 30 43 39 38 19 45 26 54 41 38 7 15 46 47 13 30 23 68 69 69 70 37
38 27 63 39 66 46 63 21 66 20 65 47 66 16 63 49 44 39 65 21 66 37 63 31 68 69 69 70 38
39 35 22 46 18 25 42 33 37 49 44 48 33 50 26 36 53 18 43 46 24 33 28 68 69 69 70 39
40 54 40 26 64 15 52 57 63 45 54 30 64 22 44 20 63 52 44 32 64 18 23 68 69 69 70 40
41 25 17 45 35 22 27 34 18 14 24 48 39 29 13 30 49 32 13 52 26 29 68 69 69 70 41
42 49 63 24 66 44 63 52 66 46 63 44 66 32 63 20 66 21 63 46 14 38 68 69 69 70 42
43 14 40 19 57 33 41 37 34 29 34 26 52 29 45 27 43 15 52 40 40 68 69 69 70 43
44 25 35 36 63 54 7 17 62 50 14 19 63 39 33 52 63 22 30 34 68 69 69 69 70 44
45 31 55 26 32 25 32 35 22 38 33 23 52 17 45 47 14 50 39 68 69 69 69 70 45
46 19 63 43 66 47 63 51 66 6 65 27 66 23 63 53 32 30 68 69 69 69 70 46
47 38 42 21 16 22 18 27 31 19 40 49 38 51 35 40 35 68 69 69 69 70 47
48 42 7 52 64 50 38 51 63 47 15 54 64 24 37 17 68 69 69 69 70 48
49 49 33 23 31 23 26 11 24 52 27 45 32 28 31 68 69 69 69 70 49
50 49 63 47 50 46 63 46 48 41 63 40 19 68 68 69 69 69 70 50
51 43 23 41 15 40 35 49 36 16 32 68 68 69 69 69 69 70 51
52 32 42 45 48 44 44 43 68 68 68 69 69 69 69 70 70 52
53 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 69 69 69 69 69 70 70 53
54 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 70 70 54
55 69 69 69 69 69 70 70 70 70 70 55
56 70 70 70 70 70 56
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56  
 
Fig. 56 – Two-dimensional channel type map (core right part) 
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Thus, seventy channel types were identified within the core geometry. Each 
channel type is then defined by several “compositions”, according to its material 
properties (due to changes in the fuel design) and burn-up. The axial locations of 
compositions for each fuel type is shown in Tab. 18. The normalized axial exposure 
distribution for the different fuel types is given in Tab. 19. 
 
4.5.2.2. The Cross-section library 
The required set of 2-group macroscopic cross sections for fuel channels consists 
of the following seven types of cross-sections: 
• diffusion coefficient, fast group (D1), 
• diffusion coefficient, thermal group (D2), 
• removal cross-section, fast group (Sa1+Ss12), 
• absorption cross-section, thermal group (Sa2), 
• neutron generation cross-section, fast group (nSf1), 
• neutron generation cross-section, thermal group (nSf2), 
• neutron transfer cross-section from fast to thermal group (Ss12).  
Separate cross-sections were calculated for upper and lower parts of fuel 
assemblies. For the non-fuel channels the following types of 2-group cross-
sections were obtained: 
• diffusion coefficient, fast group (D1), 
• diffusion coefficient, thermal group (D2), 
• removal cross-section, fast group (Sa1+Ss12), 
• absorption cross-section, thermal group (Sa2), 
• neutron transfer cross-section from fast to thermal group (Ss12). 
 
Also, a complete set of assembly discontinuity factors (ADF) were calculated. All 
these cell parameters were expressed as a function of the fuel temperature, 
moderator temperature, and coolant density for each composition. The group 
inverse neutron velocities were also provided for each composition.  
 
The expected range of the transients was covered by the selection of an adequate 
range for the independent variables shown in Tab. 20. 
 
Dependence of the cross-sections on the above variables was specified through a 
three-dimensional look-up table. Each composition was assigned to a cross-section 
set containing separate tables for the diffusion coefficient, cross-sections, and 
ADF, with each point in the table representing a possible core state. A linear 
interpolation scheme could be used to obtain the appropriate total cross-sections 
from the tabulated ones based on the reactor conditions being modeled (see Fig. 
57). 
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Fig. 57 – Interpolation Scheme for Cross Sections  parameters 
For this purpose, a 4D Linear Interpolation Routine (lint4D) implemented in a 
FORTRAN 90 program was used. Finally, after the calculation of the Cross Section 
Variation Coefficients (i.e. with the Least Square Method) too, it was possible to 
implement in the 3D NK code all the Cross Section related information, e.g. using a 
Cross Section representation like that one reported in Equation (10): 
D
D
Tgr
Tgr
Tf
Tf
DTgrTf ref ∆∂
Σ∂+∆∂
Σ∂+∆∂
Σ∂+Σ=Σ ),,(
 
( 10 ) 
where: 
Sref = Reference Cross Section 
Tf = Fuel Temperature 
Tgr = Graphite Temperature 
D = coolant density 
 
Tab. 21 and Fig. 58 shows in details the definition of a cross-section table 
associated with a composition. All cross-section sets are assembled into a cross-
section library. The cross-sections were provided in separate libraries for rodded 
(nemtabr) (absorber part of the control rods), unrodded compositions (nemtab) 
(fuel channels, displacer parts of the control rods, water column, additional 
absorber, and axial detector channels) and nemtab (connecting rod of the manual 
control rods). The format of each library was as follows: 
• The first line of data was used to show the number of data points used for 
the independent thermal-hydraulic (T-H) parameters. These parameters 
included fuel temperature, moderator temperature, coolant density  
• Each cross-section set is in the order shown in Tab. 21. Each table is in 
the format described in Fig. 58. First, the values of the independent 
thermal-hydraulic parameters used to specify that particular set of cross-
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sections are listed, followed by the values of the cross-sections. Finally, 
the group inverse neutron velocities complete the data for a given cross-
section set. 
• The dependence of the reflector and of CPS cross-section on thermal-
hydraulic parameters is also modeled. This is because the reflector and 
CPS cross-sections are generated by performing lattice physics transport 
calculations, including the next fuel region. Therefore, the feedback 
parameters should be taken from the neighboring fuel region. 
 
Tab. 18 – Composition numbers in axial layers for each channel type 
Bottom 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
2 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131 141 151 161 171 181 191 201 211 221
3 2 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 102 112 122 132 142 152 162 172 182 192 202 212 222
4 3 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 103 113 123 133 143 153 163 173 183 193 203 213 223
5 4 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 104 114 124 134 144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224
6 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 105 115 125 135 145 155 165 175 185 195 205 215 225
7 6 16 26 36 46 56 66 76 86 96 106 116 126 136 146 156 166 176 186 196 206 216 226
8 7 17 27 37 47 57 67 77 87 97 107 117 127 137 147 157 167 177 187 197 207 217 227
9 8 18 28 38 48 58 68 78 88 98 108 118 128 138 148 158 168 178 188 198 208 218 228
10 9 19 29 39 49 59 69 79 89 99 109 119 129 139 149 159 169 179 189 199 209 219 229
11 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230
12 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675  
Top 
 
Bottom 
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
231 241 251 261 271 281 291 301 311 321 331 341 351 361 371 381 391 401 411 421 431 441 451
232 242 252 262 272 282 292 302 312 322 332 342 352 362 372 382 392 402 412 422 432 442 452
233 243 253 263 273 283 293 303 313 323 333 343 353 363 373 383 393 403 413 423 433 443 453
234 244 254 264 274 284 294 304 314 324 334 344 354 364 374 384 394 404 414 424 434 444 454
235 245 255 265 275 285 295 305 315 325 335 345 355 365 375 385 395 405 415 425 435 445 455
236 246 256 266 276 286 296 306 316 326 336 346 356 366 376 386 396 406 416 426 436 446 456
237 247 257 267 277 287 297 307 317 327 337 347 357 367 377 387 397 407 417 427 437 447 457
238 248 258 268 278 288 298 308 318 328 338 348 358 368 378 388 398 408 418 428 438 448 458
239 249 259 269 279 289 299 309 319 329 339 349 359 369 379 389 399 409 419 429 439 449 459
240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370 380 390 400 410 420 430 440 450 460
675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675  
Top 
 
Bottom 
47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 671
461 471 481 491 501 511 521 531 541 551 561 571 581 591 601 611 621 631 641 651 661 672 673 674
462 472 482 492 502 512 522 532 542 552 562 572 582 592 602 612 622 632 642 652 662 672 673 674
463 473 483 493 503 513 523 533 543 553 563 573 583 593 603 613 623 633 643 653 663 672 673 674
464 474 484 494 504 514 524 534 544 554 564 574 584 594 604 614 624 634 644 654 664 672 673 674
465 475 485 495 505 515 525 535 545 555 565 575 585 595 605 615 625 635 645 655 665 672 673 674
466 476 486 496 506 516 526 536 546 556 566 576 586 596 606 616 626 636 646 656 666 672 673 674
467 477 487 497 507 517 527 537 547 557 567 577 587 597 607 617 627 637 647 657 667 672 673 674
468 478 488 498 508 518 528 538 548 558 568 578 588 598 608 618 628 638 648 658 668 672 673 674
469 479 489 499 509 519 529 539 549 559 569 579 589 599 609 619 629 639 649 659 669 672 673 674
470 480 490 500 510 520 530 540 550 560 570 580 590 600 610 620 630 640 650 660 670 672 673 674
675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675  
Top 
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Tab. 19 – Normalized axial exposure 
Axial 
layer 
# 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Fuel 
2.0% 0.758 1.036 1.087 1.118 1.154 1.160 1.113 1.029 0.915 0.629 
Fuel 
2.4% 0.756 1.076 1.126 1.143 1.170 1.164 1.103 1.006 0.878 0.577 
 
Tab. 20 – Range of independent variables 
T fuel 
(K) 
T moderator 
(K) 
Rho 
coolant 
(kg/m3) 
T fuel 
(K) 
T moderator 
(K) 
Rho 
coolant 
(kg/m3) 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
557.00 
557.00 
557.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
557.00 
557.00 
557.00 
500.00 
500.00 
500.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
700.00 
700.00 
700.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
700.00 
700.00 
700.00 
500.00 
500.00 
500.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
856.00 
856.00 
856.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
856.00 
856.00 
856.00 
500.00 
500.00 
500.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
500.00 
500.00 
500.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
557.00 
557.00 
557.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
557.00 
557.00 
557.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
700.00 
700.00 
700.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
700.00 
700.00 
700.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
856.00 
856.00 
856.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
856.00 
856.00 
856.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
744.00 
744.00 
744.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
557.00 
557.00 
557.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
557.00 
557.00 
557.00 
998.00 
998.00 
998.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
700.00 
700.00 
700.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
700.00 
700.00 
700.00 
998.00 
998.00 
998.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
856.00 
856.00 
856.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
856.00 
856.00 
856.00 
998.00 
998.00 
998.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
557.00 
850.00 
1030.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
1060.00 
998.00 
998.00 
998.00 
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Tab. 21 – Key to macroscopic cross-section tables 
TF1 TF2 TF3 TM1 TM2 
TM3 TM4 ρC1 ρC2 ρC3 
ρC4 ρC5 ρC6 Σ1(f1,m1,c1) Σ2(f2,m1,c1) 
Σ3(f3,m1,c1) Σ4(f1,m2,c1) Σ5(f2,m2,c1) Σ6(f3,m2,c1) Σ7(f1,m3,c1) 
Σ8(f2,m3,c1) Σ9(f3,m3,c1) Σ10(f1,m4,c1) Σ11(f2,m4,c1) Σ12(f3,m4,c1) 
Σ13(f1,m1,c2) Σ14(f2,m1,c2) Σ15(f3,m1,c2) Σ16(f1,m2,c2) Σ17(f2,m2,c2) 
Σ18(f3,m2,c2) Σ19(f1,m3,c2) ……   
  …… Σ71(f2,m4,c6) Σ72(f3,m4,c6) 
Where: 
TF – fuel temp. 
[K] 
TM – moderator 
temp. [K] 
ρC – coolant 
density [kg/m3] 
f – same as TF 
m – same as TM 
c – same as ρC 
 
 
************************************************************************* 
 NEM – Cross-Section Table Input 
* 
* T Fuel T Mod. Rho Cool. CXe 
 3 4 6 0 
* 
*********** X-Section Set # 
    # 
************************************************************************* 
 Group No. 1 
* 
************* Diffusion Coefficient Table 
* 
************* Absorption X-Section Table 
* 
************* Fission X-Section Table 
* 
************* Nu-Fission X-Section Table 
* 
************* Scattering From Group 1 to 2 X-Section Table 
* 
************* Assembly Discontinuity Factors Table 
* 
************************************************************************* 
 Group No. 2 
* 
************* Diffusion Coefficient Table 
* 
************* Absorption X-Section Table 
* 
************* Fission X-Section Table 
* 
************* Nu-Fission X-Section Table 
* 
************* Assembly Discontinuity Factors Table 
* 
************************************************************************* 
************* Inv. Neutron Velocities 
*  
Fig. 58 – Macroscopic cross-section table’s structure 
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4.5.3. The RELAP5-3D TH nodalization 
The detailed description of the RELAP5 nodalization developed for Smolensk-3 
NPP is presented in [44]. An idea of the nodalization can be derived from Fig. 59 to 
Fig. 63. Two models of the NPP were developed, one representing the NPP up to 
the turbine, the other one (simplified), representing only the MCC from the MCPs 
exit up to the SD inlet. The latter one was used for 3D NK TH analyses were it was 
not necessary to model the whole primary circuit (e.g., CR / CR group withdrawal). 
All the nodalizations are divided into two parts identified as right and left side. Both 
sides are modeled in the same way, i.e., the main components (pumps, pipes, 
steam drums) are identical. An higher resolution of the core is achieved for the right 
side (47 channels modeled versus 8 for the left side), thus the right side is 
considered as the damaged one during the safety analyses. 
As it can be seen in Fig. 59, all the main hydraulics components of the plant are 
modeled. Starting from the Steam Drums (SD), both two are represented by a set 
of branches and pipes, Fig. 61 in order to reproduce the stratification that ensures 
the gravity driven steam separation. The water (in the lower part) and the steam (in 
the upper part) zones of the SD are linked each other by a water and steam bridge. 
Two pipes joined to the top of each SD drive the steam to the steam ring where the 
steam lines are connected. All the safety valves (e.g. BRU-K, MSV and ICV) are 
considered in the input deck. The nozzle of the feed-water system is represented 
by the jet mixer component to simulate the suction effect of these devices. 
 
The two feed-water systems (one per each SD) are simulated by a time dependent 
volume and a time dependent junction with a nominal imposed mass flow rate. The 
jet mixer components are joined to two pipes that simulate the downcomer. These 
two pipes are connected to four branches that simulate the suction header, Fig. 62. 
Four pipes supply the water from the suction header to four pumps connected via 
other pipe components to a pressure header schematized by eight branches. 22 
GDH are simulated by 22 pipes (8 pipes for the left side) and, at the end of each of 
them, one branch is placed. 47 pipes (8 pipes for the left side) divided into 59 
volumes represent the water lines and the fuel channels, up to the connection with 
the steam water line, with different scaling factor ranging from 1 up to 34 (from 62 
to 134, for the left side). Additional 47 pipes (8 pipes for the left side) simulate the 
steam water lines connected to the lower part of the SD, Fig. 63. 
The additional absorbers are simulated with a unique pipe (the same subdivision of 
the core channel has been used) together with its water line and steam water line. 
One separate circuit is reproduced to simulate the control rod and radial reflector 
cooling channels (one hydraulic channel for the CR cooling and one for the 
reflector).  
 
All the passive components have the relative mono-dimensional heat structure 
divided into five radial mesh points and they are considered insulated on one side. 
The active heat structures that simulate the fuel are divided into 12 radial mesh 
points and into 20 axial parts. They are, on the left side, thermally coupled with the 
corresponding hydraulic volume of the core channel, on the right side insulated.  
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Fig. 59 – Sketch of the reference RELAP5-3D TH nodalization of Smolensk-3 (only left MCC showed) 
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Fig. 60 – Sketch of the simplified RELAP5-3D TH nodalization (Left and Right MCC) 
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Fig. 61 – RELAP5-3D model of Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization sketch of FW and 
SL systems. 
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Fig. 62 – RELAP5-3D model of Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization sketch of down-
comers up to the water lines. 
 
Fig. 63 – RELAP5-3D model of Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization sketch of core, FC 
exit lines and CPS cooling system. 
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The thermal structures used to simulate the pressure tube, the graphite rings and 
the graphite bricks are divided into 12 radial meshes and in 24 axial parts in order 
to consider the axial reflector. They are thermally coupled with the core channel at 
the inner side and with the corresponding pipe of the reactor cavity at the outer 
side. 
 
The ECCS included in the model of the Smolensk 3 NPP are, Fig. 64: 
• Main-subsystem 1 and 2 including two trains of accumulators. Each train is 
composed by 6 accumulators. The two trains are connected to the headers 
to inject water in the damaged side of the core. 
• Main-subsystem 3: this system injects water in the damaged side of the 
core by connecting to the main feed water pumps. The feed water pumps 
take water from the deareators. 
• Long term sub-system damaged core side 1, 2 and 3: the system is 
constituted by three trains. Each train includes two pumps injecting in the 
damaged side of the core the water from the PSP in the ASL. 
• Long term sub-system undamaged core side 1, 2 and 3: the system is 
constituted by three trains. Each train includes one pump. The pumps 
inject in the undamaged side of the core the water from the clean 
condensate tank. 
 
The twelve accumulators of the Main sub-system 1 and 2 are schematized. In the 
model the accumulators injection is stopped when the level is low to avoid nitrogen 
injection in the MCC. The model makes possible to manage separately injection 
capability of any accumulators, if needed, simply changing the intervention logic 
that is separately implemented for each accumulator.   
 
The Main sub-system 3 is schematized with a “tmdpjun” component simulating the 
main feed water pumps and a “tmdpvol” component simulating the thermal 
hydraulic condition of the water in the deaerators. The “tmdpjun” component makes 
possible a specific simulation of the mass flow-rate of the main feed water pumps 
for this system separated by the simulation of the feed water pumps of the MCC; 
this schematization has been preferred to avoid any “complicated interaction” with 
the model of the pumps used in the MCC. In addition this model makes available to 
change easily the mass flow-rate trend of the pumps to take into account the 
effects of LOOP and to control the integral mass flow-rate through the pumps: this 
value is used to check if the deaerators contain water to be injected. 
 
The three trains of the Long term sub-system for the damaged core side are 
separately modeled. Each model includes a “tmdpjun” component connected whit 
the PSP simulating the two pumps of each train. Each train can be isolated if 
needed to investigate transient involving ECCS failure. The three train of the Long 
term sub-system for the undamaged core side are separately modeled. Each 
model includes a “tmdpjun” component simulating the pump of each train. Each 
train can be isolated if needed to investigate transient involving ECCS failure. The 
clean condensate tanks are schematized by a suitable “tmdpvol” component 
reproducing the thermal hydraulic condition of the water into the tank. The integral 
mass flow-rate exiting from the “tmdpvol” component is computed by the model to 
check the amount of water available to be injected by the system. 
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The Main sub-system 1, 2 and 3 and the Long term sub-system for the damaged 
core side 1, 2 and 3 are connected to three main distribution headers; each header 
is connected to all the 22 GDH schematized for the right side of the core; this side 
is supposed to be the damaged side of the core. The three trains of the long term 
sub-system for the undamaged core side 1, 2 and 3 are connected together in a 
single common distribution header because only one GDH is schematized for the 
right side of the core (suppose to be the undamaged side). 
 
The logic of actuation of the systems is implemented especially in relation to 
accident involving break occurrence in component in the ALS (e.g. rupture in the 
piping downstream the MCP up to core inlet). The ECCS intervention logic for other 
kind of accident (i.e. feed water pipe break) can be implemented adding some 
specific conditions because the model does not include some special rooms where 
ECCS actuation signals are generated in some transients (e.g. no feed water 
compartment is modeled and the pressure increase in the this compartment as a 
consequence of a feed water piping break is not reproduced).    
Main subsystem train 1 (accumulators)
Main subsystem train 2 (accumulators)
Main subsystem train 3 (from deaerators)
Long term damaged subsystem
train 1-2-3 (from PSP)
Long term undamaged subsystem
train 1-2-3 (from clean condensate tanks)
ECCS headers
DGH
Schematization 
of ECCS
 
 
Fig. 64 – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization sketch of ECCS. 
 
 
 
 118 
In Tab. 22 and Tab. 23 is reported, as already mentioned at the beginning of the 
present section, the list of all the components modeled identified by the RELAP5-
3D card numbers and components. 
 
Tab. 22 – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence between 
nodes and NPP components (left side). 
LEFT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
010, 012, 
014, 016 Pipe Downcomer 
011, 015 Branch 
Suction 
headers 
020, 021, 
022, 023 Branch 
030, 040, 
050, 060 Pipe 
031 Branch Suction piping 032, 042, 
044 Pipe 
035, 045, 
055, 065 Pipe 
036, 046, 
056, 066 Valve Bypass line 
037, 047, 
057, 067 Pipe 
MCP 033, 043, 053, 063 Pump component 
Pressure 
pipes after 
the pumps 
034, 044, 
054, 064 Pipe component 
070, 071, 
072, 073 Branch Pressure 
headers 074, 075, 
076, 077 Branch 
80÷86, 
87÷91, 
92÷96, 
97÷101 
Pipe Group distribution 
header 
102÷123 Pipe 
141 Branch 
142 Pipe 
143 Branch 
Additional 
absorber 
channel 
144 Pipe 
Core 
channels 
145, 148, 
…, 285 Pipe 
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Tab. 22 (cont.) – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence 
between nodes and NPP components (left side). 
LEFT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
146, 149, 
…, 286 Branch Core 
channels 147, 150, 
…, 287 Pipe 
300÷348 
for the 
core 
channels 
Pipe 
Steam 
water pipes 329, 330 
for the 
additional 
absorber 
Pipe 
354÷357 Pipe 
376÷379 Branch 
358, 363 Branch 
359, 361 Pipe 
Steam 
Drum 1 
360 Branch 
Jet spray 
system for 
SD 1 
349÷353 Jet mixer 
489 Branch 
490 Pipe 
491 Valve 
492 Pipe 
Water 
bridge 
488 Branch 
495 Pipe 
496 Valve Steam bridge 497 Pipe 
Steam Line 
after SD 1 366÷367 Pipe 
404÷407 Pipe 
426÷429 Branch 
408, 413 Branch 
409, 411 Pipe 
Steam drum 
2 
410 Branch 
Jet spray 
system for 
SD2 
399÷403 Jet mixer 
Steam Line 
after SD2 416÷417 Branch 
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Tab. 22 (cont.) – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence 
between nodes and NPP components (left side). 
LEFT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
395, 445 Branch 
396, 446 Pipe 
897 Branch 
898, 947 Pipe 
397, 447 Trip valve 
Steam rings 
steam lines 
and turbines
398, 448 Time dependent volume 
381 Time dependent volume 
382 Time dependent junctions 
383 Pipe 
Feed-water 
system 1 
384 Branch 
431 Time dependent volume 
432 Time dependent junctions 
433 Pipe 
Feed-water 
system 2 
434 Branch 
 
Tab. 23 – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence between 
nodes and NPP components (right side). 
RIGHT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
510, 
512, 
514, 516 
Pipe Downcomer 
511, 515 Branch 
Suction 
headers 
520, 
521, 
522, 523 
Branch 
Suction 
piping 
530, 
540, 
550, 560 
Pipe 
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Tab. 23 (cont.) – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence 
between nodes and NPP components (right side). 
RIGHT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
531, 
541, 
551, 561 
Branch 
 
532, 
542, 544 Pipe 
535, 
545, 
555, 
565, 
537, 
547, 
557, 567 
Pipe 
Bypass line 
536, 
546, 
556, 566 
Valve 
MCP 
533, 
543, 
553, 563 
Pump component 
Pressure 
pipes after 
the pumps 
534, 
544, 
554, 564 
Pipe component 
Pressure 
headers 
570, 
571, 
572, 
573, 
574, 
575, 
576, 577 
Branch 
580 Pipe Group 
distribution 
header 602 Branch 
641 Branch 
642 Pipe 
643 Branch 
Additional 
absorber 
channel 
644 Pipe 
Core 
channels 
645, 
648, …, 
666 
Pipe 
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Tab. 23 (cont.) – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence 
between nodes and NPP components (right side). 
RIGHT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
646, 
649, …, 
667 
Branch 
 647, 
650, …, 
668 
Pipe 
805÷812 
for the 
core 
channels
Pipe 
Steam water 
pipes 829, 830 
for the 
AA 
Pipe 
854÷857 Pipe 
876÷879 Branch 
858, 863 Branch 
859, 861 Pipe 
Steam Drum 
1 
860 Branch 
Jet spray 
system for 
SD 1 
849÷853 Jet mixer 
989 Branch 
990 Pipe 
991 Valve 
992 Pipe 
Water bridge 
988 Branch 
995 Pipe 
996 Valve Steam bridge
997 Pipe 
Steam Line 
after SD 1 866, 867 Pipe 
904÷907 Pipe 
926÷929 Branch 
908, 913 Branch 
909, 911 Pipe 
Steam drum 
2 
910 Branch 
Jet spray 
system for 
SD2 
899÷903 Jet mixer 
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Tab. 23 (cont.) – Relap5 UNIPI model of Smolensk 3 NPP: correspondence 
between nodes and NPP components (right side). 
RIGHT SIDE 
Component ID of node Node type 
Steam Line 
after SD2 916, 917 Branch 
895, 945 Branch Steam rings 
and turbines 896, 946 Pipe 
881 Time dependent volume 
882 Time dependent junctions 
883 Pipe 
Feed-water 
system 1 
884 Branch 
931 Time dependent volume 
932 Time dependent junctions 
933 Pipe 
Feed-water 
system 2 
934 Branch 
 
4.5.4. The NESTLE 3D NK nodalization and the coupling 
RELAP5-3D NK model was developed according to data reported in Chapter 2 of 
this document, so the main parameters (power, burnup, CR position, channels 
flow-rate) were referring to the Smolensk-3 NPP core status of 16 October 1996. 
RELAP5-3D reactor core model is composed by 2488 channels. 1570 Fuel 
Channel, 314 Non-Fuel Channels (CRs, Axial Detectors, Additional Absorber, 
Water Column), 604 Radial Reflector Channels are modeled. 
 
Radially the core was divided into square cells with a pitch of 0.25 m, each one 
corresponding to a core channel. Thus, the model resulted in a 56 per 56 squared 
arrays (see Fig. 68). 
 
Axially the core was divided by 12 planes. First and twelfth plane have an axial 
dimension of 0.3 m (i.e. corresponding to the graphite bottom and top reflectors), 
planes from 2 to 11 have a dimension of 0.7 m. A sketch of the Fuel Channel 
Neutronic Mesh is reported in Fig. 65. It has to be noted that the axial mesh utilized 
is equal to the axial mesh used for the HELIOS code Cross Sections calculations.  
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Fig. 65 – RELAP5-3D Core neutron kinetic mesh 
All different CR types are implemented in the RELAP5-3D code, with the correct 
insertion direction and the appropriate physical structure (absorber + connecting 
rod+ graphite displacer for MCR, only absorber for FASS, absorber + graphite 
displacer for SHR). Their numeration with their arrangement is shown in Fig. 69; 
their insertion depth is reported in Tab. 9 as indicated by the plant data in the 
chapter 2 of this document. This CR configuration has to be intended for all 
calculations here reported, where it is not specified a different one. 
 
4.5.4.1. 3D NK-TH Coupling Scheme 
Because of the different mesh dimension between the core TH nodalization (0.35 
m) and the 3D NK axial mesh (0.7 m), the coupling procedures connected two 
thermal-hydraulic mesh points to one neutron kinetic mesh point. Instead the 
dimension of the TH node for the bottom and top reflector was the same one of the 
neutron kinetic node (i.e. 0.3 m). The heat structures of the fuel and of the graphite 
have the same axial dimension of the corresponding TH node and are, for this 
reason, coupled in the same way with the NK nodes. In Fig. 66 it can be viewed the 
coupling scheme between the HELIOS, NESTLE and RELAP5 nodalization. 
 
1
12
CORE MESHING  
(10 x 0.7 m) 
2 to 11 
Bottom Reflector
Top Reflector
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Fig. 66 – TH / 3D NK & Lattice Codes meshes coupling 
Neutronic nodes were coupled to a total of 56 thermal-hydraulic channels 
according to the maps showed in Fig. 68. Left part of the core was modeled with: 
o 8 TH channels (grouped in NK Zone # 46 to # 53) 
o 1 GDH 
Right part was instead modeled with: 
o 48 TH channels (grouped in NK Zone # 2 to 45, 56, 57, 58,60) 
o 22 GDH 
All the three types of Control Rods (Manual, Shortened, Safety) and the Axial 
Detectors were modeled with an equivalent TH channel (equivalent TH channel 
#288, Zone 54). Instead the Additional Absorber and the Water Column were 
coupled to two TH channel, one for both halves (equivalent TH channel #142, 
#642, NK Zone #55 and #59). Radial Reflector neutron kinetics nodes were 
coupled with an equivalent TH channel too (equivalent TH channel #292, Zone #1) 
simulating the cooling circuit. 
1
12
CORE MESHING  
(10 x 0.7 m) 
2 to 11 
Bottom Reflector 
Top Reflector 
Graphite 
HS 
TH  
MESH 
Fuel 
HS 
1 
20 
22
1
RELAP5 TH Code HELIOS 2D Transport Code  NESTLE 3D NK Code 
1 
22 
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Fig. 67 – Radial Arrangement of TH Channels for General Purpose Nodalization 
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Fig. 68 – Correlation map between TH channels, TH Zones and NK Nodes for General Purpose Nodalization 
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Fig. 69 – CR Numbers & Types – RELAP5-3D Numeration 
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Finally, all the neutron kinetics nodes, grouped in 60 Macro – Zones, were coupled 
to a total of 60 TH channels according to the map showed in Fig. 67. 
 
4.5.4.2. Some considerations on the axial meshing scheme 
 
Some considerations on numerics and FD methods can help to derive the 
maximum size of the node to be used by the NESTLE code. As reported in section 
4.2.4, NESTLE calculations are by default employing NEM, providing sufficient 
robustness and accuracy in the neutron flux distribution calculations. Nevertheless, 
the implemented non-linear strategy allows to result in a FD calculation by 
choosing to not update each n outer iterations the coupling coefficients between 
two nodes (see section 4.2.4.1). It is well known that, using a FD method the error 
on the flux calculation is proportional to the size of the node and to the migration 
length. For example, for a 1D mono-energetic FD discretization it results that [71]: 
...)(
4
3 2 +∆≅
L
l
Rε  
( 11 ) 
where: 
∆l = dimension of node l 
εR = error on the flux calculation 
L = cell diffusion length 
 
The RBMK neutronic characteristics, with a greater diffusion (and migration) length 
allows the use of a relatively large (compared, e.g. to a BWR) node dimension. 
From Tab. 4 of this report it results that 1/L2 for RBMK is 5.03*10-3 while for BWR 
2.07*10-1. Therefore, a reasonable accuracy can be get with a RBMK node size 
also of the order of 100 cm size [89]. Several tests were performed for a SS 
configuration, halving the axial discretization length and changing the numerical 
solution scheme. Some results of these sensitivities are showed in Fig. 70 and Fig. 
71. 
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Fig. 70 – Relative Axial Power: SS sensitivity, FD method calculations 
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Fig. 71 – Relative Axial Power: SS sensitivity, NEM calculations 
It was found that the use of a 22 axial nodes (20 for the active zone plus 2 for the 
top and bottom reflectors) scheme (node length for the active zone = 35 cm) did 
not improve the calculation accuracy in a significant manner. On the other hand, 
the computational time increased dramatically (more than doubling in the cases of 
both FD and NEM). Thus, the use of NEM with a 12 axial nodes (10 nodes of 70 
cm length for the active zone plus 2 for the top and bottom reflectors) was chosen 
for all the SS and transient calculations.  
 
4.5.5. The MCNP5 code model 
4.5.5.1. Reference Geometry Material  
Cell modeling by MCNP5 code was done according to the following geometrical 
data (see Fig. 72 and Tab. 25). These data were supplied by Russian Research 
Center Kurchatov Institute (RRC KI) [73].  
 
Fig. 72 – Fuel Channel Cross-View 
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• Distance inner row fuel rod axis - center of fuel assembly axis: 1.6 cm 
• Distance outer row fuel rod axis - center of fuel assembly axis: 3.1 cm 
 
4.5.5.2. Reference Material data 
Material compositions for MCNP5 input decks were also supplied by RRC KI and 
are reported in Tab. 24 and Tab. 25.  
 
Tab. 24 – Nuclear densities in fresh fuel, 1024 atoms/cm3 
Fuel type 2,0 % 2,4 % 
235U 4.3386E-4 5.2063E-4 
238U 2.0991E-2 2.0905E-2 
16O 4.4283E-2 4.4283E-2 
 
Tab. 25 – Geometry and material composition of fuel cell 
Element Size, cm Nuclear density, 1024/см3 
Central rod Router=0,75 
Zr = 4,287*10-2 
Hf= 7,06*10-6 
Nb= 1,069*10-3 
Fuel Router=0,5850 See Tab. 24 
Clad Rinner=0,5850 Router=0,6815 
Zr= 4,338*10-2 
Hf= 1,35*10-5 
Nb= 8,135*10-4 
Water with mixed holding greed 
(Water density 0.998 g/cm3) Inside tube 
H= 6.6177*10-2 
O= 3.3088*10-2 
Fe= 4,774*10-4 
Cr= 1,3395*10-4  
Ni= 6,593*10-5 
Tube Rinner=4,0 Router=4,4 
Zr= 4,287*10-2 
Hf= 7,06*10-6 
Nb=1,069*10-3 
Graphite 
 25х25 
C= 0,084233 
B10= 1.8*10-8 
 
For voiding calculation, concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen were taken as 
zero, the other one were unchanged. Temperature of all cell components was fixed 
at 300 K. These geometric and composition data were used for the all reference 
criticality calculations given in this document.  
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4.5.5.3. MCNP5 Reference Model Geometry 
Geometric dimensions and materials data used for developing the following model 
are reported in the previous paragraph. An infinite – along z-axis – geometry was 
considered. Model pictures are given in Fig. 73 and Fig. 74. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 73 – Fuel Cell in XY plane (at Z=10) 
 
                 
 
Fig. 74 – Fuel Cell in YZ and XZ plane (at X=0 and Y=0) 
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4.5.5.4. MCNP5 Cross Section Libraries 
ENDL92 [62] and ENDF-B/VI.6 [61] continuous cross section data library was used 
for reference calculations. Temperature was set up at 300 K. Thermal S(a,b) 
tables were used to correctly represent the role of molecular forces acting on the 
hydrogen and carbon atoms in the water and in the moderator, respectively. 
 
4.5.5.5. Boundary Conditions 
Specular reflective boundary conditions (J(m) = J(-m)) were implemented on the XZ 
and YZ planes delimiting the graphite block. 
 
4.5.6. The DRAGON code model 
DRAGON is a 2D-3D deterministic transport code, so the implemented model was 
similar to the MCNP and HELIOS ones and it consisted of a 2D simulation of a 
single fuel channel with the relative graphite block. A picture of the model is given 
in Fig. 75. 
 
Fig. 75 – DRAGON RBMK FC model 
The source data for the model set up were taken from [73] and are consistent with 
the data reported in Tab. 24 and Tab. 25. 
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4.5.6.1. Cross Section Libraries 
The DRAGON code can use different format of multi-group cross sections libraries. 
The WIMS-D libraries, developed by the IAEA in the framework of the WIMS-D 
Library Update Project were used. They have are composed by 69 and 172 energy 
groups and an extensive description of them can be found in [58].  
 
4.5.6.2. Boundary Conditions 
Reflective boundary conditions on the model periphery were imposed for all the 
DRAGON calculations. 
 
4.5.6.3. Calculation modules 
DRAGON code is a modular code and can perform the same type of calculation  
using different solution algorithms. Several options were tested, resulting in the 
selection of the modules reported in Fig. 76 [59].  
 
 
EXCELT
(GEOMETRY TRACKING)
SHI
(SELF-SHIELDING)
ASM
(Collision Probabilities)
IAEA 69 (or 172) Groups
WIMS-D Libraries
Tracking File Tracking File
Self Shielded Libraries
FLU
(Flux & Criticality calculation)
EDI
(Editing)
EVO
(Burnup calculations)
 
Fig. 76 – DRAGON code: calculation scheme used for RBMK calculations 
After the geometry and the material definition, DRAGON code effectuated the 
geometry tracking using the EXCELL (Isotropic) tracking module. This information 
was then used for the self shielding calculation and for the collision probabilities 
matrix calculations. The use of the previous data (self-shielded libraries plus 
collision probabilities matrix) allow DRAGON to calculate the multigroup transport 
solution for the considered model. EDI module is then used for printing results and 
for performing eventual homogenizations. EVO module was also used iteratively 
for the burnup calculations. 
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4.6. The Qualification 
The execution of nuclear reactor calculations should be performed according to the 
best international practice guidelines (e.g., [45], [46]), and with a level of quality 
comparable to the one used in other fields of the nuclear technology. Therefore the 
most rigorous methodologies for calculations should be developed and submitted 
to the review of the scientific and technical community (e.g., through participation to 
international benchmarks and/or thorough review of a Safety Authority). The 
calculation methodologies developed at the GRNSPG/UNIPI and applied here for 
these RBMK analyses were discussed and tested in an international framework 
during several Projects and publications (e.g., see [43], [47], etc.)  
The GRNSPG/UNIPI calculation methodologies are mainly based on the respect of 
the followings criteria: 
• Use of the most advanced codes. Codes versions used for calculations are 
“frozen” (no beta or testing versions of codes are used). Code should not 
modified by the user. 
• Code user should be “qualified” (see [48] for the meaning of “qualified 
user”) 
• Nodalizations and input decks developed should pass a “steady-state” and 
“on transient” qualification process [49].  
In the following paragraphs, information about the codes and the models 
qualification process is reported.   
 
4.6.1. Codes qualification 
4.6.1.1. The RELAP5-3D validation for RBMK analyses 
RELAP5-3D code was validated for pressure tube graphite moderated reactors in 
the framework of several Projects managed by the US-DOE for the study of the 
American production reactors and for the study of the RBMK reactors in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl accident (see the code description paragraph). 
 
Example of code modifications for considering RBMK peculiarities of RBMK are, 
e.g., the implementation of Osmachkin TH correlation, the implementation of a 
special RBMK option for handle Kurchatov Institute’ generated Cross Section 
Libraries.  
  
The multidimensional neutron kinetic model in RELAP5-3D based on NESTLE 
code, was extensively validated [75],[76]. Since the 1990 it was adapted and used 
for the RBMK analyses too. In the literature it can be found recently published 
papers [77], [78], [79], focused to develop RELAP5-3D models for RBMK system 
(more precisely for Ignalina and Kursk NPPs). All these analyses use the RELAP5-
3D code developed by INL. 
E.g., a validation of the nodal kinetics part of the RELAP5-3D was made using 
steady-state data and using reactor power reduction and feedwater flow rate 
perturbation transients data from the Ignalina NPP in [78], [79].  
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4.6.1.2. The HELIOS code validation for RBMK analyses 
HELIOS is an industrial world-wide recognized lattice physics code, with 
capabilities to model the most complex geometries. This characteristic and a 
several RBMK related activities like [26] and [50], suggested its application to 
RBMK calculations.   
 
4.6.1.3. The DRAGON code validation for RBMK analyses 
DRAGON code is a lattice physics code developed by the Politecnique of Montreal 
with the support of the Canadian nuclear industry and utilities. Its main applications 
are for heavy water reactor studies. Nevertheless the geometry modeling 
capabilities as well as the IAEA multi-group libraries developed during an 
International Research Project [69] allows its applications to RBMK reactors too. 
DRAGON validation works for this reactor technology was not found in the 
literature before the execution of the present activities. 
 
 
4.6.1.4. The MCNP validation for RBMK analyses 
MCNP5 is an extensively validated code, used world-wide as a code for reference 
calculations. ENDFB-VI continuous energy cross section libraries were validated 
for RBMK analyses [74]. Comparison of MCNP5 results with Russian Monte Carlo 
codes like MCU code showed comparable agreements with experimental data [51]. 
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4.6.2. Model and Nodalization qualification 
4.6.2.1. RELAP5-3D TH nodalization qualification 
The nodalization qualification procedure proposed at GRNSPG has been applied. 
This consisted of two main steps: steady state level qualification and on-transient 
level qualification. The first part of the procedure is considered. A comprehensive 
documentation of the activity can be found in [44]. 
 
A nodalization is qualified at the steady state level if it has a geometrical fidelity of 
the simulated plant and if it shows a stable time trend of the main thermal-hydraulic 
parameters.  
 
Relevant geometrical data are compared with the design data and a set of 
acceptable errors in Tab. 26. A demonstration of  the geometrical fidelity of the 
nodalization can be derived from  Fig. 77. Key thermal-hydraulic parameters are 
considered in Tab. 27 and in Fig. 78 to Fig. 82. Emphasis is given, when reporting 
selected curves, to the void fraction in the core and to the initial temperature 
distribution inside graphite stacks, including radial and axial distributions.  
 
The completed nodalization qualification process shows that the Smolensk 3 
nodalization is qualified at the steady state level.  
 
Tab. 26 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization: qualification at steady state 
level, key MCC geometric parameters. 
RELAP5-3D 
Right side QUANTITY Unit Design Left side 
Acceptab
le 
Error + 
Error Notes 
Circuit volume m3 667.67 667.67 
667.78 
667.78 1% 0.01%  
Active 
structures 
heat transfer 
area (overall) 
m2 
12134.42 
(fuel & PT) 
19904 
(Graphite-
Gap) 
12135.66 
17476.36 0.1% 
-0.01% 
-12.2% 
External 
radius 
calculated 
to 
preserve 
the mass 
Active 
structures 
heat transfer 
volume 
(overall) 
m3 14.4 1088.2 
14.4 
1088.8 0.2% 
0.02% 
-0.05%  
Graphite 
blocks total 
mass 
Ton 1850 1851  0.05%  
+ The % error is defined as the ration (reference or measured value – calculated value)/(reference or 
measured value); “The dimensional error” is the numerator of the above expression 
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Fig. 77 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, comparison between adopted and reference (design) volume vs. height curve 
of MCC. 
Tab. 27 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, key MCC thermal-hydraulic parameters. 
RELAP5-3D 
Right side Quantity Unit Design 
left side 
Acceptab
le Error 
(%)+ 
Error° (%) Notes 
1606 1594 -0.75 Thermal 
power MW 1565 1567 2 0.13  
6.865 6.863 0.07 0.04 DS pressure MPa 6.86 
6.862 6.863 
0.1 
0.03 0.04 
On all 
SD 
dome 
269.5 -0.19 Core inlet 
temperature °C 270 269.1 
0.5 
-0.33 
 
284.66 0.23 DS inlet 
temperature °C 284 284.65 
0.5 
0.23 
 
82.5 3.13 Void 
Fraction at 
DS Inlet 
% 80 
82.4 
10.0 
3.00 
 
DS feed 
water 
temperature 
°C 165 165 0.5 0.0 Imposed Value 
104.71 0.11 MCP speed Rad/s 104.6 104.71 1 0.11  
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Tab. 27(cont.) – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady 
state level, key MCC thermal-hydraulic parameters. 
RELAP5-3D 
Right side Quantity Unit Design 
left side 
Acceptabl
e Error 
(%)+ 
Error° (%) Notes 
0.8 N/A Pressure 
drop on the 
water line 
0.5* 
 N/A 
0.475 N/A Pressure 
drop on the 
core 
0.657* 
 N/A 
0.249 N/A Steam-water line 
pressure 
drop 
MPa 
0.392* 
 
10 
N/A 
Ref. for 
2.9 
MW 
channe
l 
Total 
pressure 
drop on the 
FC 
MPa 1.549 1.524 10 1.6  
1.51 1.507 -0.20 
MCP head MPa 
1.51 1.518 
10 
0.53 
 
85.2
7 84.89 -0.3 0.1 
DS mass 
inventory m
3 85 
84.4
7 85.49 
2 
0.6 -0.5 
Liquid 
Fractio
n Vol 
5157.9 5196.6 0.75 Total loop 
coolant flow 
rate 
Kg/s 
5103.9 5112.5 
2 
0.17 
 
5064.9 5099.2 0.68 Technologic
al channel 
flow rate 
Kg/s 
4987.9 5001.0 
2 
0.26 
 
93 97.4 4.74 Additional 
absorber 
flow rate 
Kg/s 
116 111.5 
10 
-3.89 
 
*  Reference conditions refer to the maximum power channel (3.2 MW). 
+ The % error is defined as the ration (reference or measured value – calculated value)/(reference or 
measured value); “The dimensional error” is the numerator of the above expression 
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Fig. 78 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, comparison between steady state and reference (nominal conditions) 
pressure distribution along the MCC. 
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Fig. 79 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, comparison between steady state and reference (nominal conditions) void 
fraction at SD inlet, right part, channels 1-24. 
 
  141 
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Distance from core bottom (m)
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 (°
C
)
Reference
Calculated
 
Fig. 80 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, comparison between steady state and reference (nominal conditions) 
graphite axial temperature at outer surface. 
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Fig. 81 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, comparison between steady state and reference (nominal conditions) FC 
void fraction (2.01 MW) 
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Fig. 82 – RELAP5-3D Smolensk 3 NPP: nodalization qualification at steady state 
level, radial temperature distribution of graphite at various elevations along the FC 
stack. 
4.6.2.2. RELAP5-3D 3D NK nodalization qualification 
Steady state calculations for the RELAP5-3D code neutron kinetics model 
validation were performed. When available, the results were compared with the 
NPP data, otherwise only calculated results were reported. As can be seen in Fig. 
83 and Fig. 84, the calculated trends of the axial power are similar to those 
measured in the NPP.  
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Fig. 83 –RELAP5-3D  Smolensk 3 Axial Power 
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Fig. 84 – Smolensk 3 nodalization qualification for 3D NK-TH Relap5/Nestle code: 
axial power distribution in selected FC (coordinate 40-47) 
Tab. 28 – RELAP5-3D Axial Peaking Factor 
Axial Peaking Factor (Fz) (from Bottom of the Core) 
Maximum  1.21 at ( at 3.15 m) 
Minimum  0.522 ( at 6.478 m) 
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Fig. 85 – RELAP5-3D Radially Averaged Power 
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Fig. 86 – RELAP5-3D Relative Radial Power 
 
 
 
Fig. 87 – 3D Thermal Neutron Flux Distribution (n/(cm2*sec)) 
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Tab. 29 – RELAP5-3D Channels Radial Averaged Power 
 Normalized Power 
Thermal Power 
(MW) 
Channel Position 
(xx-yy) 
Maximum 1.6942 3.4091 43-20 
Minimum 0.53410 1.0813 15-49 
 
Tab. 30 – RELAP5-3D Reactor core Neutron Kinetics Parameters 
Parameter Value 
K-eff 1.01359 (at HFP) 
Void Reactivity Feedback  
 CPS + 0.125 β/s (*) 
 FC + AA - 0.16 β 
CR Worth  
 MCR  - 12 β  
 MCR & FASS - 14 β 
 FASS - 1.7 β 
(*) Imposed Value, [8]. 
 
Tab. 31 – RELAP5-3D adopted delayed neutron fraction data 
Group Decay Constants (s-1) Delayed Neutron Fraction, % 
1 0.0125 0.0167 
2 0.0305 0.0987 
3 0.111 0.0912 
4 0.305 0.2094 
5 1.13 0.1013 
6 3.0 0.0399 
TOTAL β: 0.5572 
 
 
In Fig. 85, the radially averaged Power profile of the core is reported; the peaking 
trend is due to the presence in the averaging columns of a different number of 
active channels. From this picture is resulting that in the right side of the core there 
is a higher power production.  
 
In Fig. 87 the 3D thermal neutron flux distribution calculated by RELAP5-3D is 
reported. From Fig. 86 and Tab. 29 it can be seen that the radial peak factor is 
ranging from a minimum of 0.53410, localized in a channel in the bottom left 
quadrant of the core, to a maximum of 1.6942, localized in the upper right 
quadrant. These values can be connected to the fuel burnup distribution in that 
zone and to the adopted CRs position (see Tab. 9).  
In Tab. 30 are reported the reactivity coefficients calculated for the insertion of the 
all type of CR (MCR, FASS and MCR and FASS together). It should be noted that 
during these calculations, the Shortened CR where always supposed to be in the 
same position (see Tab. 9). In the same table are also reported the values of the 
reactivity inserted in case of total and partial MCC voiding and in case of CPS 
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cooling system voiding. It should be noted, also for its implications for the safety of 
the RBMK system that only in the last case there was a positive reactivity feedback 
during a LOCA. 
 
In Tab. 31 are reported the delayed neutron fraction data used for the neutron 
kinetics calculation. They refer to a fuel with an average burnup of 20 MWd/KgU. 
 
4.6.2.3. HELIOS model qualification 
Calculations comparison performed with MCNP and HELIOS about the keff for an 
RBMK-1000 infinite lattice was executed. The results showed that the greater 
deviations between the two codes are in the FC with lower enrichment FC (see 
Tab. 32). 
 
Tab. 32 – Comparison between HELIOS and MCNP codes of the kinf for a RBMK 
lattice (Temp. 300 K, fresh fuel) 
kinf Presence 
of coolant in the 
channel 
Enrichment, 
% MCNP 
(NIKIET) HELIOS 
Relative 
Difference,% 
YES 2.0 1.27332 1.27838 0.40 
YES 2.4 1.33144 1.33594 0.34 
NO 2.0 1.32256 1.31549 -0.53 
NO 2.4 1.36991 1.36475 -0.38 
 
A comparison of the difference value between the two kinf showed that HELIOS 
model underestimates the effect of a FC voiding more than MCNP model. HELIOS 
error in this case is around 25% in absolute value for both different FC (see Tab. 
33). 
 
Tab. 33 – Void Effects by HELIOS and MCNP Codes, absolute units 
 
Fuel enrichment, 
% 
 
MCNP (NIKIET) HELIOS ε, (HELIOS/MCNP) % 
2.0 0.04924 0.03711 - 24.6 
2.4 0.03847 0.02881 - 25.1 
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4.6.2.4. The MCNP5 model qualification 
MCNP5 criticality calculation were run for estimating the kinf of the system. 10050 
neutron cycles were calculated, using 104 neutron per cycle, thus totaling 100.5 
Million of Histories (MH). The first 50 neutron cycles calculation (i.e., 0.5 MH) were 
skipped for statistical purposes. Both ENDL and ENDF/B-VI [61] were used for 
reference calculations. An example of the convergence of the kinf and of the fission 
source distribution through the Shannon Entropy measurement is given in Fig. 88, 
Fig. 89. 
 
Fig. 88 – kinf trend versus cycle number 
 
 
Fig. 89 – Shannon Entropy trend versus cycle number 
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Tab. 34 – Results for the reference calculations 
Run ID 
UO2 
Enrich
ment, %
Presence 
of coolant 
in the 
channel 
kinf 
Standard 
Deviation 
(pcm) 
RBMK20 (ENDL) 2.0 YES 1.22864 5 
RBMK20A (ENDL) 2.0 NO 1.25134 5 
RBMK40 (ENDL) 2.4 YES 1.28352 5 
RBMK40A (ENDL) 2.4 NO 1.29895 5 
RBMK20 (ENDF-B-VI) 2.0 YES 1.27449 5 
RBMK20A (ENDF-B-VI) 2.0 NO 1.31911 5 
RBMK40 (ENDF-B-VI) 2.4 YES 1.33159 5 
RBMK40A (ENDF-B-VI) 2.4 NO 1.36892 5 
 
 
4.6.2.4.1. Sensitivity analyses 
A series of sensitivity analyses were performed in order to: 
• assess the model developed; 
• evaluate the effects of the main input parameters on the calculations 
results. 
For the sake of simplicity, sensitivities were performed using results from the ENDL 
2.0% fuel calculations only. In the followings paragraphs, the description of how the 
main parameters were changed is reported. 
 
4.6.2.4.2. Geometry Variation 
Two calculations were performed with a finite-along-the-z-axis model, using 35 and 
70 cm tall models respectively. Reflection condition were applied to the bottom and 
the top XY surfaces. Finite 3x3 and 5x5 lattices of identical RBMK FC cell were 
considered too (see Fig. 90, Fig. 91).  
 
4.6.2.4.3. Cross Section Libraries Variation 
Different cross section libraries were used in order to assess their effects on the 
calculation results. The following two cases were investigated: 
• Multi-group Cross Section Libraries MGXSNP (at 300 K) [80]. 
 
4.6.2.4.4. Boundary Conditions 
A “white” reflective boundary condition was used instead of the normal reflection 
one. 
 
4.6.2.4.5. Calculation Parameters Variation 
Two different calculation parameters were changed in order to assess their effects 
on the results: 
• Number of neutron cycles: 250; 
• Total number of neutron histories: 1.5 MH. 
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Fig. 90 –  3 x 3 Lattice 
 
 
Fig. 91 – 5 x 5 Lattice 
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4.6.2.4.6. Results of Sensitivity Analyses  
Results from sensitivity analyses reported in Tab. 35 showed that: 
• geometry limitation along z-axis does not influence significantly the results; 
• use of  lattice models (3x3 or 5x5) does not influence significantly the results; 
• Multi-group cross section libraries MGXNSP as well as activation of thermal 
model S(a,b) have the strongest influence on the kinf (some percent);  
• decreasing of number of cycles/total number of neutron histories cause the 
increase of the results variance. 
 
Tab. 35 – Results from sensitivity calculation 
Run ID # Sensitivity Parameter kinf 
Standard 
Deviation 
(pcm) 
Variation 
with 
reference 
case, % 
RBMK16L Geometry: H=70 cm 1.22863 5 -0.8e-3 
RBMK16K Geometry: H=35 cm 1.22882 5 +0.015 
RBMK26 Geometry:  5 x 5 lattice 1.22870 5 -0.004 
RBMK28 Geometry:  3 x 3 lattice 1.22860 5 -0.003 
RBMK24 XSec:  No S(α, β) model 1.24122 5 +1.0 
RBMK22 XSec:  Multigroup MGXSNP 1.27339 5 +3.6 
RBMK19 Boundary:  White reflection 1.22850 5 -0.011 
RBMK20I Calculation: 1.5 MH 1.22855 39 N/A 
RBMK21 Calculation:  250 cycles 1.22842 34 N/A 
 
NIKIET MCNP results for criticality calculations of an RBMK cell were supplied to 
GRNSPG/UNIPI during the framework of the TACIS Project R2.03/97 by RRC KI. 
They are reported in Tab. 36; in the fifth column, a comparison with the UNIPI 
results presented in this document is given. 
Tab. 36 – Comparison between NIKIET and GRNSPG criticality calculations 
Water 
in 
channel 
Fuel 
enrich., 
% 
NIKIET 
MCNP 
(kinf) 
GRNSPG 
MCNP 
(ENDL) 
(kinf) 
Deviatio
n  
NIKIET/ 
GRNSP
G 
(ENDL), 
% 
GRNSPG 
MCNP 
(ENDF/B-
VI) 
(kinf) 
Deviation 
NIKIET/GRNS
PG (ENDF/B-
VI) 
% 
YES 2.0 1.27332 1.22864 +3.6 1.27449 +0.09 
YES 2.4 1.33144 1.28352 +3.7 1.33159 +0.01 
NO 2.0 1.32256 1.25134 +5.7 1.31911 -0.26 
NO 2.4 1.36991 1.29895 +5.4 1.36892 -0.07 
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Tab. 37 – Comparison between RRC-KI and GRNSPG results for voiding effect 
Fuel 
enrichme
nt (%) 
Voiding 
NIKIET 
(∆kinf) 
Voiding 
GRNSPG/END
L (∆kinf) 
Deviation,  
(NIKIET/GR
NSPG-
ENDL),  % 
Voiding 
GRNSPG/E
NDF/B-VI 
(∆kinf) 
Deviation,  
(NIKIET/GRNS
PG-ENDF/B-
VI),  % 
2.0 0.04924 0.02270 +117 0.04462 -9.3 
2.4 0.03847 0.01543 +150 0.03733 -2.9 
 
From the comparison, a large deviation was observed when using for calculation 
the ENDL libraries. This could be explained by the presence of relevant 
uncertainties in some of the cross sections used for calculation. Therefore all the 
successive MCNP calculations were executed using the ENDF-B/VI libraries. 
 
 
4.6.2.5. The DRAGON model qualification 
 
Comparison of the reference calculations performed by different codes and input 
decks are given in Tab. 38. A good agreement resulted in the prediction of the kinf 
between the independent NIKIET MCNP4C  calculations and DRAGON  
calculations. This agreement increased when considering the DRAGON 
calculations performed with a 172 groups cross section libraries.  
 
Tab. 38 - Comparison of the reference criticality calculations Monte Carlo versus 
DRAGON code 
Water in 
channel 
Fuel 
Enr.
, % 
NIKIET 
MCNP4C 
– 
ENDF/B 
data (kinf) 
DRAGON
/EXCELL 
IAEA 69 
Groups 
libr. (kinf) 
Deviation 
NIKIET/GR
NSPG, 
% 
GRNSPG 
DRAGON/ 
EXCELL 
IAEA 172 
Groups libr. 
(kinf) 
Deviation 
NIKIET/GR
NSPG, 
% 
YES 2.0 1.27332 1.278768 -0.4 1.277029 -0.3 
YES 2.4 1.33144 1.335680 -0.3 1.334003 -0.2 
NO 2.0 1.32256 1.312085 +0.8 1.315861 +0.5 
NO 2.4 1.36991 1.359907 +0.7 1.363961 +0.4 
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The comparison of the calculated FC voiding effect (Tab. 39) showed an 
underestimation by DRAGON code. This underestimation is greater when using 
few energy groups (69) and when considering higher enrichment of the fuel. It is 
interesting to note that also the other deterministic lattice physics code, HELIOS, 
showed the same problem when considering the voiding effect (underestimation of 
roughly -25% was found).  
 
The roots of this underestimation should lie both in the data libraries as well as in 
the neutron transport solution methods. 
Tab. 39 – Comparison between RRC-KI and DRAGON results for voiding effect 
Fuel 
enric
hmen
t (%) 
Voiding 
NIKIET 
(∆kinf) 
Voiding 
DRAGON  
69 
groups(∆kinf) 
ε, 
(DRAGON 
69/NIKIET),
% 
Voiding 
DRAGON 
172 
groups(∆kinf) 
Deviation,  
(NIKIET/DRA
GON 172), % 
2.0 0.04924 0.03332 -32.3% 0.03883 -21.1% 
2.4 0.03847 0.02423 -37.0% 0.02996 -22.1% 
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5. THE APPLICATION TO REALISTIC TRANSIENTS 
ANALYSES  
 
5.1. Hot Full Power Analyses 
In this chapter, the results from a series of transient calculations are reported. All 
transients were calculated considering the plant at Hot Full Power (HFP), or 3159 
MW. This allowed to maximize the power and temperature excursions of the fuel 
element calculated in a realistic safety analyses by the best estimate (BE) code 
RELAP5-3D. 
The selection of these transients was performed in order to investigate the main 
relevant physical phenomena for the RBMK technology (see chapter 3 of this 
document), to test the developed coupled codes model capabilities, to asses the 
safety level of the RBMK system. 
 
Six transients are here presented. They are considered the most significant to be 
analyzed by coupled codes technology [52]. They are: 
• CR withdrawal: Reactivity Initiated Event (RIA), transient involving 
asymmetric power and flux perturbation;  
• CR group withdrawal: as the previous one, but with a more significant 
reactivity insertion; 
• GDH blockage: decrease of coolant flow event, transient involving possible 
coupled flow and power oscillations; 
• Single FC blockage: decrease of coolant flow event, local transient, 
influences from and on neighbor channels to be assessed; 
• GDH rupture: loss of coolant event (LOCA), Design Basis Accident (DBA); 
• CPS cooling circuit LOCA: Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA) LOCA, 
accident involving strong reactivity insertion 
 
All these transients, except the GDH rupture, were calculated using the simplified 
RELAP5-3D model (see Fig. 60 in the previous chapter), simulating only the 
reactor core with imposed boundary conditions. The GDH rupture, since it involved 
the feedback from more NPP components (e.g., MCPs and SD), was instead 
calculated using the full scale nodalization (see Fig. 59). 
 
5.1.1. Reactivity Initiated Accidents 
In these two transients, the CR/CRs were selected among the ones having the 
highest worth. Their positions in the core is given in the Fig. 92. 
Since in the RBMK, the CR are designed to operate in a low pressure circuit (the 
CPS cooling circuit, operating at atmospheric pressure), they cannot be ejected 
(e.g., like could happen in a PWR). Therefore, it has to be assumed that the cause 
of this events is a malfunction of the CPS or a wrong action by the reactor operator.  
 
  154 
CR GROUP WITHDRAWAL
CR WITHDRAWAL
 
Fig. 92 – CR Cartogram for RELAP5-3D RIA calculations 
 
5.1.1.1. CR Withdrawal 
The main purpose of the analysis of the CR withdrawal event is the evaluation of 
the overall core power (even in relation to the achievement of the scram set-point) 
and the demonstration of the capabilities of the developed code model to deal with 
this event. After a preliminary calculation of the worth of the all MCR, the CR with 
higher worth (resulted to be the #151 according to map of Fig. 35) was selected to 
be withdrawn during this transient. An ‘ad-hoc’ TH and 3D NK nodalization was 
developed in order to investigate the effects on the neighbor channels too (Fig. 93 
and Fig. 94). 
 
Selected results of the event originated by a spurious single CR withdrawal are 
given from Fig. 95 to Fig. 101. The CR withdrawal event resulted to be: 
 
• 0.0 s:  onset of control rod #151 withdrawal with the speed 40 cm/s (1 rod 
with initial insertion depth of 6.70 m from bottom of top reflector); 
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• 17 sec.: reactor peak power (3350 MW – 106% of Nominal Power, see Fig. 
95) 
 
The scram signal is generated if the reactor power reaches the level of 110% of 
nominal power (3475 MW). The scram delay time is 0.25 s and the speed of CR 
insertion is 3.5 and 0.5 m/s for safety and manual CR, respectively. 
 
It can be noted that the power surge in not large enough to generate the AZ scram 
signal, which set point is 110% of nominal power. The extraction of this MCR 
control rod from the core results in a mild increase of power in all channels, Fig. 96. 
In Fig. 96, Fig. 97 and Fig. 98 are reported the neighbor channels power trends 
and their equivalent mass flow and void fraction. All these parameters were slightly 
affected by the transient. In Fig. 99, Fig. 100 and Fig. 101 there are also reported 
the temperatures trends of clad, of fuel centerline and of Graphite hot spot.  
 
All the investigated parameters did not exceed the safety thresholds.  
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Fig. 93 – Radial Arrangement of TH Channels for CR Withdrawal Nodalization 
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Fig. 94 – Correlation map between TH channels, TH Zones and NK Nodes for CR Withdrawal Nodalization 
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Fig. 95 – Total Reactor Power 
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Fig. 96 – 1 FC equivalent Power 
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Fig. 97 – 1FC Equivalent Coolant Mass Flow – 214, 259, 265 channel 
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Fig. 98 – Void Fraction at the exit of FC 214, 259, 265 
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Fig. 99 – Clad Temperature at Hot Spot 
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Fig. 100 – Fuel CL temperature 
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Fig. 101 – Graphite Temperatures 
 
5.1.1.2. CR Group Withdrawal  
The main purpose of the analysis of the CR-Group-Withdrawal event is the 
evaluation of the overall core power and the demonstration of the capabilities of the 
adopted code system to deal with this event. The event is originated by a spurious 
signal for CR bank (or group) withdrawal. The uncontrolled withdrawal of a 
peripheral control rod bank occurs (3 CR, the #179, #194 and the #196 with initial 
insertion depth of 5.80 m from bottom of top reflector, see Fig. 92).  
 
An ‘ad-hoc’ TH and 3D NK nodalization was developed in order to investigate the 
effects on the neighbor channels too (Fig. 102 and Fig. 103).  
 
The temporal development of the transient resulted to be: 
1) 0 sec. – onset of CR Group withdrawal with the speed of 40 cm/s; 
2) 7 sec – generation of AZ signal (Reactor power: 110% of Nominal Power, 
see Fig. 104) 
a. Insertion of all MCR with a speed of 50 cm/s 
b. Insertion of all SR with a speed of 350 cm/s 
 
The withdrawal speed is 0.40 m/s. The scram signal is generated when the reactor 
power reaches the level of 110% of nominal power (3475 MW). The scram delay 
time is 0.25 s. 
 
Key results are given in Fig. 104 to Fig. 111. The set-point for scram signal is 
achieved in a few seconds and total core power decreases as reported in Fig. 104. 
Fission power in equivalent FC (per individual channel) is given in Fig. 105 and 
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axial power distribution can be found in Fig. 111. Dangerous fuel rod temperature 
excursions are not predicted (Fig. 108), therefore reactor safety limits are 
preserved.  
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Fig. 102 – Radial Arrangement of TH Channels for CR Bank Withdrawal Nodalization 
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Fig. 103 – Correlation map between TH channels, TH Zones and NK Nodes for CR Bank Withdrawal Nodalization 
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Fig. 104 – Reactor Power 
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Fig. 105 – 1 FC Equivalent Power 
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Fig. 106 – Equivalent 1FC mass flow rate 
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Fig. 107 – Top FC void fraction 
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Fig. 108 – Hot Spot Clad Temperatures 
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Fig. 109 – Hot Spot Fuel CL temperature 
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Fig. 110 – Hot Spot Graphite Outer Temperature 
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Fig. 111 – 1 FC - Equivalent axial Power 
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5.1.2. Decrease of coolant flow event 
5.1.2.1. GDH blockage  
The main purpose of the analysis of the GDH-blockage event is the evaluation of 
the power inside the affected FCs and the demonstration of the capabilities of the 
adopted code system to deal with this event. The event is supposed to be 
originated by the blockage of the 11th GDH on the right half of the MCC, Fig. 67. 
The available bypass mass flow rate is 60 Kg/s for the affected GDH. The 
emergency protection signal is generated when the reactor power reaches the level 
of 110% of nominal power (i.e. 3475 MW) or if one PT rupture occurs. The scram 
delay time is 0.25 s and the speed of CR insertion is 3.5 and 0.5 m/s for safety and 
manual CR, respectively. 
 
Key results are given in Fig. 112 to Fig. 121. The total core power decreases soon 
after the accident start, Fig. 112. Flow oscillations are predicted in the FC of the 
affected GDH (see Fig. 113 and Fig. 114) that cause rod surface temperature 
excursions in some of the channels early into the transient, Fig. 118. This is one 
reason for global core power decrease (e.g. Fig. 112). The PT temperature is 
reported in Fig. 120. During the calculated transient duration, the PT temperature 
does overpass the safety limit. 
 
In connection with FC thermo-hydraulic instabilities (e.g. flow-rates, Fig. 113, Fig. 
114) it must be noted that a physical response of the system can be obtained when 
each FC of the affected GDH is modeled. This implies modeling accurately the 
length and the geometrical discontinuities of each of the 43 individual pipes 
connected with the affected GDH (i.e. from the GDH to the FC inlet in the core 
region) and from the individual FC outlet and the SD. This is well beyond the scope 
of the present activity.  
 
Conditions for PT rupture are reached for Smolensk at different times (these could 
not be reached in Ignalina NPP because of the special-additional scram signal 
considered that causes an early core power reduction following scram). The 
present results, i.e. PT rupture in 300 s of calculation, show the importance of the 
3D NK coupled TH model. 
 
The close connection between thermal-hydraulic instabilities and occurrence of 
CHF in the rod bundle and consequent rod surface temperature rise can be noted 
from Fig. 118. The further consequence is the PT wall temperature above the 
acceptable threshold, as already emphasized. 
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Fig. 112 – Reactor Power 
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Fig. 113 – 1FC Equivalent Mass Flow Rate (channels 265, 259, 214) 
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Fig. 114 – 1FC Equivalent Mass Flow Rate (channels 244, 175, 669) 
 
0 50.0 100.0 150.0 200.0 250.0 300.0
Time (s)
4750
4800
4850
4900
4950
5000
5050
5100
M
as
s 
Fl
ow
ra
te
 (K
g/
s)
WinGraf 4.1 - 08-17-2005
XXX RBMK_GDH_BLOCKAGE mtotal_unaff_GDH
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
 
Fig. 115 – Total Mass Flow in not-affected GDHs (Right Half) 
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Fig. 116 – Mass Flowrate in the affected GDH 
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Fig. 117 – Void Fraction at top of affected GDH FCs 
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Fig. 118 – Hot Spot Clad Temperatures - FC 214, 259, 265, 175, 244 
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Fig. 119 – Hot Spot Fuel CL Temperatures - FC 214, 259, 265, 175, 244 
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Fig. 120 – Pressure Tubes temperatures at Hot Spot – FC 214, 259, 265, 175 
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Fig. 121 – Graphite Temperatures 
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5.1.2.2. Fuel Channel Blockage: the System Code Analysis  
 
The main purpose of the analysis of the Fuel Channel (FC) Blockage event is the 
evaluation of the affected FC power. This is relevant to calculate the time of the PT 
failure and, therefore, the time available for any corrective action. Following FC 
blockage, two counteracting main phenomena contribute to the variation of the 
local (i.e. of the affected FC) fission power: a) the voiding that causes an easier 
way for graphite moderated neutron to reach the fuel bundle; b) the fuel 
temperature increase consequence of lack of cooling, that through the Doppler 
effect tends to cause a greater parasitic neutron capture, thus introducing the 
potential for power decrease. Both phenomena depend upon burn-up and, to a 
lower extent, upon the position of the FC in the core region.  
 
The analysis has been conducted, assuming no scram, with reference to the FC 
indicated in the bottom left part of Fig. 67 (channel ID is 214 and surrounding group 
of channel ID is 259). Key results are given in Fig. 122 to Fig. 128. It can be seen 
that the affected FC power substantially decreases soon after the event, Fig. 126, 
with overall core power slightly influenced by the event, Fig. 123. Conditions for 
fuel rod damage and PT failure are reached in a few tens of seconds after the 
transient start, Fig. 127 and Fig. 128, respectively. 
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Fig. 122 – Relap5-3D/Nestle coupled 3D NK TH FC blckage analysis of Smolensk 
3 RBMK NPP: flow-rate in the affected FC  
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Fig. 123 – Relap5-3D/Nestle coupled 3D NK TH FC blckage analysis of Smolensk 
3 RBMK NPP: core power 
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Fig. 124 – Mass Flowrate in the other channels of the affected GDH 
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Fig. 125 – Void Fraction at the Blocked Channel Exit 
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Fig. 126 – Affected FC power and power (per unit FC) in neighbouring FC. 
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Fig. 127 – Rod surface temperature at different elevations in the affected FC. 
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Fig. 128 – PT temperature at different elevations in the affected FC. 
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5.1.2.3. The Fuel Channel Blockage: the FC criticality calculations 
In order to perform precise criticality analyses for a FC flow blockage accident,  
Monte-Carlo code MCNP5 calculations were performed considering as calculation 
domain a single FC and a 3x3 lattice of RBMK cells. Boundary conditions for 
MCNP5 input were derived by a previous transient calculation by state-of-the-art 
codes HELIOS/RELAP5-3D. 
The changes of the main physical parameters (e.g. fuel and water/steam 
temperature, water density, graphite temperature) at different time intervals of the 
FC blockage transient were evaluated by a RELAP5-3D calculation. This 
information was used to set up further MCNP5 inputs. Criticality analyses were 
performed for different systems (single channel and lattice) at those transient’ 
states, obtaining global criticality versus transient time. Finally the weight of each 
parameter’s change (fuel overheating and channel voiding) on global criticality was 
assessed. 
 
5.1.2.3.1. Introduction 
Cell kinf was calculated for several physical states occurring during a Fuel Channel 
Blockage (FCB) event. Fuel and moderator temperatures as well as coolant density 
values at different time-steps were obtained by a previously executed 3D NK – TH 
calculation by RELAP5-3D code. These values are given in Tab. 40.  
 
Tab. 40 – Cell parameter variation during a FCB event by RELAP5-3D code 
Transient 
Time (s) 
Avg. Fuel 
Temperature 
(K) 
Coolant 
Density 
(Kg/m3) 
Coolant 
Temperature 
(K) 
Avg. 
Moderator 
Temperature 
(K) 
0.0 800 543 563 850 
8.0 1100 18.63 836 850 
15.0 1300 15.2 1000 850 
20.0 1500 12.6 1194 850 
 
 
In order to assess the effects played by the different models, several calculations 
were run for both single FC models (with fuel 2.0% and 2.4%) and for lattice fuel 
channels models, considering FC blockage occurring in the central FC of the 
lattice. Results are reported hereafter. 
 
5.1.2.3.2. Single Fuel Channel - 2.0% Fuel  
 
Criticality Calculations 
 
Excluding the reference state at 0.0 second (run ID Xi), 9 runs were executed (see 
Tab. 40) changing, in each run: 
• all parameters, thus obtaining system criticality (runs X1, X4, X7); 
• only coolant parameters, thus assessing voiding effect (runs X2, X5, X8); 
• or only fuel temperature, thus assessing Doppler effect (runs X3, X6, X9).  
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All parameter changes were done according to values reported in Tab. 40. Results 
of cell kinf with standard deviation are reported in Tab. 41 and Fig. 129. Low 
variance was obtained running 103 active cycles, simulating 104 neutrons histories 
per cycle.  
Tab. 41 – 2.0% fuel cell criticality during a FCB event considering occurrence of all 
phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
System criticality Channel voiding Doppler Effect Transient 
Time (s) RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm)
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm)
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
0.0 Xi 1.28033 15 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8.0 X1 1.27654 17 X2 1.28343 15 X3 1.27395 15 
15.0 X4 1.27590 16 X5 1.28319 16 X6 1.27382 16 
20.0 X7 1.27581 16 X8 1.28290 16 X9 1.27323 15 
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Fig. 129 – 2.0% fuel cell criticality during a FCB event considering occurrence of all 
phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
 
Some considerations were obtained by a qualitative analysis of the previous 
results. FC total reactivity during this kind of transient seemed reduced thanks to 
overwhelming negative reactivity insertion by Doppler effect; this phenomenon 
looked opposed to the positive reactivity insertion generated by void effect. 
 
Reaction Rates and neutron flux tallying 
 
In order to have a rigorous justification for the previous results, reaction rates tallies 
for Xi to X3 runs were executed, assessing the effects of the main phenomena (fuel 
overheating and channel voiding) on the neutron fluxes and reaction rates. Results 
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for runs Xi to X3 are given in Tab. 42. The effects of parameters changes on the 
different tallies for runs X1, X2, X3 compared with run Xi is showed in Tab. 43. Low 
variance for the tallies was obtained running a large number (108) of neutron 
histories. Tallies were executed dividing the energy domain into two energy groups: 
the fast group (from 14 MeV to 0.625 eV) and the thermal group (from 0.625 eV to 
0 eV). 
 
Tab. 42 – 2.0% fuel cell reaction rates and fluxes for runs Xi to X3 
Xi X1 X2 X3 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Fuel 2.0% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.52E-04 3.42E-04 3.44E-04 3.50E-04 Sfission * F 
3.49E-05 
3.87E-04
4.34E-05 
3.86E-04
4.34E-05 
3.88E-04 
3.48E-05 
3.85E-
04 
1.49E-04 1.47E-04 1.47E-04 1.48E-04 Sabsorption 
(fuel) * F 
(excluding 
fission) 
1.05E-04 
2.54E-04
1.28E-04 
2.74E-04
1.25E-04 
2.72E-04 
1.08E-04 
2.56E-
04 
2.27E-05 3.56E-06 3.58E-06 2.26E-05 Sabsorption * F  
(in the water) 1.33E-06 
2.40E-05
3.10E-07 
3.87E-06
3.11E-07 
3.89E-06 
1.33E-06 
2.39E-
05 
2.90E-03 3.21E-03 3.21E-03 2.90E-03 
F (in fuel) 
5.49E-03 
8.39E-03
7.09E-03 
1.03E-02
7.11E-03 
1.03E-02 
5.48E-03 
8.38E-
03 
2.12E-03 2.28E-03 2.28E-03 2.12E-03 Sscattering * F  
(in the 
graphite) 
1.55E-03 
3.67E-03
2.04E-03 
4.32E-03
2.05E-03 
4.33E-03 
1.55E-03 
3.67E-
03 
 
Tab. 43 – 2.0% fuel cell – Ratio of Tallies, % 
X1/Xi, % X2/Xi, % X3/Xi, % 
Thermal Total Thermal Total Thermal Total 
Ratios of Tallies - Fuel 
2.0% 
Fast  Fast  Fast  
-2.8 -2.2 -0.5 Sfission * F 
24.3 
-0.3 
24.5 
0.2 
-0.2 
-0.5 
-1.2 -0.8 -0.4 Sabsorption (fuel) * F 
(excluding fission) 21.1 
8.0 
18.3 
7.1 
2.7 
0.9 
-84.3 -84.2 -0.4 Sabsorption * F 
(water) -76.7 
-83.9 
-76.7 
-83.8 
-0.4 
-0.4 
10.7 10.7 -0.1 
F (in fuel) 
29.1 
22.8 
29.5 
23.0 
-0.2 
-0.2 
7.3 7.4 -0.1 Sscattering * F 
(graphite) 31.9 
17.6 
32.1 
17.8 
-0.1 
-0.1 
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Considering Tab. 43, the followings can be stated. 
• Channel voiding and steam overheating (run X2) is causing a large drop in 
the neutron absorption by the water (-83%) and a shift of the energy 
spectrum of the neutrons towards higher energies (flux hardening, +29%); 
consequently, an increase of the neutron flux (F = n*v) results (+23%). 
Faster flux is increasing the scattering reaction rates in the graphite block 
(+32% in epithermal-fast zones); hardened flux is increasing neutron 
absorption and neutron fissions in epithermal-fast zones (+18% and 
+24.5% respectively). Neutron multiplication per generation (i.e., kinf) is 
increased as result from the sum of all these effects. 
• Fuel overheating (run X3) as a sensible impact on the neutron population, 
interesting neutron absorption epithermal-fast zones; consequently a 
decrease on neutron population and fissions result. 
• The results from the physical simulation of both effects and its comparison 
with the reference case (fuel and coolant overheating, run X1) is 
reproduced in the first column of Tab. 42 and Tab. 43 respectively. The 
coolant overheating is causing a flux hardening that results in an increase 
of the scattering reaction rates in the graphite block, in an increase of the 
neutron flux, and in an increase of the fast fissions (ε term in the kinf factor). 
Fuel overheating is instead causing an increase of the neutron absorption 
(p term in the kinf factor) in the and contributing to the decrease of thermal 
fissions. The overall number of fissions (tallying on fast and thermal 
energies groups) is therefore decreased. Thus, the system criticality 
decrease (see Fig. 129). 
 
5.1.2.3.3. Single FC – 2.4% Fuel 
 
Criticality Calculations 
 
The same considerations exposed in the previous paragraph can be applied for the 
single FC with the 2.4% enriched fuel. The identification of the different cases is 
done using the same nomenclature specified above. From Tab. 44 and Fig. 130 
respectively, it results that the system kinf is always decreasing, also when 
considering channel voiding effect only. The explanation of these phenomena is 
given in the next paragraph. 
 
Tab. 44 – 2.4% fuel cell criticality during a FCB event considering occurrence of all 
phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
System criticality Channel voiding Doppler Effect Transient 
Time (s) RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm)
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
0.0 Xi 1.33503 15 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8.0 X1 1.32694 17 X2 1.33383 16 X3 1.32873 16 
15.0 X4 1.32680 16 X5 1.33369 16 X6 1.32850 16 
20.0 X7 1.32637 16 X8 1.33375 16 X9 1.32788 15 
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Fig. 130 – 2.4% fuel cell criticality during a FCB event considering occurrence of all 
phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
 
Reaction Rates and neutron flux tallying 
 
As for the 2.0 % single FC case (see previous paragraphs for calculation 
parameter specifications), several tallies were executed, measuring the effects of 
the main phenomena (fuel overheating and channel voiding) on the neutron fluxes 
and reaction rates. Results for runs Xi to X3 are given in Tab. 45. The effects of 
parameters changes on the different tallies for runs X1, X2, X3 compared with run 
Xi is showed in Tab. 46.  
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Tab. 45 – 2.4% fuel cell reaction rates and fluxes for runs Xi to X3 
Xi X1 X2 X3 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Fuel 2.4% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.65E-04 3.52E-04 3.55E-04 3.63E-04 
Sfission * F 
3.91E-05 
4.04E-04
4.87E-05 
4.01E-04
4.88E-05 
4.03E-04
3.91E-05 
4.02E-04 
1.39E-04 1.36E-04 1.37E-04 1.38E-04 Sabsorption 
(fuel) *F 
(excluding 
fission) 
1.06E-04 
2.45E-04
1.28E-04 
2.64E-04
1.25E-04 
2.62E-04
1.09E-04 
2.47E-04 
2.00E-05 3.10E-06 3.12E-06 1.99E-05 Sabsorption * 
F  
(in the 
water) 
1.32E-06 
2.13E-05
3.06E-07 
3.41E-06
3.06E-07 
3.43E-06
1.31E-06 
2.12E-05 
2.54E-03 2.79E-03 2.79E-03 2.54E-03 
F (in fuel) 
5.47E-03 
8.01E-03
7.05E-03 
9.84E-03
7.07E-03 
9.86E-03
5.46E-03 
7.99E-03 
1.97E-03 2.09E-03 2.10E-03 1.97E-03 Sscattering * 
F 
(in the 
graphite) 
1.55E-03 
3.52E-03
2.04E-03 
4.13E-03
2.04E-03 
4.14E-03
1.54E-03 
3.51E-03 
 
Tab. 46 – 2.4% fuel cell criticality during a FCB event considering occurrence of all 
phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect, % 
X1/Xi, % X2/Xi, % X3/Xi, % 
Thermal Thermal Thermal TALLYING Fuel 2.4% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
-3.3 -2.8 -0.5 
Sfission * F  
24.4 
-0.6 
24.6 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.5 
-1.8 -1.3 -0.4 Sabsorption (fuel) * F  
(excluding fission) 20.7 
8.0 
18.0 
7.0 
2.6 
0.9 
-84.5 -84.4 -0.4 Sabsorption * F  
(water) -76.8 
-84.0 
-76.8 
-83.9 
-0.4 
-0.4 
9.8 9.9 -0.1 
F (in fuel) 
29.0 
22.9 
29.3 
23.1 
-0.2 
-0.2 
6.2 6.3 -0.1 Sscattering * F  
(graphite) 31.7 
17.4 
31.9 
17.6 
-0.1 
-0.1 
 
From Tab. 45 and Tab. 46, the following considerations result: 
• channel voiding and steam overheating (run X2) is causing a large drop in 
neutron absorption by water (-84%) and a shift of the neutron energy 
spectrum towards higher energies (+29%). Consequently, an increase of 
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the neutron population (+23%) results. The faster neutron flux is increasing 
the scattering reactions in the graphite block (+32% in epithermal-fast 
zones) as well as epithermal neutron absorption and fast fissions reaction 
rates in the epithermal-fast zones (+18% and +24.6% respectively). The 
voiding effect on kinf is negative (kinf is slightly decreasing ) because the 
fissions reaction rates are decreasing in thermal zone more than for the 
2.0% fuel case. Therefore, a sensible reduction of the number of neutrons 
from fissions results, causing a reduction of the kinf. 
• Fuel overheating (run X3) has a sensible impact on the neutron population, 
interesting neutron absorption epithermal-fast zones; consequently a slight 
decrease of the neutron population and of fissions reaction rates result. 
The magnitude of the reductions is the same as for the 2.0% fuel case. 
• The results from the physical simulation of both effects and its comparison 
with the reference case (fuel and coolant overheating, run X1) is 
reproduced in the first column of Tab. 45 and Tab. 46 respectively. The 
coolant overheating is causing a flux hardening that results in an increase 
of the scattering reaction rates in the graphite block, in an increase of the 
neutron flux, and in an increase of the fast fissions. Fuel overheating is 
instead causing an increase of the neutron absorption and contributing to 
the decrease of thermal fissions. The overall number of fissions (tallying on 
fast and thermal energies groups) is therefore decreased, in this case 
more than in the 2.0% fuel case. Thus, the system criticality decreases 
(see Fig. 130). 
 
5.1.2.3.4. Lattice Cell Analysis  
Similar analyses were performed for studying the effects of channel voiding and 
fuel overheating phenomena when they take place in a FC of a lattice, i.e. 
simulating an event more similar to what is occurring in a real RBMK core. For this 
purpose, the 3x3 lattice model was used, considering blockage of the central FC. 
Analyses were performed for the following configurations: 
1. 2.0 % fuel lattice 
2. 2.4 % fuel lattice 
3. 2.4 % fuel lattice with 2.0 % fuel for blocked channel 
 
Results of these analyses are reported in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.0 % Fuel : Criticality Calculations 
 
Results of criticality calculations are given in Tab. 47 and in Fig. 131. Very low 
variance was obtained running 104 neutron histories for 104 active neutron cycles 
(108 MH). Doppler and voiding effect in the central FC produced the same 
qualitative effects on the lattice reactivity as in the case of a single FC with 2.0% 
enriched fuel (i.e., positive and negative insertion, for voiding and Doppler 
respectively). System criticality is instead, in this case, increased. 
 
It should also be noted that in all these simulations with lattice of FCs, the 
magnitude of kinf change is smaller than in the case of single FCs simulations (tens 
of pcm compared to hundreds of pcm, respectively). 
  186 
 
For the identification of the different cases, the same nomenclature specified in the 
previous paragraphs was used.  
 
Tab. 47 – 2.0% fuel lattice criticality during a FCB event on central channel 
considering occurrence of all phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
System criticality Channel voiding Doppler Effect Transient 
Time (s) RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm)
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm)
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
0.0 Xi 1.28030 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8.0 X1 1.28068 5 X2 1.28139 5 X3 1.27957 5 
15.0 X4 1.28066 5 X5 1.28128 5 X6 1.27966 5 
20.0 X7 1.28058 5 X8 1.28132 5 X9 1.27957 5 
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Fig. 131 – 2.0% fuel lattice criticality during a FCB event on central channel 
considering occurrence of all phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
 
2.0 % Fuel : Reaction Rates and neutron flux tallying 
 
As for the single FC calculations, several reaction rates and flux tallies were 
executed assessing the effects of the main phenomena. Results for runs Xi to X3 
are given in Tab. 48 and Tab. 49, reporting values for the central channel (blocked 
channel) and for the border channels of the lattice. The effects of parameters 
changes on the different tallies for runs X1, X2, X3 in comparison with run Xi is 
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showed in Tab. 50. Low variance for the tallies was obtained running a large 
number of neutron histories (108 MH). 
 
Tab. 48 – 2.0% lattice fuel cells reaction rates and fluxes for runs Xi and X1  
Xi X1 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice 
Fuel 2.0% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.91E-05 3.91E-05 3.42E-05 3.97E-05 
Sfission * F 
3.88E-06 
4.30E-
05 3.88E-06 
4.30E-
05 3.96E-06 
3.81E-05 
3.96E-06 
4.36E-
05 
1.65E-05 1.65E-05 1.46E-05 1.67E-05 Sabsorption 
(fuel) * F  
(excluding 
fission) 
1.17E-05 
2.82E-
05 
1.17E-05 
2.82E-
05 
1.13E-05 
2.60E-05 
1.20E-05 
2.87E-
05 
2.52E-06 2.52E-06 3.55E-07 2.55E-06 Sabsorption  * F 
(in the 
water) 1.48E-07 
2.67E-
06 1.48E-07 
2.67E-
06 2.76E-08 
3.83E-07 
1.52E-07 
2.70E-
06 
3.22E-04 3.23E-04 3.18E-04 3.27E-04 
F (in fuel) 
6.10E-04 
9.32E-
04 6.11E-04 
9.33E-
04 6.64E-04 
9.82E-04 
6.22E-04 
9.49E-
04 
2.36E-04 2.36E-04 2.28E-04 2.39E-04 Sscattering  * F  
(in the 
graphite) 1.72E-04 
4.08E-
04 1.72E-04 
4.08E-
04 1.84E-04 
4.12E-04 
1.76E-04 
4.15E-
04 
 
Tab. 49 – 2.0% lattice fuel cells reaction rates and fluxes for runs X2 and X3 
X2 X3 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice 
Fuel 2.0% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.43E-05 3.97E-05 3.89E-05 3.91E-05 
Sfission * F 
3.97E-06 
3.83E-05
3.96E-06 
4.36E-05
3.86E-06 
4.28E-
05 3.88E-06 
4.30E-
05 
1.47E-05 1.67E-05 1.65E-05 1.65E-05 
Sabsorption 
(fuel) * F  
(excluding 
fission) 1.11E-05 
2.58E-05
1.20E-05 
2.87E-05
1.20E-05 
2.85E-
05 
1.17E-05 
2.82E-
05 
3.56E-07 2.55E-06 2.51E-06 2.52E-06 Sabsorption  * F 
 
(in the 
water) 
2.76E-08 
3.84E-07
1.52E-07 
2.70E-06
1.47E-07 
2.66E-
06 1.48E-07 
2.66E-
06 
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Tab. 49(cont.) – 2.0% lattice fuel cells reaction rates and fluxes for runs X2 and X3 
X2 X3 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice 
Fuel 2.0% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.17E-04 3.27E-04 3.22E-04 3.23E-04 
F(in fuel) 
6.67E-04 
9.84E-04
6.22E-04 
9.49E-04
6.07E-04 
9.29E-
04 6.11E-04 
9.33E-
04 
2.28E-04 2.39E-04 2.36E-04 2.36E-04 
Sscattering  * 
F  
(in the 
graphite) 1.84E-04 
4.12E-04
1.76E-04 
4.15E-04
1.72E-04 
4.08E-
04 
1.72E-04 
4.08E-
04 
 
Tab. 50 – 2.0% lattice fuel cell – Ratio of Tallies, % 
X1/Xi , % X2/Xi , % X3/Xi , % 
Central Border Central Border Central Border 
Th. Th. Th. Th. Th. Th. 
Ratios of 
Tallies -  
Lattice 
Fuel 
2.0% Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot.
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
-12.7 1.4 -12.3 1.4 -0.4 0.0 
Sfission* F  
2.1 
-11.3
2.1 
1.4 
2.4 
-11.0
2.1 
1.4 
-0.3 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-11.4 1.4 -11.1 1.4 -0.3 0.0 Sabsorption* 
F (fuel) -3.3 
-8.0 
2.4 
1.8 
-5.4 
-8.7 
2.4 
1.8 
2.4 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
-85.9 1.4 -85.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 Sabsorption* 
F  
(water) -81.4 
-85.6
2.4 
1.4 
-81.3 
-85.6
2.4 
1.4 
-0.5 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.5 1.4 -1.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 
F(fuel) 
8.9 
5.3 
1.9 
1.7 
9.4 
5.6 
1.8 
1.7 
-0.5 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.3 1.1 -3.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 Sscattering* 
F  
(graphite) 7.0 
1.0 
2.5 
1.7 
7.2 
1.1 
2.5 
1.7 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
From Tab. 48 to Tab. 50, the followings can be stated. 
• Central FC coolant overheating (run X2) is causing a large drop in the 
neutron absorption by the water (-86%) and a shift of the energy spectrum 
of the neutrons towards fast energies (flux hardening, +9.4%, sensibly 
less than +29% occurring in the single FC model because of neutron 
leakages). This is causing a neutron leakage towards border FC of the 
lattice; accordingly, there is an increase of the fast scattering (+7.2%) in 
the central graphite block and a decrease of total fission (-11%) and 
absorption (-8.7%) reaction rates in the fuel of the central FC. The 
reaction rates of the border FCs are instead all increased of some 
percent. 
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• Fuel overheating is affecting only the reaction rates of the central FC. 
Neutron absorption is increased in the fuel. 
• The results from the physical simulation of both effects (fuel and coolant 
overheating, run X1) are reported in the first column of Tab. 48 and Tab. 
50 respectively. The coolant overheating in the central FC is causing a 
flux hardening that results in an increase of the scattering reaction rates in 
the graphite block, in an increase of the neutron flux and fast fissions and 
in an increase of neutron leakages toward peripheral FCs. Reaction rates 
in the peripheral FCs increase of some percents, while the overall fission 
and absorption reaction rates of the central FC are sensibly reduced (-
11% and -8% respectively). The system neutron multiplication capability 
(i.e., kinf) is slightly increased (see Fig. 131). 
 
2.4 % Fuel: Criticality Calculations 
 
Results of criticality calculations for the 2.4% enriched fuel are given in Tab. 51 and 
in Fig. 132. Also in this case, very low variance was obtained running 104 neutron 
histories for 104 active neutron cycles (i.e., 108 MH). Doppler and voiding effect in 
the central FC produced negative and positive reactivity insertion respectively; 
system criticality did not change. For the indication of the different cases, the same 
nomenclature specified in the previous paragraphs was used. 
 
Tab. 51 – 2.4% fuel lattice criticality during a FCB event on central channel 
considering occurrence of all phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
System criticality Channel voiding Doppler Effect Transient 
Time (s) RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
0.0 Xi 1.33513 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8.0 X1 1.33511 5 X2 1.33573 5 X3 1.33435 5 
15.0 X4 1.33512 5 X5 1.33575 5 X6 1.33442 5 
20.0 X7 1.33503 5 X8 1.33574 5 X9 1.33439 5 
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Fig. 132 – 2.4% fuel lattice criticality during a FCB event on central channel 
considering occurrence of all phenomena, of channel voiding, of Doppler effect 
 
2.4 % Fuel: Reaction Rates and neutron flux tallying 
 
Reaction rates tallies were executed assessing the effects of the main phenomena. 
Results for runs Xi to X3 are given in Tab. 52 and Tab. 53 (see the previous 
paragraphs for the nomenclature and for details about calculation procedure), 
reporting tallies values for the central channel (blocked channel) and for the border 
channels of the lattice. The effects of parameters changes on the different tallies 
for runs X1, X2, X3 in comparison with run Xi is showed in Tab. 54. 
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Tab. 52 – 2.4% lattice fuel cells reaction rates and fluxes for runs Xi and X1  
Xi X1 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice Fuel 
2.4% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
4.05E-05 4.05E-05 3.53E-05 4.10E-05 
Sfission* F 
4.35E-06 
4.49E-05
4.35E-06 
4.49E-05
4.44E-06
3.98E-05
4.44E-06 
4.55E-05 
1.54E-05 1.54E-05 1.36E-05 1.56E-05 Sabsorption 
(fuel) *SF 
(excluding 
fission) 
1.18E-05 
2.72E-05
1.18E-05 
2.72E-05
1.14E-05
2.50E-05
1.21E-05 
2.77E-05 
2.22E-06 2.22E-06 3.11E-07 2.25E-06 Sabsorption 
(water) * F 1.46E-07 
2.37E-06
1.47E-07 
2.37E-06
2.72E-08
3.38E-07
1.50E-07 
2.40E-06 
2.82E-04 2.83E-04 2.77E-04 2.87E-04 
F(in fuel) 
6.07E-04 
8.90E-04
6.08E-04 
8.91E-04
6.62E-04
9.39E-04
6.20E-04 
9.06E-04 
2.19E-04 2.19E-04 2.11E-04 2.21E-04 Sscattering 
(graphite) * 
F 1.72E-04 
3.91E-04
1.72E-04 
3.91E-04
1.84E-04
3.94E-04
1.76E-04 
3.97E-04 
 
Tab. 53 – 2.4% lattice fuel cells reaction rates and fluxes for runs X2 and X3 
X2 X3 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice 
Fuel 2.4% 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.55E-05 4.11E-05 4.03E-05 4.05E-05 
Sfission * F 
4.44E-06 
3.99E-05
4.44E-06 
4.55E-05 
4.33E-06 
4.47E-05
4.35E-06 
4.48E-05 
1.37E-05 1.56E-05 1.54E-05 1.54E-05 Sabsorption 
(fuel) * F 
(excluding 
fission) 
1.11E-05 
2.48E-05
1.21E-05 
2.77E-05 
1.21E-05 
2.74E-05
1.18E-05 
2.72E-05 
3.12E-07 2.25E-06 2.22E-06 2.22E-06 Sabsorption 
(water) * F 2.72E-08 
3.39E-07
1.50E-07 
2.26E-06 
1.46E-07 
2.36E-06
1.47E-07 
2.37E-06 
2.77E-04 2.87E-04 2.82E-04 2.83E-04 
F (in fuel) 
6.64E-04 
9.41E-04
6.19E-04 
9.06E-04 
6.05E-04 
8.87E-04
6.08E-04 
8.91E-04 
2.11E-04 2.21E-04 2.19E-04 2.19E-04 Sscattering 
(graphite) * 
F 1.84E-04 
3.95E-04
1.76E-04 
3.97E-04 
1.72E-04 
3.91E-04
1.72E-04 
3.91E-04 
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Tab. 54 – 2.4% lattice fuel cells – Ratio of Tallies, % 
X1/Xi, % X2/Xi, % X3/Xi, % 
Central Border Central Border Central Border 
Th. Th. Th. Th. Th. Th. 
Ratios of 
Tallies -  
Lattice 
Fuel 
2.4% Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot.
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
-12.7 1.3 -12.5 1.3 -0.4 0.0 
Sfission * F 
2.1 
-11.3
2.1 
1.4 
2.2 
-11.0 
2.1 
1.4
-0.3 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-11.5 1.3 -11.3 1.3 -0.3 0.0 Sabsorption* 
F (fuel) -3.2 
-7.9 
2.4 
1.8 
-5.4 
-8.7 
2.4 
1.8
2.7 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-86.0 1.3 -86.0 1.3 -0.3 0.0 Sabsorption * 
F (water) -81.4 
-85.7
2.4 
1.4 
-81.4 
-85.7 
2.4 
1.4
-0.5 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.8 1.4 -2.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 F (in 
fuel) 8.9 
5.5 
1.9 
1.7 
9.3 
5.7 
1.8 
1.7
-0.4 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.8 1.0 -3.8 1.1 0.0 0.0 Sscattering * 
F 
(graphite) 6.9 
0.9 
2.4 
1.6 
7.1 
1.0 
2.4 
1.7
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
From to Tab. 52 to Tab. 54, the followings can be stated: 
• Central FC coolant overheating (run X2) is causing a large drop (-86%) in 
central FC of neutron absorption rates and a shift of the neutron energy 
spectrum toward higher energies (+7.1% for fast scattering reaction rates 
in central channel graphite and +9.3% increase of the fast flux). This 
causes an increase of neutron leakage from the central FC to the border 
FCs, a sensible reduction of the fissions and neutron absorption in the fuel 
of central FC (-11%). The reaction rates in the border FCs are instead 
increased of some percent by the neutron leakages from the central FC. 
• Central FC fuel overheating (run X3) is causing an increase of 1.0% in the 
neutron absorption rate. Border FCs are not perturbed by this 
phenomenon. 
• The results from the physical simulation of both effects (fuel and coolant 
overheating, run X1) are reported in the first column of Tab. 52 and Tab. 
54. The involved phenomena are the same as those reported in the 2.0% 
case analysis. The kinf resulted to be not affected by these phenomena, 
i.e., there is a very close balance between neutron absorption and neutron 
production . 
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2.4 % fuel lattice with 2.0 % fuel in the central channel : criticality calculations 
 
The purpose of this simulation was to simulate one of the possible zone 
configuration of an RBMK core. Today, the RBMK core is mostly composed by 
2.4% FCs and by few 2.0% FCs (e.g, a configuration for Smolensk-3 NPP core 
resulted in about 1522 channel with 2.4% fuel and just 48 channels with 2.0% fuel). 
The following model was considered: 
• Central FC with 2.0% fuel 
• Border elements of a 3x3 FC lattice with 2.4% fuel 
The results of criticality calculations are reported hereafter (see Tab. 55 and Fig. 
133).  
 
Tab. 55 – 2.4% fuel lattice w/ central 2.0% FC: criticality during a FCB event on 
central channel considering occurrence of all phenomena, of channel voiding, of 
Doppler effect 
System criticality Channel voiding Doppler Effect Transient 
Time (s) RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
RUN 
ID kinf s (pcm) 
RUN 
ID kinf 
s 
(pcm) 
0.0 Xi 1.32934 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8.0 X1 1.33021 5 X2 1.33068 5 X3 1.32862 5 
15.0 X4 1.33012 5 X5 1.33074 5 X6 1.32866 5 
20.0 X7 1.33004 5 X8 1.33068 5 X9 1.32857 5 
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Fig. 133 – 2.4% fuel lattice w/ central 2.0% FC: criticality during a FCB event on 
central channel considering occurrence of all phenomena, of channel voiding, of 
Doppler effect 
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2.4 % fuel lattice with 2.0 % fuel in the central channel : Reaction Rates and 
neutron flux tallying 
 
Reaction rates tallies were executed assessing the effects of the main phenomena. 
Results for runs Xi to X3 are given in Tab. 56 and Tab. 57 (see the section 
5.1.2.3.2 for the nomenclature and for details about calculation procedure), 
reporting tallies values for the central FC (blocked channel) and for the border FCs 
of the lattice. The effects of parameters changes on the different tallies for runs X1, 
X2, X3 in comparison with run Xi is showed in Tab. 58. 
 
Tab. 56 – 2.4% lattice fuel w/ 2.0% central FC: reaction rates and fluxes for runs Xi 
and X1 
Xi X1 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice FC 
2.4% - 
Central 
FC 2.0% Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.73E-05 4.07E-05 3.23E-05 4.13E-05 
Sfission * F 
3.71E-06 
4.10E-05
4.37E-06 
4.51E-05
3.81E-06 
3.62E-05
4.46E-06 
4.58E-05 
1.57E-05 1.55E-05 1.39E-05 1.57E-05 Sabsorption 
(fuel) * F 
(excluding 
fission) 
1.14E-05 
2.71E-05
1.18E-05 
2.73E-05
1.11E-05 
2.50E-05
1.21E-05 
2.78E-05 
2.40E-06 2.24E-06 3.36E-07 2.27E-06 Sabsorption 
(water) * F 1.44E-07 
2.54E-06
1.47E-07 
2.38E-06
2.70E-08 
3.63E-07
1.50E-07 
2.42E-06 
3.08E-04 2.84E-04 3.02E-04 2.88E-04 
F (in fuel) 
5.79E-04 
8.87E-04
6.12E-04 
8.96E-04
6.34E-04 
9.35E-04
6.23E-04 
9.11E-04 
2.24E-04 2.20E-04 2.16E-04 2.23E-04 Sscattering 
(graphite) 
*F 1.68E-04 
3.92E-04
1.72E-04 
3.93E-04
1.80E-04 
3.96E-04
1.76E-04 
3.99E-04 
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Tab. 57 – 2.4% lattice fuel w/ 2.0% central FC: reaction rates and fluxes for runs 
X2 and X3 
X2 X3 
Central Border Central Border 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Thermal 
TALLYING 
Lattice FC 
2.4% - 
Central 
FC 2.0% Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
Fast 
Total 
3.25E-05 4.13E-05 3.71E-05 4.07E-05 
Sfission * F 
3.82E-06 
3.63E-05
4.46E-06 
4.58E-05
3.70E-06 
4.08E-05
4.37E-06 
4.51E-05 
1.39E-05 1.57E-05 1.57E-05 1.55E-05 Sabsorption 
(fuel) * F 
(excluding 
fission) 
1.09E-05 
2.48E-05
1.21E-05 
2.78E-05
1.17E-05 
2.73E-05
1.18E-05 
2.73E-05 
3.38E-07 2.27E-06 2.39E-06 2.24E-06 Sabsorption 
(water) * F 2.71E-08 
3.65E-07
1.50E-07 
2.42E-06
1.43E-07 
2.53E-06
1.47E-07 
2.38E-06 
3.01E-04 2.88E-04 3.08E-04 2.84E-04 
F (in fuel) 
6.36E-04 
9.37E-04
6.23E-04 
9.11E-04
5.76E-04 
8.84E-04
6.12E-04 
8.96E-04 
2.16E-04 2.23E-04 2.23E-04 2.20E-04 Sscattering 
(graphite) * 
F 1.80E-04 
3.96E-04
1.76E-04 
3.99E-04
1.68E-04 
3.92E-04
1.72E-04 
3.93E-04 
 
Tab. 58 – 2.4% lattice fuel cell w/ 2.0% central FC: Ratio of Tallies, % 
X1/Xi, % X2/Xi, % X3/Xi, % 
Central Border Central Border Central Border 
Th. Th. Th. Th. Th. Th. 
Ratios of 
Tallies -  
Lattice 
FC 2.4% - 
central FC 
2.0% Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot.
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast
Tot.
Fast 
Tot. 
Fast 
Tot. 
-13.2 1.3 -12.9 1.3 -0.5 0.0 
Sfission * F 
2.7 
-11.8
2.1 
1.4 
2.9 
-11.4
2.1 
1.4 
-0.3 
-0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-11.9 1.3 -11.6 1.3 -0.4 0.0 Sabsorption * 
F (fuel) -2.4 
-7.9 
2.3 
1.7 
-4.6 
-8.7 
2.3 
1.8 
2.5 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
-86.0 1.3 -85.9 1.3 -0.3 0.0 Sabsorption * 
F (water) -81.2 
-85.7
2.3 
1.4 
-81.2 
-85.7
2.3 
1.4 
-0.5 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
-2.0 1.4 -2.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 
F (in fuel) 
9.5 
5.5 
1.8 
1.6 
9.9 
5.7 
1.8 
1.6 
-0.5 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.4 1.1 -3.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 Sscattering * F 
(graphite) 6.9 
1.0 
2.3 
1.6 
7.2 
1.1 
2.3 
1.6 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
From Tab. 56 to Tab. 58 the followings can be stated: 
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• the involved phenomena are the same as for the other cases analyzed 
(see 2.0% and 2.4% lattice case analyses); this configuration allows a 
stronger hardening of the flux (+9.5% compared to +8.9% for the 2.0% and 
2.4% fuel) that is reflected in a greater decrease of the fissions in the 
central FC (-11.8% versus -11.3% for the other cases) and of the thermal 
absorption (-11.9% versus -11.4/-11.5% for the other cases); on the other 
hand, fast neutron fission are increased more than in the other cases 
(+2.7% versus +2.1%). 
• the system kinf increased more than for the 2.0% fuel lattice case (+87 pcm 
versus +38 pcm). This could be explained by the higher enrichment of the 
fuel lattice considered in this case. 
 
5.1.2.3.5. Conclusions 
Criticality and reaction rates analyses of a FC blockage accident were performed, 
deriving boundary conditions and main parameters changes by a previously 
executed RELAP5-3D calculation. It was found thatt during such type of accident 
the fission reaction rates were significantly reduced (average of -11%) in the FC 
where the blockage was occurring.  
This was due to: 
• the increased neutron leakage towards the other un-perturbed FCs; this 
phenomenon was caused by the shift of the neutron energy spectrum 
towards epithermal-fast regions (flux “hardening”) as a consequence of the 
coolant overheating and density reduction; 
• the increased neutron absorption by Doppler effect in the overheated fuel 
of the blocked FC. 
 
The other important outcome of these calculations was the estimation of the 
neighboring channels behavior; because of the increased neutron leakage from the 
blocked FC, all the reaction rates in these un-perturbed FCs are increased by 1-
2%, thus not producing any relevant effects of safety concern.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that these calculations reported here were performed 
assuming fresh fuel (i.e., no presence of Plutonium was considered). Therefore, 
further MCNP calculations should consider, through the use of appropriate 
depletion codes (e.g., ORIGEN code), the effects of actinides and fission products. 
Other improvements could be obtained by the modeling of the Additional Absorber 
also. 
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5.1.3. LOCA events 
5.1.3.1. CPS LOCA 
 
The CPS is cooled by a low pressure loop independent from the MCC. However 
leakages from the loop may occur. This justifies the analysis of the CPS-LOCA 
event. The main purpose for the analysis is the calculation of the overall core 
power response. 
It was supposed that the initiating event was the rupture of the CPS cooling system 
collector and that the voiding of the CR channels occur in 40 seconds (see Fig. 
138). This last assumption is considered conservative [81]. 
The time trend of the main events is: 
1) 0.0sec - onset of the CPS LOCA 
2) 24.5 sec – AZ scram signal for reactor power equal to 110% of Nominal 
Power (Fig. 134) 
3) 50.0 sec – voiding of the CPS LOCA completed (Fig. 138) 
 
The power surge in the FC is roughly the same (Fig. 135). Because the actuation 
of AZ scram signal, the fuel clad temperatures at the hot spots is not of safety 
concern (Fig. 137). 
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Fig. 134 – Reactor Power 
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Fig. 135 – Power in FC of 11th GDH of right MCC part 
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Fig. 136 – Equivalent Mass Flowrate in FC of 11th GDH of right MCC part 
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Fig. 137 – Hot Spot Clad Temperature in FC 214, 259, 265, 669 
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Fig. 138 – Void fraction in CPS Cooling Channel 
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5.1.3.2. GDH LOCA (rupture after the GDH check valve) 
  
The main purpose of the analysis of the GDH LOCA simulation is the evaluation of 
the overall MCC response with main consideration to the core power and the 
demonstration of the capabilities of the adopted code system to deal with this 
event. However, this even is not the most severe LOCA. The event is originated by 
the break of one GDH, with breaking occurring after the GDH check valve. 
Conditions for scram occurrence are the same as in the previous sections. 
 
The ‘standard’ TH and 3D NK nodalization was developed in order to investigate 
the effects on the all channels of the affected GDH (see Fig. 67 and Fig. 68). 
The temporal development of the transient resulted to be: 
1) 0 sec. – onset of the break; 
2) 0.4 sec – onset of the SCV closure  
3) 1.6 sec – AZ scram signal – insertion of MCR and FASS in the core 
a. Insertion of all MCR with a speed of 50 cm/s 
b. Insertion of all Safety Rods with a speed of 350 cm/s 
 
Immediately after the GDH break, flow rates of FC connected to the affected GDH, 
revert their flow directions (see Fig. 140 and Fig. 141). Coolant flows into reactor 
compartment from the PH and from the DS connected to the FC of the affected 
GDH (Fig. 142). Due to power decrease following AZ activation and flow reverse, 
the void fraction at the exit of the accident FC’s decrease firstly because of 
saturated water delivery from DS and then grows up to 1.0 after complete DS 
depletion (Fig. 145). At the same time pressure decrease in FC’s, results in 
channels’ voiding, in deterioration of heat removal from fuel rod surfaces (Fig. 146 
to Fig. 150) and in void fraction growth at the entrance of the accident FC’s (Fig. 
144). The clad temperature is decreased thanks to the combined effects of the 
power decrease caused by the scram and thanks to the steam flow coming from 
DS. In Fig. 151 it is possible to observe that the PT temperature trends are not of 
safety concern 
 
Decrease of full reactor power to 30% Nном occurs quickly after AZ signal, therefore 
closure of the MCP valve plates is actuated in the NPP. Nevertheless, as Russian 
calculation demonstrated, MCP flowrate increases for a while because the 
reduction of the total hydraulic MCC resistance for the leak opening. At the end of 
calculation the pressure in the intact GDH of the left half starts to decrease, 
causing left half MCP degradation due to cavitations. 
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Fig. 139 – Reactor Power 
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Fig. 140 – Mass Flow rate in affected Channels 214, 259, 265 
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Fig. 141 – Mass Flow rate in affected Channels 669, 175, 244 
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Fig. 142 – Mass Flowrate at GDH rupture 
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Fig. 143 – Imposed Mass flow rate in damaged MCC part 
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Fig. 144 – Void Fraction at Core Inlet 
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Fig. 145 – Void Fraction at core outlet 
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Fig. 146 – Clad Temperature in FC 214 
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Fig. 147 – Clad Temperature in FC 259 
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Fig. 148 – Clad Temperature in FC 265 
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Fig. 149 – Clad Temperature in FC 669 
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Fig. 150 – Clad Temperature in FC 244 
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Fig. 151 – PT Hot Spots temperatures 
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5.2. Conclusion 
A wide spectrum of  combined 3D NK TH analyses by the RELAP5-3D code were 
executed. The classification of the accidents was the following: 
• Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA): CR withdrawal and CR group 
withdrawal 
• Decrease of coolant event: Single FC blockage, GDH blockage 
• LOCA: GDH LOCA, CPS cooling circuit LOCA 
All of the considered accidents were DBA, with the exception of CPS cooling circuit 
LOCA. The results showed that in the case of CR withdrawal and CR group 
withdrawal any safety threshold was overcome as well as during the GDH LOCA. 
This because of some intrinsic good qualities of the RBMK design, e.g.: 
• In the case of GDH LOCA, a large water inventory is available in the DS, 
allowing a cooling by a backflow of the fuel rods 
• CR are located in a circuit that is physically separated from the Primary 
Side. Therefore, they are operating in a low pressure environment (i.e, 
namely atmospheric pressure) that excludes their rapid ejection, as in the 
case, e.g., of a PWR 
On the other hand, two safety barriers are lost during the FC blockage event and 
during the GDH blockage. Fuel rods and PT are overheating during the FC 
blockage, leading to the release of radioactivity into the ALS. The Monte Carlo 
analyses allowed to analyze the physic of the neutronics phenomena involved 
during a FC voiding (increased leakages, Doppler effect). The  
 
GDH blockage is an accident leading to a sharp coolant flow reduction in all the 
channels (generally 42 FC) of the affected GDH. Flow oscillations are induced and 
in some FC this could lead to PT and fuel rods overheating, with their consequent 
disruptions and release of radioactivity in the MCC and the ALS if any scram signal 
is actuated in time. The modeling of all the single FC connected to the affected 
GDH is mandatory in order to derive acceptable conclusions for a licensing safety 
analyses [82]. 
 
Last, the CPS cooling circuit LOCA is a BDBA accident leading to a rapid insertion 
of positive reactivity. The installation of dedicated scram rods (the safety rods) not 
affected by the LOCA is avoiding dangerous consequences for the reactor. 
  209 
6. THE EXTREME CASE 
6.1. Introduction 
A comprehensive safety analysis of the RBMK system should not preclude the 
calculation of events occurring at low power. This because of the particular 
features of this reactor that can lead to significant changes of reactivity coefficients 
and in some particular situations to the neutronic decoupling of some zones of the 
core (see Chapter 2 of this document for a description of the neutronics 
characteristics of RBMK). The notorious event of Chernobyl sadly demonstrated 
the vulnerability and the instability of these systems when brought to low power.  
 
However, it should be stressed that after that event, extensive hardware and 
procedure modifications were implemented in order to minimize or avoid some 
dangerous situations. The reference RBMK unit studied during this PhD thesis 
(Smolensk-3 NPP) already included some important changes that enhanced its 
stability at low power (e.g., U enrichment at 2.4%, higher number of AA, the new 
design of CR). Nowadays, in order to further improve the reactor safety levels (e.g., 
reducing the positive void effect), all RBMK in Russia operates with fuel having an 
enrichment of 2.8%, in conjunction with the use of Erbium as burnable poison. 
Thus, the analyses that are showed here applies to an intermediate step of the 
evolution of the RBMK configuration. 
 
6.2. The Chernobyl event 
We reported here a brief overview of the Chernobyl accident, in order to get the 
reader familiar with the quite complex chains of events that caused the reactor 
destruction. The main source document for the reconstruction of this event was the 
IAEA INSAG-7 report [83]. Other sources were also [84], [85]. 
 
The main aspects that differed the Chernobyl-4 from the Smolensk-3 here 
analyzed are the following: 
• fuel enrichment at 2.0% instead of 2.4%; 
• small number of Additional Absorber,  
• As a consequence of the previous bullets, a greater void coefficient of 
reactivity (total vaporization of the coolant was estimated in +4-5 b) 
• Different design of CPS. In particular: 
o MCR with a shorter graphite follower that allowed to some water to 
be present on the bottom of the CR channels when the CR itself 
was completely extracted (see Fig. 152) 
o Greater time for the insertion of CR (18 seconds) 
 
The accident occurred during the execution of a turbine trip test at low power, in 
the first hours of the 26 April 1986. The test was conducted in order demonstrate 
the capability of the turbo-generator to produce enough power, during the run-
down, for the unit’s internal requirements. In particular, the test should have had 
demonstrate the capability to power the MCP and the FW pumps. 
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The run-down concept was accepted and included in the design of NPP equipped 
with RBMK reactors. For example, it was reported in the Technical Safety Report of 
Smolensk that “.[..] during a DBA involving the total loss of power for the unit’s 
internal requirements, cooling water should be fed to the damaged part by FW 
pumps powered by the turbo-generator rundown” [86]. 
 
This kind of test was already performed at other RBMK units, considering it as a 
merely electrical test. Instead, what resulted was that these tests should have had 
to be considered as complex unit tests, and should have had involve the General 
Designer, the Chief Design Engineer, the Scientific Manager and the Regulatory 
Body. 
 
The Chernobyl 4 test differed from the other tests and that contributed to the 
accident were the following conditions: 
• Reduced power (200 MWth instead of the prescribed 700 MWth) 
• Extreme Xenon poisoning of the core: the test was delayed by the electric 
grid manager and a wrong operator action caused a sudden reactor power 
reduction (to 30 MWth) for several minutes (see Tab. 59)  
• Complete extraction of several MCR, with consequent reduction of ORM 
• 4 MCP in operations per side, with a decreased level of subcooling at the 
inlet of the core  
 
 
Fig. 152 – MCR configuration of Chernobyl-4 reactor 
The sequence of the events for the Chernobyl-4 accident, as it was recorded by the 
plant instrumentation, is given in report Tab. 59. This was used as reference for the 
transient reconstruction (see the following paragraph). 
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Tab. 59 – Chernobyl-4 accident, sequence of the events 
Time Event 
25 April 1986 
01:06 Start of reactor power reduction; ORM equals 31 MCRs 
03:45 Start of replacement of the nitrogen—helium gas mixture with nitrogen in the gas cooling system for the reactor graphite stack 
03:47 Reactor thermal power is 1600 MW 
from 04:13  
until 12:36 
Sequential measurement of the control system parameters and 
vibration characteristics of turbo-generator No. 7 and turbo-
generator No. 8 at constant thermal power of 1500 MW 
07:10 ORM equals 13.2 manual control rods 
13:05 Disconnection of turbo-generator No. 7 from the system 
14:00 Disconnection of the ECCS from the multipass forced circulation circuit (MFCC) 
14:00 Postponement of testing programme requested by Kiev power grid controller 
15:20 ORM equals 16.8 manual control rods 
18:50 Power supply to auxiliary equipment not involved in the tests switched to working transformer No. T6 
23:10 Power reduction continued, ORM equals 26 manual control rods 
26 April 1986 
00:05 Reactor thermal power was 720 MW 
00:28 
At reactor thermal power of about 500 MW transfer made from 
the local to global main range automatic power control 
(automatic power controllers Nos. 1 and 2). During the transfer 
there was a reduction in thermal power to 30 MW (neutron 
power to zero), which was not envisaged in the testing 
programme. Measures to increase the power were taken 
00:34:03 Emergency fluctuations of water level in steam separator drums 
00:36:24 The EPS trip point in response to a pressure drop in the steam separator drums was changed from 55 to 50 kg/cm2 
from 00:39:32 
until 00:43:55 
Diagnostic Parameter Recording Program (DREG) did not work 
Personnel blocked the EPS signal which would have shut down 
the two turbo-generators 
from 00:41  
until 01:16 
Disconnection of turbo-generator No. 8 from the system to 
determine the vibration characteristics during rundown 
01:03 Reactor thermal power increased to 200 MW and stabilized 
01:03 Seventh main circulating pump was put into operation (MCP No. 12) 
01:07 Eighth MCP was put into operation (MCP No. 22) 
from 01:12:10 
until 01:18:49 
DREG program did not work 
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Tab. 59(cont.)  – Chernobyl-4 accident, sequence of the events 
Time Event 
26 April 1986 
from 01:19:44 
until 01:19:57 
'One overcompensation upwards' signal on 
01:22:30 
The parameters were recorded on magnetic tape (calculations 
were performed at the Smolensk plant after the accident using 
the PRIZMA program; ORM proved to be equal to 8 manual 
control rods) 
01:23:04 
'Oscilloscope is on' signal was given; emergency stop valves of 
turbo-generator No. 8 were closed. The rundown was started of 
four MCPs: MCPs Nos. 13 and 23 (section 8RA) and MCPs 
Nos. 14 and 24 (section 8RB) 
01:23:10 DBA button was pressed 
01:23:30 'One overcompensation upwards' signal went off (it lasted 3 min 33 s) 
01:23:40 EPS-S button was pressed; the EPS rods and manual control rods started to move down into the core 
01:23:43 
Power excursion rate emergency protection system signals on; 
excursion period: less than 20 s; emergency power protection 
system signals actuated; power exceeded 530 MW(th) 
01:23:46 Disconnection of the first pair of MCPs being 'run down' 
01:23:46.5 Disconnection of the second pair of MCPs being 'run down' 
01:23:47 
Sharp reduction in the flow rates (by 40%) of MCPs not involved 
in the rundown test (MCPs Nos. 11, 12, 21 and 22) and 
unreliable flow rate readings of the MCPs taking part in the 
rundown (MCPs Nos. 13, 14, 23 and 24); sharp increase of 
pressure and in the water level in the SDs; signals 'failures of 
measuring systems' from both main range automatic controllers 
(automatic power controllers Nos. 1 and 2) 
01:23:48 
Restoration of flow rates of MCPs not involved in the rundown 
test to values close to the initial ones; restoration of flow rates to 
15% below the initial rate for the MCPs on the left side which 
were being 'run down'; restoration of flow rates to 10% below the 
initial rate for MCP No. 24; unreliable readings for MCP No. 23; 
further increase of pressure in die steam separator drums (left 
side 75.2 kg/cm2, right side 88.2 kg/cm2) and of water level in 
the steam separator drums; triggering of fast acting systems for 
dumping of steam to condensers Nos. 1 and 2 
01:23:49 
Emergency protection signal 'Pressure increase in reactor space 
(rupture of a fuel channel)'; 'No voltage — 48 V signal (no power 
supply to the servo-drive mechanisms of the EPS); 'Failure of 
the actuators of automatic power controllers Nos. 1 and 2' 
signals. From a note in the chief reactor control engineer's 
operating log: "01:24: Severe shocks; the RCPS rods stopped 
moving before they reached the lower limit stop switches; power 
switch of clutch mechanisms is off” 
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From the review of data and from the successive simulations it was deduced that 
the main causes of the accidents were the followings. The reactor, through the 
series of events that preceded that test, was brought to an instable point, 
characterized by: 
• Complete extraction of most of the MCRs, with consequent reduction of the 
ORM 
• Xenon poisoning of the core with axial flux characterized by a concave 
shape, with two humps, one in the bottom and one in the top of the core 
(see Fig. 153) 
• Low level in SD 
• 4 MCP per side in operation instead of two per side 
• Coolant temperature close to saturation at the core inlet 
 
 
Fig. 153 – Chernobyl axial distribution of the thermal neutron flux density at h.22:00 
(curve 3) and h. 00:30 (curve 4) before the accident [83] 
The actuation of the scram caused a positive reactivity insertion because of the 
particular design of the MCR (see Fig. 152). A further positive reactivity insertion 
was introduced by the coolant vaporization bringing the reactor to a power 
excursion that was anymore possible to compensate by the CPS. The rupture of 
several fuel channels with a consequent cavity pressurization, top reactor plate 
movement and air ingress into the reactor cavity caused several violent chemical 
reactions (e.g., C+O2, H2+O, C+H2O, see [85]) that led to an explosion and a 
destruction of the reactor. 
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6.3. Literature review 
 
The problem of simulation of the Chernobyl-4 accident was immediately addressed 
in the aftermath of the event. Unfortunately, at that time, coupled codes 
calculations were not available because of the lack of sufficiently robust and 
validated codes and because of the lack of computational power for dealing with 
simulations of such a large system.  
Therefore the analyses were focused on calculating the thermal-hydraulics 
phenomena with simplified 0-D neutron kinetics model. An example of these works 
can be found in [87]. Neutronics calculations were instead effectuated using nodal 
codes with simplified TH models [88], [93] or performing static analyses using 
Monte Carlo simulations [91]. 
 
The fields of investigation were the followings: 
• Assessment of the positive scram reactivity 
• Assessment of the reactivity introduced by the core voiding 
• Calculations of the plant dynamics, including MCP cavitations 
 
The outcomes from all these investigations demonstrated the positive scram 
effects introduced by the old design of MCR (see Fig. 152). Different axial power 
shapes and different burnup distribution were investigated. The burnup distribution 
did not affect so much the positive scram effect. What was found to be an 
important parameter was the flux axial shape: concave axial shape (neutronic 
decoupling) was found to be the main cause of the positive reactivity insertion by 
scram. On the other hand, convex axial shapes resulted in a negative reactivity 
insertion by scram [89], [90]. Reactivity insertion values were estimated to be super 
prompt critical (r> 1 b, values between 1-1.25) [91].  
The core voiding, instead, was estimated to cause a greater reactivity insertion, 
from 2 b up to 5.6 b [95]. The causes of the core voiding, including the pump run-
down effects and the eventual pumps cavitations were also investigated by several 
TH codes [92]. The conclusions were that the main contributions to the core 
voiding were given by the pump rundown and not by pumps cavitation. 
 
 
6.4. Low Power analyses – the model upgrade 
 
A transient like the Chernobyl 4 was simulated using the developed Smolensk-3 
model. In order to minimize the differences between the simulation and the 
accident, it was decided to start the calculations from the power reduction 
sequence (see Tab. 59, h.23.10 of 25 April 1986). These required the upgrade of 
the RELAP5-3D model with the inclusion of Xenon microscopic cross sections and 
of a power control system for operate the reactor power descent according to the 
available data. 
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6.4.1. Xenon modeling 
The capability to calculate a low power scenario could imply the code capability in 
handling a Xenon transient. A recent version of the RELAP5-3D code (e.g., 
RELAP5-3D v.2.4.2) allows modeling the microscopic cross section of Xenon and 
its effects on different elementary fuel cells. In order to speed up calculations it was 
assumed an average value of the microscopic cross section for all the fuel cell 
type, independently of the fuel cell burnup value. 
Thus, RELAP5-3D code calculated the steady-state Xenon number densities and 
upgraded it during the transient calculations (e.g., see Fig. 157). 
 
6.4.2. Power Control modeling 
A simplified RBMK power control system was developed and implemented. The 
objective was to create a control logic able to move a CR bank and to obtain the 
desired power history. The system should also be able to operate a scram signal 
and to compensate automatically the Xenon build-up or reduction. The scheme of 
the control logic is given in Fig. 154.   
 
REACTOR 
POWER (rkotpow)
PROGRAMMED
POWER (cntrlvar)
S
+
-
ε VCR = k*ε Lag
CR pos. (i) = CR pos(i-1) + VCR*∆t
 
Fig. 154 – CR bank 2 actuation logic 
The control logic is generating a signal operating on the CR bank velocity, with 
imposed limits for the minimum and maximum CR extraction as well as limits for 
the minimum and maximum velocity. An external general table gives as input the 
desired power history (power versus time). The control logic is calculating the error 
between the desired power and the actual reactor power and using this error for 
generating a proportional signal for the calculation of the velocity of the CR. A lag is 
used for assuring the control system stability.  
 
Therefore the CR positions are updated at each time step calculating the obtained 
CR velocity (see Fig. 154).   
 
The control logic and its interaction with Xenon build-up was thoroughly tested in 
several conditions and on different reactor core design (VVER-440) [96].For the 
Smolensk-3 reactor, the developed CR logic was applied to a group of 22 MCR, all 
inserted at the same depth. This assured enough reactivity for the Xenon transient.  
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6.5. The Power-reduction transient 
In order to reproduce as well as possible the status of the Chernobyl-4 reactor 
before the accident, a preliminary power-reduction transient was executed, using 
as imposed events those reported in Tab. 59. The transient was aimed to obtain 
the following reactor core conditions: 
• Power reduction from 1600 MWth to 200 MWth 
• Xenon build-up 
• 3 MCP per side running in stable conditions 
• The maximum number of MCRs extracted (reduced ORM) 
• A stable level in the SDs 
 
Reactor power was reduced from 50% of Nominal Power (i.e., 1600 MWth) to 
roughly 500 MW in 90 minutes (see Tab. 59 and Fig. 155). Then, after a sudden 
power reduction to low power values (50 MWth) for 5 minutes, the reactor power 
was increased and stabilized around 200 MWth in half an hour. 
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Fig. 155 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Reconstructed-
imposed reactor power before the event start (t = 1240 s in the scale above)  
The MCRs operated by the power control system were at the beginning inserted 
and then slowly extracted for compensating Xenon buildup. At around time 
t=+4680 sec. (corresponding to the 00:30 of the 26 April 1986), they were 
completely inserted, together with the Safety Rods, in order to simulate the abrupt 
power reduction that occurred during the Chernobyl-4 accident and the further 
Xenon concentration increase (see Fig. 156 and Fig. 157).  
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Fig. 156 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: MCR operated by 
power control logic - insertion 
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Fig. 157 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Xenon buildup 
The power was then stabilized at 200 MWth in half an hour by extracting again 
Safety Rods, the MCR operated by the power control system and other 10 MCRs 
already completely inserted (see Fig. 155 and Fig. 156). 3 MCP per side were in 
operation, in stable conditions. This was achieved by increasing the pressure 
losses at the MCP exit, simulating the throttling of the regulation valve (see Fig. 
158).  
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Fig. 158 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: MCPs mass flow, 
RHS and LHS 
A sufficient water level in the SDs was also achieved (Fig. 159) by some manual 
FW injections in order to avoid the risk of MCPs cavitation (Fig. 160). 
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Fig. 159 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: SD liquid level 
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Fig. 160 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: FW mass flow per 
SD, LHS and RHS  
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Fig. 161 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Void fraction at the 
core outlet, right and left side 
The obtained reactor state was then used for the transient Chernobyl-like accident 
simulation. 
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6.6. The “Chernobyl-like” event 
The sequence of events that were implemented in the RELAP5-3D code for 
reproducing the Chernobyl-4 event are given in Tab. 60. The correspondence 
between the RELAP5-3D transient time and the accident sequence of the events is 
given. 
Tab. 60 – Sequence of the events (actual versus reconstructed) 
Time transient 
(26 April 1986) 
Time (s) 
RELAP5-3D ACCIDENT EVENTS RELAP EVENTS 
1.02.00 0. Thermal Power Stabilized at 200 MW 
Thermal Power 
Stabilized at 200 MW 
1.03.00 60. MCP-7 ON Opening Isolation Valves of MCP-63 
1.03.05 65.  MCP-63 ON 
1.06.00 240. FW Adjustment N/A 
1.06.55 295  Opening Isolation Valves of MCP-563 
1.07.00 300 MCP-8 ON MCP-563 ON 
1.09.00 420 FW transient values (Reduction) 
FW at 90 Ton/h for 
RHS; FW at 180 
Ton/h for LHS 
1.18.52 1012 DBA Signal N/A 
1.22.30 1230   
1.23.04 1264 
Test Beginning 
Closure of SV on 
Right side of MCC, 
rundown of 4 MCP, 2 
per side 
SV 397 Closed; 
MCPs 33,43,533,543 
rundown 
1.23.40 1300 
EPS5 Button 
pressed;  
CRs Inserted 
Scram by MCR#1 
and Safety CRs 
1.23.43 1303   
1.23.47 1307   
1.23.48 1308   
1.23.49 1309   
1.24.00 1320 Reactor Explosion  
1.28.04 1564  End Of Calculation 
 
In the following pages, the main results  are reported. A couple of sensitivities were 
also run. In the first one a positive reactivity perturbation was introduced at the 
bottom of the reactor core by the extraction of the shortened CR, thus  reproducing 
a key phenomenon of the Chernobyl transient. In the second sensitivity, no scram 
signal was activated in order to assess the dynamic of the plant. 
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6.6.1. Reference Transient 
In the following figures the trends of the main parameters are reported. The reactor 
power before the test is kept stable at 200 MWth by the power control system. CR 
are compensating Xenon buildup (see Fig. 162 and Fig. 163). 
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Fig. 162 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Reactor Power 
before the Test 
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Fig. 163 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: CR before the test. 
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At 1.03.05 and 1.07.00 two MCP, one per side, are turned on (Fig. 164). This is 
increasing the mass flow rate per each circuit, redistributing the mass flow rate in 
each MCP (Fig. 164 and Fig. 165). 
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Fig. 164 - Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: MCP activation 
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Fig. 165 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Left and Right side 
Mass Flow (Kg/s) 
At 1.09.00 a FW perturbation is operated, reducing the mass flow on the right side 
of the MCC (Fig. 166). 
  223 
0 200. 400. 600. 800. 1000. 1200.
Time (s)
-10.0
0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
M
as
s 
Fl
ow
 (K
g/
s)
WinGraf 4.1 - 11-19-2008
XXX CH1d mflowj382000000
X X
X X X X
YYY CH1d mflowj432000000
Y Y Y Y
ZZZ CH1d mflowj882000000
Z
VVV CH1d mflowj932000000
 
Fig. 166 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: FW perturbation 
At 1.23.04 the test began, with the closure of stop valve for the RHS SD. Power 
control system is deactivated and at the same time, the rundown of two MCPs per 
side is operated (Fig. 167). 
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Fig. 167 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: MCPs speed 
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Fig. 168 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: MCP flow rates 
600.0 700.0 800.0 900.0 1000.0 1100.0 1200.0 1300.0 1400.0 1500.0 1600.0
Time (s)
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
M
as
s 
Fl
ow
 (K
g/
s)
WinGraf 4.1 - 11-19-2008
XXX CH1d left
X
X
X
XXXX
X
X
X
X
X
XX
YYY CH1d right
Y
Y
YYYY
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
YY
 
Fig. 169 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Circuit Flow Rate 
The reduction in the circuit mass flow rates (Fig. 168 and Fig. 169) is causing a 
void increase that is leading to a power reduction. This is consistent with the new 
neutronics characteristics of the RBMK system (see Chapter 2), because of the 
negative void coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
  225 
1000.0 1050.0 1100.0 1150.0 1200.0 1250.0 1300.0 1350.0 1400.0
Time (s)
.03
.05
.08
.10
.13
.15
.18
.20
.23
.25
Vo
id
 F
ra
ct
io
n
WinGraf 4.1 - 11-19-2008
XXX CH1d voidg307200000
XX
X
X
X
XXXX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
YYY CH1d voidg308200000
Y
Y
Y
YYYY
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
ZZZ CH1d voidg320200000
ZZZZZ
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
VVV CH1d voidg322200000
VVV
V
V
V
V
V
V
JJJ CH1d voidg323200000
J
J
J
J
J
JJ
HHH CH1d voidg807200000
H
H
H
H
### CH1d voidg808200000
#
OOO CH1d voidg809200000
AAA CH1d voidg810200000
 
Fig. 170 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Void Fraction at 
core exit during the transient 
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Fig. 171 – Simulation of Chernobyl event in the Smolensk NPP: Power during the 
transient 
The transient is then terminated by the actuation of the scram signal. The new 
configuration of the MCR is anymore introducing any positive reactivity, thus 
leading the reactor in safe shutdown conditions. 
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6.6.1.1. Positive Reactivity Perturbation 
This sensitivity was run in order to assess the effects of a positive reactivity 
insertion during the first phase of the test. This was caused in Chernobyl by the 
particular design of the MCR (see Fig. 152). In the current configuration of the 
RBMK, positive reactivity could be introduced in the bottom of the reactor by the 
Shortened CR only. These CR are not moved during any transient. Therefore, 
these results should be looked as a pure sensitivity test that should not happen 
under any circumstance during the real plant operation. Results of calculations with 
extraction speed of 0.5, 0.25 and 0.1 m/s are given in Fig. 172 and Fig. 173. 
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Fig. 172 – Sensitivity with introduction of additional positive reactivity: Reactor 
Power 
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Fig. 173 – Sensitivity with introduction of additional positive reactivity: Core 
Reactivity  
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6.6.1.2. No Scram actuation 
This sensitivity considered the execution of the test without the intervention of any 
scram signal. The power, after the reduction caused by the core voiding, was easily 
controlled by the power control system. 
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Fig. 174 – Reactor Power without scram actuation 
 
 
6.6.2. Conclusions 
The calculations showed that the neutronics and hardware modifications 
introduced after Chernobyl accident were effective in avoiding such kind of events.  
In particular, the two main phenomena that triggered the reactor explosion at that 
time were eliminated. In fact : 
• the new design of MCR avoid the possibility to obtain concave flux shapes 
and a positive reactivity insertion during the first phase of the scram; 
• the elimination of the positive void coefficients avoids the possibility to get 
a power excursions when operating the reactor at low power, i.e., with a 
reduced margin of coolant subcooling 
 
The upgrades that were introduced during the recent years on the RBMK (e.g., the 
increase of U enrichment at 2.8%, the cluster MCR) and that were not present in 
the Smolensk-3 configuration analyzed here, are further increasing the safety 
levels of these type of reactors for transients like the Chernobyl-4 one. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The application of a “chain of codes” to the analysis of transients in RBMK 
Smolensk 3 NPP aimed at investigating coupled 3D NK TH phenomena in the core 
has been presented. The capabilities of the adopted codes to handle the resulting 
complex scenarios have been demonstrated, though it was not the purpose of the 
PhD activity to perform licensing calculations. 
 
The key conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
 
a) a pioneering application of the chain of codes RELAP5-3D-
HELIOS/DRAGON-MCNP5 to the RBMK safety technology has been 
successfully effectuated; 
b) detailed input decks for RBMK system have been developed for the 
coupled codes and are available to the GRNSPG/UNIPI. In the case of 
RELAP5-3D, the nodalization includes up to 4000 hydraulic nodes, 50000 
meshes for conduction heat transfer and about 40000 meshes for the 
neutron kinetics model; 
c) problems were founds in calculating the correct values of void coefficients 
using both deterministic neutron transport codes DRAGON and HELIOS. 
The results showed a sensible under-estimation of the void reactivity. 
Calculations by the Monte Carlo code MCNP5 was instead not affected by 
this problem. The weight of this problem on the system code calculation 
uncertainties should be evaluated in future works; 
d) a key identified problem (confirming what found for TH analysis of Ignalina, 
see [97]) in case of GDH-Blockage event, was the (calculated) occurrence 
of inlet flow oscillations in affected FC. This caused temperature 
excursions in some FC bundles and can be the precursor of severe core 
damage;  
e) mild and controllable power excursions were calculated in the case of 
spurious withdrawal of single and of bank-of CR (CR-withdrawal and CR-
group withdrawal, respectively); 
f) the CPS-LOCA event brings to scram caused by high average core power 
and safety functions of the system are not challenged with main concern to 
SD pressure and rod surface temperatures;  
g) The analysis of the single FC-Blockage event confirmed that the affected 
rod bundle power tends to decrease following the lack of cooling event. 
This is due to the Doppler effect and to the increased neutron leakages 
that overpasses the effect of loosing coolant. Several calculations for this 
kind of transient were also run by the use of MCNP5 code. The influence of 
3D NK in predicting the overall system performance following individual 
channel blockage is negligible. Namely the power generated in the affected 
channel does not increase, rather a decrease has been calculated;  
h) A detailed simulation of the Chernobyl-type accident was performed. This 
kind of analyses required the integration of a suitable Xenon cross section 
model in RELAP5-3D and the implementation of a simplified power control 
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system. The results showed that the Smolensk-3 configuration of RBMK 
was safe also during this low power test, avoiding the positive reactivity 
excursion that led the Chernobyl reactor to a destruction. 
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